[爆卦]violation中文是什麼?優點缺點精華區懶人包

雖然這篇violation中文鄉民發文沒有被收入到精華區:在violation中文這個話題中,我們另外找到其它相關的精選爆讚文章

在 violation中文產品中有49篇Facebook貼文,粉絲數超過7萬的網紅厭世工程師,也在其Facebook貼文中提到, 捷克參議院議長柯佳洛去世前收到的威脅信 中英文翻譯 Prague, 10th January 2020 2020年1月10日,布拉格 ►The Taiwan issue is highly sensitive. The One-China Policy serves as the p...

 同時也有1部Youtube影片,追蹤數超過4萬的網紅五哥頻道,也在其Youtube影片中提到,基於《兒童網路隱私保護法》(COPPA) 和/或其他相關法律的規定,您必須說明自己的影片是否屬於為兒童打造的內容。請使用全新的上傳工具完成這項步驟。 實行左COPPA之後,將對兒童頻道大受影嚮,收入亦會大減。 大家未做要記得做,唔明就睇片,否則後果嚴重! 相關新聞:http://bit.ly/2Xg...

violation中文 在 Ivan Wong Photography Instagram 的最讚貼文

2020-05-01 17:46:28

[婚禮業界聯合聲明] 近月,香港各處也充斥著催淚煙的氣味,無論大街小巷、商場食肆,或是屋村屋苑,甚至是婚禮場所,都無一倖免。撥開這一層白茫茫的霧霾𥚃頭,是市民的眼淚、市民的驚恐、市民的痛苦,甚至是市民的鮮血。 一直以來,我們婚禮界堅信及擁護香港的法治精神,但鑑於警察行為已經失控,出現大量濫權、濫...

violation中文 在 Chris Yiu Instagram 的最讚貼文

2020-05-03 17:22:42

[婚禮業界聯合聲明] 近月,香港各處也充斥著催淚煙的氣味,無論大街小巷、商場食肆,或是屋村屋苑,甚至是婚禮場所,都無一倖免。撥開這一層白茫茫的霧霾𥚃頭,是市民的眼淚、市民的驚恐、市民的痛苦,甚至是市民的鮮血。 一直以來,我們婚禮界堅信及擁護香港的法治精神,但鑑於警察行為已經失控,出現大量濫權、濫...

violation中文 在 Sara Wong Instagram 的最佳解答

2020-05-03 21:12:55

[婚禮業界聯署聲明] 近月,香港各處也充斥著催淚煙的氣味,無論大街小巷、商場食肆,或是屋村屋苑,甚至是婚禮場所,都無一倖免。撥開這一層白茫茫的霧霾裏頭,是市民的眼淚、市民的驚恐、市民的痛苦,甚至是市民的鮮血。 一直以來,我們婚禮界堅信及擁護香港的法治精神,但鑑於警察行為已經失控,出現大量濫權、濫...

  • violation中文 在 厭世工程師 Facebook 的精選貼文

    2020-05-06 14:19:20
    有 661 人按讚


    捷克參議院議長柯佳洛去世前收到的威脅信 中英文翻譯

    Prague, 10th January 2020

    2020年1月10日,布拉格

    ►The Taiwan issue is highly sensitive. The One-China Policy serves as the political basis for China in order to preserve and develop friendly relations and cooperate with all countries in the world, including the Czech Republic.

    台灣問題高度敏感。一中政策是中國與全球包括捷克共和國在內的所有國家維護和發展友好關係並合作的政治基礎。

    ►The Chinese government resolutely opposes any official contact between any country that maintains diplomatic relations with China and Taiwan (including any mutual visits between parliamentary representatives and deputies).

    中國政府堅決反對中國之所有邦交國與台灣間有任何官方往來(包括議會代表與議員之間的任何互訪)。

    ►Top representatives of Western countries, including the USA, the United Kingdom, France and Germany, abide by the One-China Policy, and none of them has visited Taiwan (Jacques Brotchi, the then Chairman of the Belgian Senate, who visited Taiwan in May 2019, has already resigned from his office and received a lifetime ban from entering China).

