［西洋棋大數據］兩個結論：棋手30歲就見頂，之後越老越廢。另外，而家嘅棋手係勁過當年嘅。

1. 之前一篇講西洋棋嘅文都咁多人睇（https://fbook.cc/3IXb），感謝。但其實我本係想講呢篇文，呢個圖。

2. Economist 原文：“The Queen’s Gambit” is right: young chess stars always usurp the old（https://bityl.co/4TOG）

3. 見呢排忽然西洋棋熱，Economist都不甘後人講兩句。Netflix劇中講天才少女，實情差不多所有活動觀眾都鍾意睇呢啲，梗係天才少女贏老嘢好，老嘢落場仲玩死啲後生（Uncle Drew？），太冇癮了，叫人點睇落去？

4. 不過，開講都有話，拳怕少壯，棍怕老狼。日本仔去飛田新地都唔搵後生女（如是我聞）。咁打拳嘅嘢，當然係後生仔氣力好體力勁。但講到用棍（咩棍都好啦），就話老人家經驗夠。

5. 體力競爭，大家好易理解，但智力競爭呢？事實證明，西洋棋亦的確係一種「不許人間見白頭」嘅遊戲，後生仔玩意。同一年代，後生仔普遍都勁過老人家。去到四五十歲必然收皮。呢個同數學都差不多（＊），或者彈鋼琴都係，一般十幾歲已經光芒四射，去到三十歲都冇突破嗰啲，唔該認命轉行，或者專注去培育新一代，或者寫文呃飯食，好似我而家咁（＊＊）

6. 呢篇文，就只係講呢兩個圖，上個月嘅研究論文，分析咗1890年-2014年嘅 24000盤棋（有冇最近500舖摸玉戒指？）。

7. 結論兩個，原文話齋：Champions decline with age and each generation is better than the last—即係棋手老咗就變廢，同埋一代新人勝舊人。

8. 前者另外再講，但後者，係我一路講嘅核心信念。人總係覺得自己個時代特別，我年紀嘅講見證公牛皇朝，或者睇馬勒當拿，或者係碧咸七旋斬，有今生冇來世。但我老豆嗰啲就會講當年告魯夫碧根鮑華嗰啲先係勁（雖然佢地唔知睇咗幾多場）。而家啲小朋友當然就話美斯　勒邦占士勁過　朗拿度　佐敦。

9. 我嘅睇法，講過多次。文學電影呢啲真係幾主觀，難講。但你講體育，仲要競技嘅，冇得傾，應該必然係新人勁過舊人。想當年乜乜乜嘅，只係啲老嘢嘅感情。理智上站不住腳。

10. 論據唔少，首先你睇個人項目，跑步游水之類，紀錄不停破，好多以前認為冇人可以做到嘅關口都破到。因為人會進步，科學會進步，體能當然好過當年。我睇唔到點解個人項目勁過當年，但隊際會唔一樣。

11. 咁總有會話，體力唔係一切，但你講技巧亦都係一樣。不講到太深入，但以前啲競賽水平低好多，而家啲球員一般都好全面，唔會死晒左腳，或者中鋒就唔識射罰波咁。告魯夫當年半場食煙都得，而家頂級賽事邊有可能？我估好快食煙嘅全部踢唔到頂級球隊。

12. 另一種想見嘅借口，叫做「球例唔同，冇得直接比」。Bull shit．做個假想實驗就知，你運而家一隊歐聯冠軍，同幾十年前嘅踢，贏面應該好高。我任你用咩例都好，或者大家都用十年前嘅例，或者畀一兩星期去適應。實力相差細就話啫，去到體能技術爭太遠嘅，人地踢大場贏你，踢細場都贏你。

13. 最後嘅遮醜佈，唯有講「個感染力唔同」「個feel唔同」「而家啲球員係好波佰冇咁優雅」。咁用到咁主觀嘅，就真係唔使討論的了，而我唔撚知幾時打波踢波變咗選美。

14. 講返，類似嘅原因，同樣適用於非體力競賽。固然未必同體能有關（但可能都有些少）。但都係嗰句，人類係進步嘅，你而家可以分析返晒以前嘅比賽（棋，或足球都係），加上而家啲參賽者訓練嚴格好多，唔再係以往天才波咁。

15. 但，點得到呢個「棋手老咗就變廢」同埋「一代新人勝舊人」嘅結論？體育個人項目就簡單啦，游幾耐到終點，冇得呃。隊際都有得分析，都係睇返體能，或者跑動距離之類，大約有個譜。但捉棋呢？點將而家嘅人，同當年嘅棋王比？

