銅鑼灣來台灣了，六四晚會被禁了
一切又回到了那一天
一切又來到了這一天
　　　
　　　
如果對於明天還有要求
　　　──香港 2014 – 2017
　　

……幻燈暗，初夏的維多利亞公園，六四晚會閉幕前下了一場雨，淋壞了原該播放「海闊天空」的音響器材。南中國海的晚風，輕搖二十萬港人的沉默。彷彿Beyond是低聲在說：來。閉上眼，我告訴你關於時間的知識。
　　
維港的潮水強忍了一刻，又復往前。
　　
今年七月，在北京人大「釋法」的背書下，香港政府先後DQ（Disqualify）了六名在宣示時「不符程序」的本土派立法會議士。港人認為爭不了普選制度的香港，連同其賴以為生的司法獨立、法制基礎，如今也終於動搖了。
　　
再回到二零一四十月，秋涼的政府大樓外廣場，學生們投影著來自台灣、日本、中國年輕人的加油文字，在此前，市民已佔領了香港行政中樞中環。我們穿過睡袋、零食、帳篷的天橋，背包堆成的街壘，看一隊便裝男子，手持不透明提袋，推開零星抗議者，在港警護送下，不設防快速潛進政府大樓──也許五分鐘後就是掃射，流彈、摺曲的時空、西環的坦克……
　　
但一切都沒有發生。像一個遊戲 Bug，這宛若真空的異常寂靜──延伸到了二零一七，他們隱隱察覺，或許正是這無盡頭、亦無希望的折磨，讓三年後香港中文大學、城市大學、教育大學的大專學生，無畏校長各界施壓以及《刑事罪行條例》起訴的可能性，連續在校內的海報牆、烽火台上掛起「拒絕沉淪，唯有獨立」的布條、海報，在校門口派送傳單。
　　　
從對普選制度的不滿，走到民族自決這一步；這些頂大學生要下多少決心，至今我仍不明白。這是遲遲未起火的鐵屋內的吶喊，或是對北島詩歌《回答》裡「世界／我─不─相─信」的另一次回答？港獨的火種很快被撲熄。人潮散去，少年仍獨坐在深夜餘熱的街頭，緊緊鎖眉。
　　
夜深了，卻不再帶來更多安慰。
　　
※
　　
小寧。天亮之前，我可以從彌敦道一直走回青島東，穿過打烊的金樓、舞場、芬蘭浴的霓虹、巴士總站的夢。可以站在催淚彈前流不出淚來，可以微笑著投降，卻再沒有什麼值得被奪走。
　　
我們也能假裝一切都好，像盲眼珠寶大師，輕拭他手中的贗品。周大福、周生生。一間間銀樓深處的黑光，從地底竄起，取代了牛雜攤、茶餐廳，高空上搖晃超現實的勝利手勢：「我們贏了，但你們也並沒輸去多少」。活下去吧，少年，為了島嶼明日的繁茂與興盛。
　　
我們還有書局。
　　
班雅明（Walter Benjamin）曾這樣描述「歷史的天使」，在一切終止前夜的涼風中，只剩廢墟疊加著廢墟。港島的書局也存在著一種升力，低樓層租金經年暴漲，致使唯有專賣中國遊客的藥店、金飾店能夠承租，而書店經營者，只能揹著書本連年往高樓搬遷，直到無力支撐、出清收店。
　　
巴別塔的螺旋，越接近天空，就更看清腳底的黑暗。
　　
二零一五年十月，位於港島市中心，販售政治類「禁書」和八卦雜誌予中國遊客購買的「銅鑼灣書局」，連同店長在內的五人，相續失蹤。數名經營者被家人發現綁往中國境內，創辦人林榮基遭到長時間單獨監禁、逼供，而在香港被便衣人「跨境執法」拘捕的經營者李波，更在試圖向媒體揭露失蹤真相時，收到未署名恐嚇訊息，說「如果反抗，一世都要生活在恐怖中」。
　　
前一年，「明報」總編劉進圖被斬，今年，香港的新聞自由排名創下回歸後新低。「無國界記者」亞洲辦公室為避免政治檢控，決定從香港移往台灣……
　　
當一代人愛與怕的界線開始模糊──我想起一二年初到香港，讓朋友領著，穿過半島酒店地下走廊，到廟街去宵夜煲仔飯，一旁不起眼的「歡慶回歸十五年」紀念塗鴉，現在已滲入半島的每一道牆面，在每一個隨時可能有人「被失蹤」的轉角靜靜微笑，亮出手銬。
　　
動員已經全面開始。
　　
※
　　
今年初，親北京「建制派」的林鄭月娥當選香港特首，宣布將加速北京管制香港人的「基本法二十三條」立法，讓政府可以用「煽動叛亂」、「顛覆國家政權」、「竊取國家機密」等標準模糊的罪責（劉曉波《零八憲章》正是被北京以「顛覆國家政權」罪被判囚十三年），針對香港市民進行起訴。未來在香港談論，張貼港獨布條，都可能直接觸犯二十三條的禁令而坐牢。
　　
回歸第二個十年，香港曾經進入林夕《十年》歌詞所寫的「如果對於明天沒有要求」的自我廢除，也曾在一國兩制白皮書下，「一邊享受、一邊淚流」。但在某個罕有的、神智清明的歷史時刻，如果台灣和香港曾站在一起，那必不會是基於中國框架下大中華的統一論述，也不會是另一端的台獨港獨、自決本土。
　　
那共通的，不過是生而為人所要求的基本自由罷了。
　　
趁著還沒忘記，小寧。撐起這旺角少年溫熱的臂膀，離開這場大雨，告訴他來日方長。告訴他地鐵站的出口，回家的方向。而我們，如果仍願在另一個島嶼上繼續努力，我希望將李波收到的匿名信倒過來說。
　　
「如果恐懼，一世都要生活在反抗中。」
　　
原載《幼獅文藝》