    西方國家(包括美國,英國,法國和德國)的最高代表都遵從一中政策,且沒有一個人訪問過台灣(當時的比利時聯邦參議院議長 Jacques Brotchi 曾於 2019年5月訪問台灣,其現已辭職,並令終身禁止進入中國)。

    ►The joint declaration on the establishment of the strategic partnership between the People’s Republic of China and the Czech Republic states that “the Czech Republic has again confirmed its observance of the One-China Policy, as well as its respect towards the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the People’s Republic of China”.

    在中華人民共和國與捷克共和國建立戰略夥伴關係的聯合聲明中寫道:“捷克共和國再次確認其遵守一個中國政策,並尊重中華人民共和國領土與主權的完整”。

    ►Whatever its form and purpose, a visit to Taiwan by Jaroslav Kubera, the Chairman of the Senate of the Parliament of the Czech Republic and as such the second highest representative of the Czech Republic, bears the marks of an official visit. That would constitute a grave violation of the recognition of the One-China principle.

    捷克共和國國會參議院議長 Jaroslav Kubera 作為捷克共和國第二層級的最高政治代表,若訪問台灣,無論其形式及目的為何,此舉都將被視為是官方正式的外交出訪,具有不可逆的政治意義。此舉將嚴重違反對於 “一中原則” 的承認。 **(bears the marks of 留下印記這裡我試試看有別於字面上的翻法!不知道有沒有更好地翻法?)**

    ►The Chinese-Czech strategic partnership has been continuously developing over the last few years, thus bringing tangible benefits to Czech enterprises. China has already become the largest foreign market for many Czech companies, such as Škoda Auto, Home Credit Group, Klavíry Petrof and others.

    近年來,中捷戰略夥伴關係不斷發展,為捷克企業帶來了實質的利益。對於許多捷克公司(例如 汽車製造商 Škoda Auto,捷信集團 Home Credit Group,佩卓夫鋼琴 Klavíry Petrof 等),中國已經成為最大的國外市場。

    ►A potential visit to Taiwan by Chairman Kubera would seriously hurt the feelings of the Chinese people, damage the friendly atmosphere of cooperation between China and the Czech Republic, the Czech Republic’s reputation among the Chinese public and the interests of the Czech Republic.

    Kubera 議長可能對台灣進行的訪問將嚴重損害中國人民的感情,損害中國與捷克共和國之間的友好合作氣氛、捷克共和國在中國公眾中的聲譽以及捷克共和國的利益。

    ►Czech enterprises whose representatives visit Taiwan with Chairman Kubera will not be welcome in China or by the Chinese people. Czech enterprises with economic interests in China will have to pay for Chairman Kubera’s visit to Taiwan.

    與 Kubera 議長一起訪問台灣的捷克企業代表,將不被中國與中國人民歡迎。在中國具有經濟利益的捷克企業將為 Kubera 議長對台灣的訪問付出代價。

    ►Chairman Kubera’s visit to Taiwan will not benefit anyone. We hope that the Czech side will observe the One-China policy and cancel this visit, thus avoiding damaging Chinese-Czech relations.

    Kubera 議長對台灣的訪問將不會使任何人受益。我們希望捷克方面遵守一中政策並取消此次訪問,以免破壞中捷關係。

    ►Attn.: Office of the President of the Czech Republic

    收信者:捷克共和國總統辦公室

    ►Prague

    布拉格

    ►[Seal of the Office of the President in Czech Republic confirming receipt on 13th January 2020]

    [捷克共和國總統辦公室印章,確認於2020年1月13日收到]

    ►[Seal of the Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in the Czech Republic]

    [中華人民共和國駐捷克共和國大使館印章]

    ══════════════════════

    -
    https://sinopsis.cz/en/embassy-threats/… (★ 接下來有這個星號的都是這個連結裡的內容)

    一直找不到全信的中文內容,有點煩躁,所以我在上面那個網址找到了這封捷克語威脅信的全文英文翻譯,然後就自己努力地翻成中文了(本人非外交或外文專業,翻譯內容可能有誤,請多指教😓),如果大家需要的話可以直接轉發。

    ★ 連結中寫道:“The threatening letter eschews diplomatic protocol; it is written as a series of “bullet points”, lacking even a salutation. It appears to have been translated by a non-native speaker, from a Chinese original into nearly flawless Czech.”