16. 有人知道我寫過Elo rating（https://bityl.co/4TPM），固然係一套好好嘅東西，但佢只係計到相對於其他對手嘅實力—即係我可以話到畀你知，呢個人在呢一代有幾屈機，屈機過老嘢在佢嗰代—但不代表呢個人勁過個老嘢，可能當年啲對手全部好勁呢？

17. 聰明嘅學者，就用一個好簡單（但可能有啲人唔舒服）嘅方法：用電腦！

18. 應該大家都知電腦捉西洋棋好叻，好多年前已經捉贏世界冠軍。因為西洋棋相對（例如相對於圍棋）簡單，計晒所有行法，再畀分，電腦再揀個最好嘅，好多年前技術已超成熟。所以話電腦係世界最強，應冇異議啦？

19. 學者就係睇，到底個人類棋手，行嘅棋，同電腦計嘅「最佳」，有幾吻合？電腦最強嘛，咁你成日同佢一樣，你咪勁。

20. 結果見到，好靚仔。首先睇左邊圖，打橫係棋手出世年份，打棟係有幾多%行法同電腦嘅最佳行法一樣。百幾年前嗰啲，一半都冇。而家嘅？過半年，穩步上揚。即係基本上你捉而家嘅冠軍，用時光機返當年同當年嘅冠軍捉，贏面極大。

21. 右邊嘅圖，深少少。打橫係棋手嘅年紀，打棟又係有幾多%行法同電腦嘅最佳行法一樣。而唔同嘅線，代表唔同年代嘅棋手。Two dimensional．

22. 首先見到，1975-1996嗰條線最高，之後一路跟年代落。即係，而家啲棋手30歲時，係勁過當年啲棋手30歲嗰時。事實上，1950-74年嗰代，25歲嗰時嘅實力，已經勁過1925-49嗰推一生中任何時間嘅水平。

23. 另外，每一條線咁去睇，亦都見到，至少1925-49，或者1950-74呢兩代嘅棋手，都係老咗就退化了。30歲左右到頂。最近一代1975-1996嘅，未有太多去到呢個階段。但最古老1836-1924嘅，反而見到老咗有進步，原因不明，我估同科技或文化進步有關？多咗書？多咗機會同其他國家交流？

24. 新人勝舊人，作者提到因為而家嘅訓練認真啲嚴格啲（鬼唔知咩），仲有數據同電腦幫助。至於點解30歲見頂？同腦部發展有關。嗯。所以我都係寫文算。文無第一，寫文呢啲，好主觀嘅，難分高下，容易呃飯食。（不過話說回頭，受歡迎嘅又不等於最勁，體育都係，否則英格蘭唔會咁多人捧，黎明都唔會咁多人鍾意，對不？）

（＊）可以睇Simon Singh嘅《費馬最後定理》（https://bityl.co/4TON），中文版都譯得不錯，我睇過最出色嘅科普書（可能唔使之一），不過我估有啲數理背景嘅讀者睇好啲。香港真係出唔到呢啲作家，此人本身已經係劍橋PhD，博學多材，仲要寫文寫得好，極唔容易。　

（＊＊）其實我換咗張相同banner係有意思的，居然冇一個人問。對，我就肯定冇得打籃球搵食。但做下表演賽搞下笑都仲得嘅。當然你可以質疑我同「哈林籃球隊」都仲爭好遠，話晒當年「哈林」可以打贏NBA（N年前，而家冇可能）。但，目標啫，個個貼美斯，最後又好波過美斯咩，好波過陳美斯都冇幾可。

———————————————————
新田飛地已開Patreon：港女批判，暗黑情場，性愛怪論，虛偽的香港人。地主為你一一踢爆，挑戰自論自由底線，知無不言，言無不盡。3蚊美金一個月，未夠買紙巾！你願意地主導你升仙嘛？（https://bityl.co/4MbY）

———————————————————
instagram @ivanliresearch．七成金融（短打）兩成嘢食一成其他嘢。

【After Winning Majority in LegCo: Beijing's Crackdown May Trigger International Intervention】

***感謝Hong Kong Columns - Translated，將我早前撰寫『議會過半想像：以「#國際攬炒」反制「臨立會2.0」』長文（https://www.facebook.com/joshuawongchifung/photos/a.313299448762570/2887650867994069/）翻譯成英文，鼓勵國際社會關注立會選舉一旦過半的沙盤推演，在最惡劣形勢下的制衡策略。***

中文精簡版本：https://www.facebook.com/joshuawongchifung/photos/a.564294826996363/2888641404561682/

Hongkongers have experienced our revolution for over half a year. They no longer take a consequentialist view to the effectiveness of their movement as they did years ago, or waste time second-guessing the intentions and background of fellow activists. Following the defensive battles at CUHK and PolyU, November’s District Council election saw a great victory of unity. More marvellous is the union between peaceful and “valiant” protesters.

