【After Winning Majority in LegCo: Beijing's Crackdown May Trigger International Intervention】

***感謝Hong Kong Columns - Translated，將我早前撰寫『議會過半想像：以「#國際攬炒」反制「臨立會2.0」』長文（https://www.facebook.com/joshuawongchifung/photos/a.313299448762570/2887650867994069/）翻譯成英文，鼓勵國際社會關注立會選舉一旦過半的沙盤推演，在最惡劣形勢下的制衡策略。***

中文精簡版本：https://www.facebook.com/joshuawongchifung/photos/a.564294826996363/2888641404561682/

Hongkongers have experienced our revolution for over half a year. They no longer take a consequentialist view to the effectiveness of their movement as they did years ago, or waste time second-guessing the intentions and background of fellow activists. Following the defensive battles at CUHK and PolyU, November’s District Council election saw a great victory of unity. More marvellous is the union between peaceful and “valiant” protesters.

In the process of resisting tyranny, the people have realised that one cannot prioritize one strategy over another. This is also how the common goal of “35+” came into being—the hope that we will win over half of the seats in the Legislative Council (LegCo) this September, such that the political spectrum that represents the majority of Hongkongers is able to gain control of legislative decisions. The political clout of Hongkongers will increase if 35 or more seats are successfully secured on our side. It is certainly one vital step to achieve the five demands within the system.

The possibility of realizing legislative majority

Technically it is not unrealistic to win a majority even under the current undemocratic system. Back in the 2016 LegCo election, we already won 30 seats. In addition to the District Council (First) functional constituency seat that is already in the pocket of the pan-democrats, as long as the candidates in Kowloon East and New Territories West do not start infighting again, we could safely secure 33 seats based on the number of pan-dem votes in 2016.

The other 3 seats required to achieve a majority depend on democrats’ breakthrough among the functional constituencies by dispersing the resources of the Liaison Office. They also count on whether the turnout this September could exceed 71.2% — that of last year’s District Council elections. Some of the factors that could affect the turnout include: will the epidemic persist into the summer? Will there be potential violent repression of protests in the 2 weeks preceding the election? Will Hong Kong-US relations be affected by the downturn of the global economy?

Therefore, the ambition of “35+” is to be prioritised by the resistance as both a means and an end. I have already expressed my support for an intra-party primary at the coordination meeting. In the meantime, it is pleasing to see the ongoing debates reaching a consensus of maximising the seats among geographical constituencies in the upcoming election.

Whilst enthusiastic coordination, we should also assess the post-election landscape and gauge Beijing’s reactions: if we do not reach 35 seats, Hong Kong will be subject to tighter control and more severe repression by China; but if the democratic parties successfully form a majority in LegCo, CCP’s fears of a “constitutional crisis” would become imminent. Hence, the key questions are how the Pan-Democrats should deal with the volatile political situation in Hong Kong and how they are going to meet Beijing’s charge head-on.

Watching out for Beijing’s dismissal of LegCo after reaching majority

To take back control of LegCo such that it faithfully reflects the majority’s principles and needs is the definition of a healthy democracy. Recently, however, DAB’s Tam Yiu-chung has warned that the plan of the Pan-Dems to “usurp power” in the LegCo would only lead to Beijing’s forceful disqualification of certain members or the interpretation of the Basic Law. This proves that winning a majority in LegCo is not only a popular conception but also a realistic challenge that would get on the nerves of Beijing. Could Beijing accept a President James To in LegCo? These unknown variables must be addressed upon achieving a majority.

While there is no telltale sign as to Beijing’s exact strategy, we are already familiar with the way CCP manipulated the Basic Law in the past 4 years. Having experienced three waves of disqualifications in LegCo, twice kicked out of LegCo with my team, and thrice locked up in jail, I have no false hopes of an easy compromise from Beijing: they would not let Pan-Dems control LegCo for half a year and wait (as is the proper procedure) until after having negatived the Budget to dissolve the legislature, and thereby giving them an easy victory in the re-elections. The greater the Pan-Dems threaten Beijing’s rule in Hong Kong, the more likely that it will trigger Beijing’s repression.