    此封威脅信不以外交禮儀寫成;而是使用條列式列出了一系列要點,信中甚至沒有收信人的稱呼(一般書信在開頭會有 Dear xx)。它似乎是由非母語人士翻譯而成的,從原本的中文翻譯成了近乎完美的捷克語。

    ★ “In 2019, the chairman of the Czech Senate, Jaroslav Kubera, announced a trip to Taiwan as head of a business delegation. Various voices in local politics criticised these plans out loud, most notably the country’s CCP-friendly president Miloš Zeman, who said Kubera’s Taiwan visit would mean the end of their friendship. The PRC’s direct attempt to prevent the visit was not, however, made through public channels.”

    2019年,捷克參議院主席 Jaroslav Kubera 宣布作為商務代表團團長前往台灣。地方政治上出現了各種聲音大聲批評了此計劃,最值得注意的是捷克的親中總統 Miloš Zeman,他表示,柯佳洛議長對台灣的訪問將意味著中捷兩國友誼的終結。然而,中國嘗試阻止訪問的直接方法並不是透過公開透明的管道。

    ★ 據捷克媒體 Aktuálně 於2/19的報導(source: https://zpravy.aktualne.cz/…/r~3602b9ba51a711eaa5e40cc47ab…/)
    重點節錄:這封信經過了捷克總統府,並隨信附有捷克總統府對外辦公室主任 *Rudolf Jindrák* 的評論,最後轉交給了柯佳洛。信件發出後的第七天,柯佳洛去世了,這封信在他的辦公室裡被發現。

    *(💥 查資料的過程中不小心翻到這位 Rudolf Jindrák 似乎有過共產黨背景...... https://taiwantrc.org/捷克駐德大使被指曾是共黨軍情系統同路人/ 這篇是2010年的...不確定現在的情形,但我google到的時候真的有覺得不太對勁...)

    (然後請大家不要曲解意思,我沒有說是這封信害死了柯佳洛,只寫了這是他去世之前收到的威脅信,這裡的威脅指的是對於捷克外交和經濟上的。)

    文章來源:柳子賢

  • violation中文 在 公民聯盟 Facebook 的最讚貼文

    2020-05-05 09:44:39
    有 15 人按讚


    ▌捷克參議院議長柯佳洛去世前收到的威脅信 中英文翻譯 ▌


    Prague, 10th January 2020

    2020年1月10日,布拉格


    ►The Taiwan issue is highly sensitive. The One-China Policy serves as the political basis for China in order to preserve and develop friendly relations and cooperate with all countries in the world, including the Czech Republic.

    台灣問題高度敏感。一中政策是中國與全球包括捷克共和國在內的所有國家維護和發展友好關係並合作的政治基礎。


    ►The Chinese government resolutely opposes any official contact between any country that maintains diplomatic relations with China and Taiwan (including any mutual visits between parliamentary representatives and deputies).

    中國政府堅決反對中國之所有邦交國與台灣間有任何官方往來(包括議會代表與議員之間的任何互訪)。


    ►Top representatives of Western countries, including the USA, the United Kingdom, France and Germany, abide by the One-China Policy, and none of them has visited Taiwan (Jacques Brotchi, the then Chairman of the Belgian Senate, who visited Taiwan in May 2019, has already resigned from his office and received a lifetime ban from entering China).

    西方國家(包括美國,英國,法國和德國)的最高代表都遵從一中政策,且沒有一個人訪問過台灣(當時的比利時聯邦參議院議長 Jacques Brotchi 曾於 2019年5月訪問台灣,其現已辭職,並令終身禁止進入中國)。


    ►The joint declaration on the establishment of the strategic partnership between the People’s Republic of China and the Czech Republic states that “the Czech Republic has again confirmed its observance of the One-China Policy, as well as its respect towards the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the People’s Republic of China”.