In the process of resisting tyranny, the people have realised that one cannot prioritize one strategy over another. This is also how the common goal of “35+” came into being—the hope that we will win over half of the seats in the Legislative Council (LegCo) this September, such that the political spectrum that represents the majority of Hongkongers is able to gain control of legislative decisions. The political clout of Hongkongers will increase if 35 or more seats are successfully secured on our side. It is certainly one vital step to achieve the five demands within the system.

The possibility of realizing legislative majority

Technically it is not unrealistic to win a majority even under the current undemocratic system. Back in the 2016 LegCo election, we already won 30 seats. In addition to the District Council (First) functional constituency seat that is already in the pocket of the pan-democrats, as long as the candidates in Kowloon East and New Territories West do not start infighting again, we could safely secure 33 seats based on the number of pan-dem votes in 2016.

The other 3 seats required to achieve a majority depend on democrats’ breakthrough among the functional constituencies by dispersing the resources of the Liaison Office. They also count on whether the turnout this September could exceed 71.2% — that of last year’s District Council elections. Some of the factors that could affect the turnout include: will the epidemic persist into the summer? Will there be potential violent repression of protests in the 2 weeks preceding the election? Will Hong Kong-US relations be affected by the downturn of the global economy?

Therefore, the ambition of “35+” is to be prioritised by the resistance as both a means and an end. I have already expressed my support for an intra-party primary at the coordination meeting. In the meantime, it is pleasing to see the ongoing debates reaching a consensus of maximising the seats among geographical constituencies in the upcoming election.

Whilst enthusiastic coordination, we should also assess the post-election landscape and gauge Beijing’s reactions: if we do not reach 35 seats, Hong Kong will be subject to tighter control and more severe repression by China; but if the democratic parties successfully form a majority in LegCo, CCP’s fears of a “constitutional crisis” would become imminent. Hence, the key questions are how the Pan-Democrats should deal with the volatile political situation in Hong Kong and how they are going to meet Beijing’s charge head-on.

Watching out for Beijing’s dismissal of LegCo after reaching majority

To take back control of LegCo such that it faithfully reflects the majority’s principles and needs is the definition of a healthy democracy. Recently, however, DAB’s Tam Yiu-chung has warned that the plan of the Pan-Dems to “usurp power” in the LegCo would only lead to Beijing’s forceful disqualification of certain members or the interpretation of the Basic Law. This proves that winning a majority in LegCo is not only a popular conception but also a realistic challenge that would get on the nerves of Beijing. Could Beijing accept a President James To in LegCo? These unknown variables must be addressed upon achieving a majority.

While there is no telltale sign as to Beijing’s exact strategy, we are already familiar with the way CCP manipulated the Basic Law in the past 4 years. Having experienced three waves of disqualifications in LegCo, twice kicked out of LegCo with my team, and thrice locked up in jail, I have no false hopes of an easy compromise from Beijing: they would not let Pan-Dems control LegCo for half a year and wait (as is the proper procedure) until after having negatived the Budget to dissolve the legislature, and thereby giving them an easy victory in the re-elections. The greater the Pan-Dems threaten Beijing’s rule in Hong Kong, the more likely that it will trigger Beijing’s repression.

Since the disqualification and arrest of lawmakers have already become “normalised”, one can even imagine the police stepping into the LegCo building to force Pan-Dems into voting. Neither is it beyond our imagination to expect the CCP to kick out all 70 lawmakers in a fit of rage and replace them with a provisional LegCo “2.0” [HKCT note: The first was from 25 Jan 1997 to 30 Jun 1998]. To depend on a majority that could lead to a chapter of a “new testament” for One Country, Two Systems is perhaps what many elites long for, but they are overly optimistic:for a ticket to the promised land will not be available at the Chief Executive election campaign a year and a half later.

Admittedly, the Pan-Dems cannot unilaterally initiate “Laam-chaau” [HKCT note: mostly translated into “scorched-earth” mentality or “mutual destruction”; some even translated into “If I burn, you burn with us”]. The most they can do is to force a standstill of the government, and not for long the LegCo will have been eliminated from the equation to make the wheels turn again. It all leaves the plan of “Negativing the motion → Dissolving LegCo → Re-election after re-election → the stepping down of Carrie Lam” merely as overly positive speculation, probably resulting from their overestimate of CCP's capacity for rational calculation. The Pan-Dems must guard their frontlines and recognise what the biggest threat from Hong Kong to China could be. In this case, should LegCo sessions be disrupted or suspended, the Pan-Dems would have to be well prepared to surmount the expected obstacles and prevent the disqualification crisis 4 years ago—a Catch-22 indeed.

