Eli Clifton 挖挖挖。

錢是台灣人民納稅，怎麼用卻不被揭露。美國智庫是拿錢辦事，還是以金援為名收受獻金為實？

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以下中文新聞內容轉自 旺報：

https://www.chinatimes.com/newspapers/20200619000151-260309?chdtv

華府智庫昆西治安研究所（Quincy Institute）民主外交政策計畫執行人克里夫頓（Eli Clifton）於17日發表《台灣金援智庫：無所不在但很少揭露》（Taiwan funding of think tanks: Omnipresent and rarely disclosed）一文指出，台灣金援了美國五大智庫，促使這些智庫向美國執政者建言，做出有利於台灣綠營執政政府的美國政策。該文發出後，台北經濟文化代表處政治組組長趙怡翔緊急在推特上指出，該文有錯失之處，且並未向台北經濟文化代表處查證置評。

文章稱，台灣金援的五個華府智庫包括布魯金斯學會、美國進步中心（CAP）、新美國安全中心（CNAS）、戰略與國際研究中心（CSIS）以及哈德遜研究所，都有來自於台北經濟文化代表處的資金，但都將其深埋在其年度報告中。這五個華盛頓最著名、看似公正的的智庫一直在發表政策文件，敦促美國與台灣建立更緊密的關係，擴大美國與台灣的武器銷售和貿易協定，卻沒有廣泛披露其背後來自台北經濟文化代表處（TECRO）的高額資金。

支持台有助民主自由

文章詳列台北經濟文化代表處對五大智庫的贊助金額，及這些智庫收到贊助後為台灣做了什麼。文章稱，布魯金斯學會學者於2019年12月為《台北時報》撰文，指出美國兩黨支持在台灣和美國的重要性；美國進步中心研究員在今年3月分《華盛頓月刊》上發表專欄文章稱，加強美台關係將有助民主自由，並在2019年9月發表《如何支持亞洲的民主與人權》報告時，直接向美國決策者「為如何穩固支持台灣」提供直接建議。

而新美國安全中心向華盛頓提供有關2020年《中國崛起的挑戰》報告時，敦促美國決策者優先考慮與台灣的雙邊投資和貿易協定；CSIS在5月發表前美國駐港澳總領事唐偉康（Kurt Tong）的文章，其中主張美台達成貿易協定，將能加強美國在亞洲領導地位。

倡售台集束炸彈抗中

哈德遜研究所則於5月向美國決策者提出售台「集束炸彈」，以便台灣可以威脅對中共具有重大政治價值的非軍事目標及領導人，並建議鼓勵台灣有效威脅中國的非軍事目標。還鼓勵美國決策者「做出直接有利於台灣綠營執政黨的政策」，敦促美國決策者承認「一個自治或獨立的台灣」。

原文請見：

Taiwan funding of think tanks: Omnipresent and rarely disclosed

https://responsiblestatecraft.org/2020/06/17/taiwan-funding-of-think-tanks-omnipresent-and-rarely-disclosed/

[節錄]

Why not disclose?

Hudson may be the most extreme in its policy proposals, but the consistent behavior from the five think tanks is unmistakable: General support funding from Taiwan’s government is never disclosed when experts, whose salaries may well be partially funded by TECRO dollars, offer policy recommendations regarding U.S.-Taiwan relations.

“My philosophy is that if you’re producing any report, you should put right up front in an acknowledgment section that lists the specific funders, including general-support funders, that helped make this report possible and list any potential conflict of interest with the funders,” said Freeman of the Foreign Influence Transparency Initiative. “Let the reader judge for themself whether there’s a conflict of interest.”

Though the appearance or possibility of a conflict of interest does not mean that the funding flows from Taiwan influenced the work products produced by the think tanks, the decision not to prominently disclose the funding may undermine otherwise valuable analysis and policy proposals.

“It seems like because they hid it, they have something to hide,” said Freeman. “When the public trust in government is at all-time lows and people think D.C. is so corrupt, it’s even more important for think tanks and think tank scholars to put this information out there and try and restore the trust of the American public.”

Indeed, as acceptance of a cold war posture toward China becomes ever more accepted as a foregone conclusion by Washington influencers, one of them actually highlighted the danger of foreign funding going largely undisclosed.

CNAS’s 2020 report that advocated for a U.S.-Taiwan trade agreement warned of think tanks receiving “substantial funding from Beijing that is often targeted at shaping views and discourse on China.” CNAS recommended “higher degrees of transparency” to help “ensure that this funding is not generating hidden forms of foreign lobbying, self-censorship, or other activities that undermine core U.S. democratic principles.”

That self-awareness about the potential influence of foreign funding, and the ethical arguments for greater transparency, does not appear to extend to the omnipresent funding stream from Taipei to think tanks across the Beltway.