    在中華人民共和國與捷克共和國建立戰略夥伴關係的聯合聲明中寫道:“捷克共和國再次確認其遵守一個中國政策,並尊重中華人民共和國領土與主權的完整”。


    ►Whatever its form and purpose, a visit to Taiwan by Jaroslav Kubera, the Chairman of the Senate of the Parliament of the Czech Republic and as such the second highest representative of the Czech Republic, bears the marks of an official visit. That would constitute a grave violation of the recognition of the One-China principle.

    捷克共和國國會參議院議長 Jaroslav Kubera 作為捷克共和國第二層級的最高政治代表,若訪問台灣,無論其形式及目的為何,此舉都將被視為是官方正式的外交出訪,具有不可逆的政治意義。此舉將嚴重違反對於 “一中原則” 的承認。 **(bears the marks of 留下印記這裡我試試看有別於字面上的翻法!不知道有沒有更好地翻法?)**


    ►The Chinese-Czech strategic partnership has been continuously developing over the last few years, thus bringing tangible benefits to Czech enterprises. China has already become the largest foreign market for many Czech companies, such as Škoda Auto, Home Credit Group, Klavíry Petrof and others.

    近年來,中捷戰略夥伴關係不斷發展,為捷克企業帶來了實質的利益。對於許多捷克公司(例如 汽車製造商 Škoda Auto,捷信集團 Home Credit Group,佩卓夫鋼琴 Klavíry Petrof 等),中國已經成為最大的國外市場。


    ►A potential visit to Taiwan by Chairman Kubera would seriously hurt the feelings of the Chinese people, damage the friendly atmosphere of cooperation between China and the Czech Republic, the Czech Republic’s reputation among the Chinese public and the interests of the Czech Republic.

    Kubera 議長可能對台灣進行的訪問將嚴重損害中國人民的感情,損害中國與捷克共和國之間的友好合作氣氛、捷克共和國在中國公眾中的聲譽以及捷克共和國的利益。


    ►Czech enterprises whose representatives visit Taiwan with Chairman Kubera will not be welcome in China or by the Chinese people. Czech enterprises with economic interests in China will have to pay for Chairman Kubera’s visit to Taiwan.

    與 Kubera 議長一起訪問台灣的捷克企業代表,將不被中國與中國人民歡迎。在中國具有經濟利益的捷克企業將為 Kubera 議長對台灣的訪問付出代價。


    ►Chairman Kubera’s visit to Taiwan will not benefit anyone. We hope that the Czech side will observe the One-China policy and cancel this visit, thus avoiding damaging Chinese-Czech relations.

    Kubera 議長對台灣的訪問將不會使任何人受益。我們希望捷克方面遵守一中政策並取消此次訪問,以免破壞中捷關係。




    ►Attn.: Office of the President of the Czech Republic

    收信者:捷克共和國總統辦公室


    ►Prague

    布拉格


    ►[Seal of the Office of the President in Czech Republic confirming receipt on 13th January 2020]

    [捷克共和國總統辦公室印章,確認於2020年1月13日收到]


    ►[Seal of the Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in the Czech Republic]

    [中華人民共和國駐捷克共和國大使館印章]

    ══════════════════════



    -
    https://sinopsis.cz/en/embassy-threats/… (★ 接下來有這個星號的都是這個連結裡的內容)

    一直找不到全信的中文內容,有點煩躁,所以我在上面那個網址找到了這封捷克語威脅信的全文英文翻譯,然後就自己努力地翻成中文了(本人非外交或外文專業,翻譯內容可能有誤,請多指教😓),如果大家需要的話可以直接轉發。


    ★ 連結中寫道:“The threatening letter eschews diplomatic protocol; it is written as a series of “bullet points”, lacking even a salutation. It appears to have been translated by a non-native speaker, from a Chinese original into nearly flawless Czech.”

    此封威脅信不以外交禮儀寫成;而是使用條列式列出了一系列要點,信中甚至沒有收信人的稱呼(一般書信在開頭會有 Dear xx)。它似乎是由非母語人士翻譯而成的,從原本的中文翻譯成了近乎完美的捷克語。


    ★ “In 2019, the chairman of the Czech Senate, Jaroslav Kubera, announced a trip to Taiwan as head of a business delegation. Various voices in local politics criticised these plans out loud, most notably the country’s CCP-friendly president Miloš Zeman, who said Kubera’s Taiwan visit would mean the end of their friendship. The PRC’s direct attempt to prevent the visit was not, however, made through public channels.”