【關於解釋國際攬炒：與外媒記者交流的工作日常】

早排同位識睇中文既日本記者食飯做訪問，佢做做下訪問期間，竟然拎左我個幾月前寫 #國際攬炒，差唔多成兩、三千字既長文出嚟，仲要自己用原字筆間曬部份佢覺得緊要既重點，見到嗰下真係覺得不得了。

呢一年以嚟，採訪同跟進香港情況既外國記者好多，當然各人認知程度都有唔同程度既差別，記得最經典係有位中歐本身唔太熟悉香港既記者問我「當選立法會議員後有咩感受」，當刻又真係有啲無奈…

點都好，國際攬炒同埋反制「臨立會 2.0」，唔好講話國際社會，就算本地都未必好明白當中較複雜既來龍去脈，感謝呢位記者之餘，我都未來都會同眾志團隊繼續努力，同各國政界官員傳媒交流時，準確分析香港抗爭形勢。

最後，如果大家早排未睇過既話，都歡迎大家重溫兩篇我寫過既文章（雖然我都知真係好長）：

【破局：立會過半 = 香港光已復？】
https://www.facebook.com/joshuawongchifung/photos/a.564294826996363/2888641404561682/

【議會過半想像：以「#國際攬炒」反制「臨立會2.0」】 https://www.facebook.com/200976479994868/posts/2887651214660701/

-----------------------------------------

A possible scenario will be like: Beijing will dissolve the existing LegCo and disqualify all 70 lawmakers once pro-democracy camps win the majority. One of the reference points is the recent statement by China’s office on Hong Kong Affairs, HKMAO.

The office unprecedentedly accused pro-democracy lawmakers of violating LegCo oaths when they use procedural tactics to block the controversial national anthem and national security legislation. In the eyes of Beijing, LegCo can only serve as a rubber stamp; otherwise, councillors fail to "show their allegiance to the central governments” and "serve dutifully” as the oath states. In other words, HKMAO is paving the way for a large-scaled disqualification before and after the election.

After the dissolution, Beijing will probably set up a pseudo-legislature and directly appoint all the members. That is not a crazy imagination since Beijing has done once in 1997. At that time, after pro-democracy forces won a majority during 1995-1997, Beijing set up a Provisional LegCo, directly appointed members and held meetings in Shenzhen. Therefore, history may repeat.

However, Hongkongers will still strive for a parliamentary majority since Beijing has already put its most controversial agenda, the national security legislation, on the table. The parliamentary majority is the only way for us to block this evil law.

If, at the end, Beijing really dissolves the LegCo and disqualifies all elected lawmakers, it means Beijing is shutting down all peaceful mechanism to resolve political problems and grievance. More importantly, this move will put the so-called promised autonomy under the One Country Two Systems formula to the test.

When even the legislature is a rubber stamp, it Is doubtful whether Hong Kong can still maintain its special status as an independent tariff zone. The latter will carry significant implications for international investors. On the street level, it is foreseeable that more protests will erupt, especially when Beijing starts to disqualify all pro-democracy candidates before the election.

https://twitter.com/joshuawongcf/status/1262645433337122816

【After Winning Majority in LegCo: Beijing's Crackdown May Trigger International Intervention】

***感謝Hong Kong Columns - Translated，將我早前撰寫『議會過半想像：以「#國際攬炒」反制「臨立會2.0」』長文（https://www.facebook.com/joshuawongchifung/photos/a.313299448762570/2887650867994069/）翻譯成英文，鼓勵國際社會關注立會選舉一旦過半的沙盤推演，在最惡劣形勢下的制衡策略。***

中文精簡版本：https://www.facebook.com/joshuawongchifung/photos/a.564294826996363/2888641404561682/

Hongkongers have experienced our revolution for over half a year. They no longer take a consequentialist view to the effectiveness of their movement as they did years ago, or waste time second-guessing the intentions and background of fellow activists. Following the defensive battles at CUHK and PolyU, November’s District Council election saw a great victory of unity. More marvellous is the union between peaceful and “valiant” protesters.