Since the disqualification and arrest of lawmakers have already become “normalised”, one can even imagine the police stepping into the LegCo building to force Pan-Dems into voting. Neither is it beyond our imagination to expect the CCP to kick out all 70 lawmakers in a fit of rage and replace them with a provisional LegCo “2.0” [HKCT note: The first was from 25 Jan 1997 to 30 Jun 1998]. To depend on a majority that could lead to a chapter of a “new testament” for One Country, Two Systems is perhaps what many elites long for, but they are overly optimistic:for a ticket to the promised land will not be available at the Chief Executive election campaign a year and a half later.

Admittedly, the Pan-Dems cannot unilaterally initiate “Laam-chaau” [HKCT note: mostly translated into “scorched-earth” mentality or “mutual destruction”; some even translated into “If I burn, you burn with us”]. The most they can do is to force a standstill of the government, and not for long the LegCo will have been eliminated from the equation to make the wheels turn again. It all leaves the plan of “Negativing the motion → Dissolving LegCo → Re-election after re-election → the stepping down of Carrie Lam” merely as overly positive speculation, probably resulting from their overestimate of CCP's capacity for rational calculation. The Pan-Dems must guard their frontlines and recognise what the biggest threat from Hong Kong to China could be. In this case, should LegCo sessions be disrupted or suspended, the Pan-Dems would have to be well prepared to surmount the expected obstacles and prevent the disqualification crisis 4 years ago—a Catch-22 indeed.

Productive tension from global intervention: Using Laam-chaau against the CCP

What aggravates the CCP the most is the potential threat to Hong Kong’s unique status as the one and only “separate customs territory”. Any miscalculation will compromise its role as the Chinese economy’s “white gloves”. Imagine if CCP were to disqualify all 70 elected lawmakers and convene a meeting north of the Shenzhen River to pass a resolution to Hong Kong’s affairs (much like the Provisional Legislative Council “1.0" in 1997), how great will the shock be in a world with an effective Hong Kong Human Rights and Democracy Act? However hard it is to predict the future one thing is certain: With the US presidential election just around the corner, blows to the separation of powers would not be tolerated, and the West would necessarily effect countermeasures against the Hong Kong government.

Beijing has been relying upon Hong Kong to navigate the international community for decades. While clamping down on the political freedom of the cosmopolitan city, Beijing desires to maintain the financial centre’s economic freedom. Hence, we started lobbying for the Hong Kong Human Rights and Democracy Act four years ago, and today we are determined to promote “Laam-chaau” on an international scale.

The will of the voters must be reflected in an election. If a “35+” legislature were to be dismissed and replaced, such flagrant violation of democracy would assuredly cause a greater backlash than the infamous extradition bill. Knowing what the reality ahead of us could be, we have to combine our election and international strategies to oppose the placement of a 35+ LegCo with an “Emergency Legislative Council 2.0”, to advance an international “Laam-chaau” to Hong Kong’s status as “separate customs territory”. Only then will we stand a chance to resist the regime and to realise the five demands.

Adjusting our mindset: Overcoming the “constitutional crisis” to reach a resolution

Upon the realization of the “35+” LegCo, it is expected that the CCP will launch a devastating counterattack. The Pan-Dems should not expect LegCo to run normally; neither can the lawmakers realise their governing blueprints they have for Hong Kong. Rather, candidates will be able to compete against one another with visions of a liberated Hong Kong through popular vote. Bringing this point up has nothing to do with undermining the common goal of reaching a majority in LegCo, but rather channels the battle of LegCo to positive use upon the rule of law’s death and a “constitutional crisis” ahead. Knowing that Hongkongers have nothing to fall back on, all Pan-Dems should not miss the only way to the realization of “35+”.

Thus, be they partisans, nonpartisans, incumbent politicians, amateur politicians, or the civil society as a whole – if we stay in the political discourse of 2016 and continue to perpetuate old stereotypes, that is to deal with the divisions on the pan-democratic camp by favouring the most “local” faction; to consider only resource allocation and self-aggrandizement as the purpose of a LegCo campaign; to ignore how potential lawmakers are fitted to what specific roles; to turn a blind eye to the journey of resistance since last summer (extending indefinitely into the future)—They would lead as astray and cost us lose a precious opportunity for change by winning a 35+ majority.