    2019年,捷克參議院主席 Jaroslav Kubera 宣布作為商務代表團團長前往台灣。地方政治上出現了各種聲音大聲批評了此計劃,最值得注意的是捷克的親中總統 Miloš Zeman,他表示,柯佳洛議長對台灣的訪問將意味著中捷兩國友誼的終結。然而,中國嘗試阻止訪問的直接方法並不是透過公開透明的管道。


    ★ 據捷克媒體 Aktuálně 於2/19的報導(source: https://zpravy.aktualne.cz/…/r~3602b9ba51a711eaa5e40cc47ab…/)
    重點節錄:這封信經過了捷克總統府,並隨信附有捷克總統府對外辦公室主任 *Rudolf Jindrák* 的評論,最後轉交給了柯佳洛。信件發出後的第七天,柯佳洛去世了,這封信在他的辦公室裡被發現。


    *(💥 查資料的過程中不小心翻到這位 Rudolf Jindrák 似乎有過共產黨背景...... https://taiwantrc.org/捷克駐德大使被指曾是共黨軍情系統同路人/ 這篇是2010年的...不確定現在的情形,但我google到的時候真的有覺得不太對勁...)


    (然後請大家不要曲解意思,我沒有說是這封信害死了柯佳洛,只寫了這是他去世之前收到的威脅信,這裡的威脅指的是對於捷克外交和經濟上的。)


    -\-\-

    📌 推薦閱讀:
    (補一些捷克與中國過去在政治外交上的脈絡)

    👉大國都不敢,為什麼就布拉格敢這麼挺台灣?
    https://www.cw.com.tw/article/article.action…

    👉總統親中,為何布拉格卻敢跟台北簽姊妹市?看懂捷克的反中浪潮
    https://www.businessweekly.com.tw/international/blog/3001569

    👉「一中政策」與「一中原則」,兩者有何不同?
    https://www.rti.org.tw/news/view/id/2002582
    https://uc.watchout.tw/read/7JQGgKA3eVkzIeEtpsHD

  • violation中文 在 黃之鋒 Joshua Wong Facebook 的最佳貼文

    2020-04-08 18:22:53
    有 400 人按讚

    【After Winning Majority in LegCo: Beijing's Crackdown May Trigger International Intervention】

    ***感謝Hong Kong Columns - Translated,將我早前撰寫『議會過半想像:以「#國際攬炒」反制「臨立會2.0」』長文(https://www.facebook.com/joshuawongchifung/photos/a.313299448762570/2887650867994069/)翻譯成英文,鼓勵國際社會關注立會選舉一旦過半的沙盤推演,在最惡劣形勢下的制衡策略。***

    中文精簡版本:https://www.facebook.com/joshuawongchifung/photos/a.564294826996363/2888641404561682/

    Hongkongers have experienced our revolution for over half a year. They no longer take a consequentialist view to the effectiveness of their movement as they did years ago, or waste time second-guessing the intentions and background of fellow activists. Following the defensive battles at CUHK and PolyU, November’s District Council election saw a great victory of unity. More marvellous is the union between peaceful and “valiant” protesters.

    In the process of resisting tyranny, the people have realised that one cannot prioritize one strategy over another. This is also how the common goal of “35+” came into being—the hope that we will win over half of the seats in the Legislative Council (LegCo) this September, such that the political spectrum that represents the majority of Hongkongers is able to gain control of legislative decisions. The political clout of Hongkongers will increase if 35 or more seats are successfully secured on our side. It is certainly one vital step to achieve the five demands within the system.

    The possibility of realizing legislative majority

    Technically it is not unrealistic to win a majority even under the current undemocratic system. Back in the 2016 LegCo election, we already won 30 seats. In addition to the District Council (First) functional constituency seat that is already in the pocket of the pan-democrats, as long as the candidates in Kowloon East and New Territories West do not start infighting again, we could safely secure 33 seats based on the number of pan-dem votes in 2016.