Productive tension from global intervention: Using Laam-chaau against the CCP

What aggravates the CCP the most is the potential threat to Hong Kong’s unique status as the one and only “separate customs territory”. Any miscalculation will compromise its role as the Chinese economy’s “white gloves”. Imagine if CCP were to disqualify all 70 elected lawmakers and convene a meeting north of the Shenzhen River to pass a resolution to Hong Kong’s affairs (much like the Provisional Legislative Council “1.0" in 1997), how great will the shock be in a world with an effective Hong Kong Human Rights and Democracy Act? However hard it is to predict the future one thing is certain: With the US presidential election just around the corner, blows to the separation of powers would not be tolerated, and the West would necessarily effect countermeasures against the Hong Kong government.

Beijing has been relying upon Hong Kong to navigate the international community for decades. While clamping down on the political freedom of the cosmopolitan city, Beijing desires to maintain the financial centre’s economic freedom. Hence, we started lobbying for the Hong Kong Human Rights and Democracy Act four years ago, and today we are determined to promote “Laam-chaau” on an international scale.

The will of the voters must be reflected in an election. If a “35+” legislature were to be dismissed and replaced, such flagrant violation of democracy would assuredly cause a greater backlash than the infamous extradition bill. Knowing what the reality ahead of us could be, we have to combine our election and international strategies to oppose the placement of a 35+ LegCo with an “Emergency Legislative Council 2.0”, to advance an international “Laam-chaau” to Hong Kong’s status as “separate customs territory”. Only then will we stand a chance to resist the regime and to realise the five demands.

Adjusting our mindset: Overcoming the “constitutional crisis” to reach a resolution

Upon the realization of the “35+” LegCo, it is expected that the CCP will launch a devastating counterattack. The Pan-Dems should not expect LegCo to run normally; neither can the lawmakers realise their governing blueprints they have for Hong Kong. Rather, candidates will be able to compete against one another with visions of a liberated Hong Kong through popular vote. Bringing this point up has nothing to do with undermining the common goal of reaching a majority in LegCo, but rather channels the battle of LegCo to positive use upon the rule of law’s death and a “constitutional crisis” ahead. Knowing that Hongkongers have nothing to fall back on, all Pan-Dems should not miss the only way to the realization of “35+”.

Thus, be they partisans, nonpartisans, incumbent politicians, amateur politicians, or the civil society as a whole – if we stay in the political discourse of 2016 and continue to perpetuate old stereotypes, that is to deal with the divisions on the pan-democratic camp by favouring the most “local” faction; to consider only resource allocation and self-aggrandizement as the purpose of a LegCo campaign; to ignore how potential lawmakers are fitted to what specific roles; to turn a blind eye to the journey of resistance since last summer (extending indefinitely into the future)—They would lead as astray and cost us lose a precious opportunity for change by winning a 35+ majority.

The extent to which the pan-democrats can stay united in light of the political atmosphere since last summer is another problem that our side must to address. Before the watershed moment of 12th June 2019, many democratic delegates were trapped in the mentality of needing to “preserve people’s livelihood”, “be content of what we have accomplished”, and other strategies that favours stability. As the government refuses to heed to the five demands, whether the democrats, especially those in the functional constituencies, have the political will to go all-in is the real difficult question that confronts us in the upcoming LegCo election.

All in all, if “35+” cannot be realised, it is unsurprising to see LegCo being more heavily suppressed in the next 4 years; even if "35+" is achieved, it is questionable whether the pan-democrats are able to weather multiple attacks, verbal or physical, from the regime (judging from its power in the last four years) and utilise the international Laam-chaau strategy against the displacement of LegCo. Adhering to the motto of “we fight on, each in his own way”, I can only hope that Hongkongers in elections, street confrontations and international front can reconcile with each other, so that we may collectively compel the government to yield to our demands in the next six months. It is only by reaching a resolution before a real constitutional crisis that we can combat the institutional violence of the regime and not be devoured by it.

https://hkcolumn.blogspot.com/2020/04/joshua-wong-after-winning-majority-in.html?fbclid=IwAR216gf53pG_j9JOpDfr2GItvjLfrFSekKTPzoEs3-s9KBqvPEwz865P8vw