In the process of resisting tyranny, the people have realised that one cannot prioritize one strategy over another. This is also how the common goal of “35+” came into being—the hope that we will win over half of the seats in the Legislative Council (LegCo) this September, such that the political spectrum that represents the majority of Hongkongers is able to gain control of legislative decisions. The political clout of Hongkongers will increase if 35 or more seats are successfully secured on our side. It is certainly one vital step to achieve the five demands within the system.

The possibility of realizing legislative majority

Technically it is not unrealistic to win a majority even under the current undemocratic system. Back in the 2016 LegCo election, we already won 30 seats. In addition to the District Council (First) functional constituency seat that is already in the pocket of the pan-democrats, as long as the candidates in Kowloon East and New Territories West do not start infighting again, we could safely secure 33 seats based on the number of pan-dem votes in 2016.

The other 3 seats required to achieve a majority depend on democrats’ breakthrough among the functional constituencies by dispersing the resources of the Liaison Office. They also count on whether the turnout this September could exceed 71.2% — that of last year’s District Council elections. Some of the factors that could affect the turnout include: will the epidemic persist into the summer? Will there be potential violent repression of protests in the 2 weeks preceding the election? Will Hong Kong-US relations be affected by the downturn of the global economy?

Therefore, the ambition of “35+” is to be prioritised by the resistance as both a means and an end. I have already expressed my support for an intra-party primary at the coordination meeting. In the meantime, it is pleasing to see the ongoing debates reaching a consensus of maximising the seats among geographical constituencies in the upcoming election.

Whilst enthusiastic coordination, we should also assess the post-election landscape and gauge Beijing’s reactions: if we do not reach 35 seats, Hong Kong will be subject to tighter control and more severe repression by China; but if the democratic parties successfully form a majority in LegCo, CCP’s fears of a “constitutional crisis” would become imminent. Hence, the key questions are how the Pan-Democrats should deal with the volatile political situation in Hong Kong and how they are going to meet Beijing’s charge head-on.

Watching out for Beijing’s dismissal of LegCo after reaching majority

To take back control of LegCo such that it faithfully reflects the majority’s principles and needs is the definition of a healthy democracy. Recently, however, DAB’s Tam Yiu-chung has warned that the plan of the Pan-Dems to “usurp power” in the LegCo would only lead to Beijing’s forceful disqualification of certain members or the interpretation of the Basic Law. This proves that winning a majority in LegCo is not only a popular conception but also a realistic challenge that would get on the nerves of Beijing. Could Beijing accept a President James To in LegCo? These unknown variables must be addressed upon achieving a majority.

While there is no telltale sign as to Beijing’s exact strategy, we are already familiar with the way CCP manipulated the Basic Law in the past 4 years. Having experienced three waves of disqualifications in LegCo, twice kicked out of LegCo with my team, and thrice locked up in jail, I have no false hopes of an easy compromise from Beijing: they would not let Pan-Dems control LegCo for half a year and wait (as is the proper procedure) until after having negatived the Budget to dissolve the legislature, and thereby giving them an easy victory in the re-elections. The greater the Pan-Dems threaten Beijing’s rule in Hong Kong, the more likely that it will trigger Beijing’s repression.

Since the disqualification and arrest of lawmakers have already become “normalised”, one can even imagine the police stepping into the LegCo building to force Pan-Dems into voting. Neither is it beyond our imagination to expect the CCP to kick out all 70 lawmakers in a fit of rage and replace them with a provisional LegCo “2.0” [HKCT note: The first was from 25 Jan 1997 to 30 Jun 1998]. To depend on a majority that could lead to a chapter of a “new testament” for One Country, Two Systems is perhaps what many elites long for, but they are overly optimistic:for a ticket to the promised land will not be available at the Chief Executive election campaign a year and a half later.