    The other 3 seats required to achieve a majority depend on democrats’ breakthrough among the functional constituencies by dispersing the resources of the Liaison Office. They also count on whether the turnout this September could exceed 71.2% — that of last year’s District Council elections. Some of the factors that could affect the turnout include: will the epidemic persist into the summer? Will there be potential violent repression of protests in the 2 weeks preceding the election? Will Hong Kong-US relations be affected by the downturn of the global economy?

    Therefore, the ambition of “35+” is to be prioritised by the resistance as both a means and an end. I have already expressed my support for an intra-party primary at the coordination meeting. In the meantime, it is pleasing to see the ongoing debates reaching a consensus of maximising the seats among geographical constituencies in the upcoming election.

    Whilst enthusiastic coordination, we should also assess the post-election landscape and gauge Beijing’s reactions: if we do not reach 35 seats, Hong Kong will be subject to tighter control and more severe repression by China; but if the democratic parties successfully form a majority in LegCo, CCP’s fears of a “constitutional crisis” would become imminent. Hence, the key questions are how the Pan-Democrats should deal with the volatile political situation in Hong Kong and how they are going to meet Beijing’s charge head-on.

    Watching out for Beijing’s dismissal of LegCo after reaching majority

    To take back control of LegCo such that it faithfully reflects the majority’s principles and needs is the definition of a healthy democracy. Recently, however, DAB’s Tam Yiu-chung has warned that the plan of the Pan-Dems to “usurp power” in the LegCo would only lead to Beijing’s forceful disqualification of certain members or the interpretation of the Basic Law. This proves that winning a majority in LegCo is not only a popular conception but also a realistic challenge that would get on the nerves of Beijing. Could Beijing accept a President James To in LegCo? These unknown variables must be addressed upon achieving a majority.

    While there is no telltale sign as to Beijing’s exact strategy, we are already familiar with the way CCP manipulated the Basic Law in the past 4 years. Having experienced three waves of disqualifications in LegCo, twice kicked out of LegCo with my team, and thrice locked up in jail, I have no false hopes of an easy compromise from Beijing: they would not let Pan-Dems control LegCo for half a year and wait (as is the proper procedure) until after having negatived the Budget to dissolve the legislature, and thereby giving them an easy victory in the re-elections. The greater the Pan-Dems threaten Beijing’s rule in Hong Kong, the more likely that it will trigger Beijing’s repression.

    Since the disqualification and arrest of lawmakers have already become “normalised”, one can even imagine the police stepping into the LegCo building to force Pan-Dems into voting. Neither is it beyond our imagination to expect the CCP to kick out all 70 lawmakers in a fit of rage and replace them with a provisional LegCo “2.0” [HKCT note: The first was from 25 Jan 1997 to 30 Jun 1998]. To depend on a majority that could lead to a chapter of a “new testament” for One Country, Two Systems is perhaps what many elites long for, but they are overly optimistic:for a ticket to the promised land will not be available at the Chief Executive election campaign a year and a half later.

    Admittedly, the Pan-Dems cannot unilaterally initiate “Laam-chaau” [HKCT note: mostly translated into “scorched-earth” mentality or “mutual destruction”; some even translated into “If I burn, you burn with us”]. The most they can do is to force a standstill of the government, and not for long the LegCo will have been eliminated from the equation to make the wheels turn again. It all leaves the plan of “Negativing the motion → Dissolving LegCo → Re-election after re-election → the stepping down of Carrie Lam” merely as overly positive speculation, probably resulting from their overestimate of CCP's capacity for rational calculation. The Pan-Dems must guard their frontlines and recognise what the biggest threat from Hong Kong to China could be. In this case, should LegCo sessions be disrupted or suspended, the Pan-Dems would have to be well prepared to surmount the expected obstacles and prevent the disqualification crisis 4 years ago—a Catch-22 indeed.

    Productive tension from global intervention: Using Laam-chaau against the CCP

    What aggravates the CCP the most is the potential threat to Hong Kong’s unique status as the one and only “separate customs territory”. Any miscalculation will compromise its role as the Chinese economy’s “white gloves”. Imagine if CCP were to disqualify all 70 elected lawmakers and convene a meeting north of the Shenzhen River to pass a resolution to Hong Kong’s affairs (much like the Provisional Legislative Council “1.0" in 1997), how great will the shock be in a world with an effective Hong Kong Human Rights and Democracy Act? However hard it is to predict the future one thing is certain: With the US presidential election just around the corner, blows to the separation of powers would not be tolerated, and the West would necessarily effect countermeasures against the Hong Kong government.

    Beijing has been relying upon Hong Kong to navigate the international community for decades. While clamping down on the political freedom of the cosmopolitan city, Beijing desires to maintain the financial centre’s economic freedom. Hence, we started lobbying for the Hong Kong Human Rights and Democracy Act four years ago, and today we are determined to promote “Laam-chaau” on an international scale.

    The will of the voters must be reflected in an election. If a “35+” legislature were to be dismissed and replaced, such flagrant violation of democracy would assuredly cause a greater backlash than the infamous extradition bill. Knowing what the reality ahead of us could be, we have to combine our election and international strategies to oppose the placement of a 35+ LegCo with an “Emergency Legislative Council 2.0”, to advance an international “Laam-chaau” to Hong Kong’s status as “separate customs territory”. Only then will we stand a chance to resist the regime and to realise the five demands.

    Adjusting our mindset: Overcoming the “constitutional crisis” to reach a resolution

    Upon the realization of the “35+” LegCo, it is expected that the CCP will launch a devastating counterattack. The Pan-Dems should not expect LegCo to run normally; neither can the lawmakers realise their governing blueprints they have for Hong Kong. Rather, candidates will be able to compete against one another with visions of a liberated Hong Kong through popular vote. Bringing this point up has nothing to do with undermining the common goal of reaching a majority in LegCo, but rather channels the battle of LegCo to positive use upon the rule of law’s death and a “constitutional crisis” ahead. Knowing that Hongkongers have nothing to fall back on, all Pan-Dems should not miss the only way to the realization of “35+”.

    Thus, be they partisans, nonpartisans, incumbent politicians, amateur politicians, or the civil society as a whole – if we stay in the political discourse of 2016 and continue to perpetuate old stereotypes, that is to deal with the divisions on the pan-democratic camp by favouring the most “local” faction; to consider only resource allocation and self-aggrandizement as the purpose of a LegCo campaign; to ignore how potential lawmakers are fitted to what specific roles; to turn a blind eye to the journey of resistance since last summer (extending indefinitely into the future)—They would lead as astray and cost us lose a precious opportunity for change by winning a 35+ majority.

    The extent to which the pan-democrats can stay united in light of the political atmosphere since last summer is another problem that our side must to address. Before the watershed moment of 12th June 2019, many democratic delegates were trapped in the mentality of needing to “preserve people’s livelihood”, “be content of what we have accomplished”, and other strategies that favours stability. As the government refuses to heed to the five demands, whether the democrats, especially those in the functional constituencies, have the political will to go all-in is the real difficult question that confronts us in the upcoming LegCo election.

    All in all, if “35+” cannot be realised, it is unsurprising to see LegCo being more heavily suppressed in the next 4 years; even if "35+" is achieved, it is questionable whether the pan-democrats are able to weather multiple attacks, verbal or physical, from the regime (judging from its power in the last four years) and utilise the international Laam-chaau strategy against the displacement of LegCo. Adhering to the motto of “we fight on, each in his own way”, I can only hope that Hongkongers in elections, street confrontations and international front can reconcile with each other, so that we may collectively compel the government to yield to our demands in the next six months. It is only by reaching a resolution before a real constitutional crisis that we can combat the institutional violence of the regime and not be devoured by it.

    https://hkcolumn.blogspot.com/2020/04/joshua-wong-after-winning-majority-in.html?fbclid=IwAR216gf53pG_j9JOpDfr2GItvjLfrFSekKTPzoEs3-s9KBqvPEwz865P8vw

你可能也想看看

搜尋相關網站