Admittedly, the Pan-Dems cannot unilaterally initiate “Laam-chaau” [HKCT note: mostly translated into “scorched-earth” mentality or “mutual destruction”; some even translated into “If I burn, you burn with us”]. The most they can do is to force a standstill of the government, and not for long the LegCo will have been eliminated from the equation to make the wheels turn again. It all leaves the plan of “Negativing the motion → Dissolving LegCo → Re-election after re-election → the stepping down of Carrie Lam” merely as overly positive speculation, probably resulting from their overestimate of CCP's capacity for rational calculation. The Pan-Dems must guard their frontlines and recognise what the biggest threat from Hong Kong to China could be. In this case, should LegCo sessions be disrupted or suspended, the Pan-Dems would have to be well prepared to surmount the expected obstacles and prevent the disqualification crisis 4 years ago—a Catch-22 indeed.

Productive tension from global intervention: Using Laam-chaau against the CCP

What aggravates the CCP the most is the potential threat to Hong Kong’s unique status as the one and only “separate customs territory”. Any miscalculation will compromise its role as the Chinese economy’s “white gloves”. Imagine if CCP were to disqualify all 70 elected lawmakers and convene a meeting north of the Shenzhen River to pass a resolution to Hong Kong’s affairs (much like the Provisional Legislative Council “1.0" in 1997), how great will the shock be in a world with an effective Hong Kong Human Rights and Democracy Act? However hard it is to predict the future one thing is certain: With the US presidential election just around the corner, blows to the separation of powers would not be tolerated, and the West would necessarily effect countermeasures against the Hong Kong government.

Beijing has been relying upon Hong Kong to navigate the international community for decades. While clamping down on the political freedom of the cosmopolitan city, Beijing desires to maintain the financial centre’s economic freedom. Hence, we started lobbying for the Hong Kong Human Rights and Democracy Act four years ago, and today we are determined to promote “Laam-chaau” on an international scale.

The will of the voters must be reflected in an election. If a “35+” legislature were to be dismissed and replaced, such flagrant violation of democracy would assuredly cause a greater backlash than the infamous extradition bill. Knowing what the reality ahead of us could be, we have to combine our election and international strategies to oppose the placement of a 35+ LegCo with an “Emergency Legislative Council 2.0”, to advance an international “Laam-chaau” to Hong Kong’s status as “separate customs territory”. Only then will we stand a chance to resist the regime and to realise the five demands.

Adjusting our mindset: Overcoming the “constitutional crisis” to reach a resolution

Upon the realization of the “35+” LegCo, it is expected that the CCP will launch a devastating counterattack. The Pan-Dems should not expect LegCo to run normally; neither can the lawmakers realise their governing blueprints they have for Hong Kong. Rather, candidates will be able to compete against one another with visions of a liberated Hong Kong through popular vote. Bringing this point up has nothing to do with undermining the common goal of reaching a majority in LegCo, but rather channels the battle of LegCo to positive use upon the rule of law’s death and a “constitutional crisis” ahead. Knowing that Hongkongers have nothing to fall back on, all Pan-Dems should not miss the only way to the realization of “35+”.

Thus, be they partisans, nonpartisans, incumbent politicians, amateur politicians, or the civil society as a whole – if we stay in the political discourse of 2016 and continue to perpetuate old stereotypes, that is to deal with the divisions on the pan-democratic camp by favouring the most “local” faction; to consider only resource allocation and self-aggrandizement as the purpose of a LegCo campaign; to ignore how potential lawmakers are fitted to what specific roles; to turn a blind eye to the journey of resistance since last summer (extending indefinitely into the future)—They would lead as astray and cost us lose a precious opportunity for change by winning a 35+ majority.

The extent to which the pan-democrats can stay united in light of the political atmosphere since last summer is another problem that our side must to address. Before the watershed moment of 12th June 2019, many democratic delegates were trapped in the mentality of needing to “preserve people’s livelihood”, “be content of what we have accomplished”, and other strategies that favours stability. As the government refuses to heed to the five demands, whether the democrats, especially those in the functional constituencies, have the political will to go all-in is the real difficult question that confronts us in the upcoming LegCo election.

All in all, if “35+” cannot be realised, it is unsurprising to see LegCo being more heavily suppressed in the next 4 years; even if "35+" is achieved, it is questionable whether the pan-democrats are able to weather multiple attacks, verbal or physical, from the regime (judging from its power in the last four years) and utilise the international Laam-chaau strategy against the displacement of LegCo. Adhering to the motto of “we fight on, each in his own way”, I can only hope that Hongkongers in elections, street confrontations and international front can reconcile with each other, so that we may collectively compel the government to yield to our demands in the next six months. It is only by reaching a resolution before a real constitutional crisis that we can combat the institutional violence of the regime and not be devoured by it.

https://hkcolumn.blogspot.com/2020/04/joshua-wong-after-winning-majority-in.html?fbclid=IwAR216gf53pG_j9JOpDfr2GItvjLfrFSekKTPzoEs3-s9KBqvPEwz865P8vw