The extent to which the pan-democrats can stay united in light of the political atmosphere since last summer is another problem that our side must to address. Before the watershed moment of 12th June 2019, many democratic delegates were trapped in the mentality of needing to “preserve people’s livelihood”, “be content of what we have accomplished”, and other strategies that favours stability. As the government refuses to heed to the five demands, whether the democrats, especially those in the functional constituencies, have the political will to go all-in is the real difficult question that confronts us in the upcoming LegCo election.

All in all, if “35+” cannot be realised, it is unsurprising to see LegCo being more heavily suppressed in the next 4 years; even if "35+" is achieved, it is questionable whether the pan-democrats are able to weather multiple attacks, verbal or physical, from the regime (judging from its power in the last four years) and utilise the international Laam-chaau strategy against the displacement of LegCo. Adhering to the motto of “we fight on, each in his own way”, I can only hope that Hongkongers in elections, street confrontations and international front can reconcile with each other, so that we may collectively compel the government to yield to our demands in the next six months. It is only by reaching a resolution before a real constitutional crisis that we can combat the institutional violence of the regime and not be devoured by it.

https://hkcolumn.blogspot.com/2020/04/joshua-wong-after-winning-majority-in.html?fbclid=IwAR216gf53pG_j9JOpDfr2GItvjLfrFSekKTPzoEs3-s9KBqvPEwz865P8vw

【前港督彭定康錄影發言　促香港政府撤回修訂逃犯條例】

「我希望即使在這個最後階段，政府仍然可以退讓，撤回方案，不要再添亂。這修例不需要通過，亦不應該通過，香港應該繼續是一個有法治、有自由的社會，而不應該面對這些令人憂心的引渡修例。」

發言英文紀錄及中文翻譯：

Former Hong Kong Governor Lord Chris Patten video message Transcript

I know that this week in Hong Kong, thousands of people will be making their views clear, demonstrating against the proposals on extradition, which the government has put forward, extradition to China. It’s a proposal, or a set of proposals, which strike a terrible blow - I think - and so, I think to most people in Hong Kong and so does the international community, against the rule of law, against Hong Kong’s stability and security, against Hong Kong’s position as a great international trading hub. And the surprise is that the government in Hong Kong doesn’t seem to understand that. It does make you wonder sometimes who actually runs Hong Kong these days: is it the Hong Kong government or is it the joint liaison office acting on behalf of the communist regime in Beijing?

Why is this important? Well it’s the latest in a number of things that have happened in recent years which have tightened Beijing’s grip on Hong Kong, and which have profoundly worried people. I think for ten or a dozen years after 1997, things in Hong Kong went pretty well. Of course they could have gone better, I’m sorry that Beijing throttled the development of democracy, much against the promises that have been made earlier. But by and large, I think, Hong Kong remained a very free and successful society.

But ever since the regime in Beijing started to roll back Deng Xiaoping’s reforms and the developments that have taken place under Jiang Zemin and Zhu Rongji and Hu Jintao, and Wen Jiabao; ever since then, with the Party taking control over everything, cracking down on dissidents, cracking down on human rights, locking people up, incarcerating them in Xinjiang and so on. Ever since then, we know that Beijing has also been tightening its grip, or trying to, in Hong Kong. And I think that the latest proposals on extradition are an example of that.

Now a lot of very spurious arguments are put forward, it said that the present situation is a “loophole” which needs to be filled up - that’s absolute nonsense. People have known exactly why there shouldn’t be an extradition agreement with China for years, and many of the arguments put for the government’s proposals don’t actually pass the laugh-off-your-seat test. The argument that, well, it’s better to have an extradition treaty than to abduct people illegally from Hong Kong - are people really supposed to believe that?

Except for, but of course, Western democracies in Europe have extradition agreements with China, but they’re in a very different position to the position that Hong Kong is in. The reason why international chambers of commerce, why lawyers, why business around the world, why governments have raised their objections is very simple: because what these proposals do is to remove the firewall between Hong Kong’s rule of law and the idea of law - which prevails in Communist China - an idea of law where there aren’t any independent courts, where the courts and the security services and the party’s rules - which are, sometimes, pretty obscure - are rolled altogether. That’s why we’ve seen recently Canadian citizens that are locked up are taken as if it were hostage against things happening in Canada itself under the rule of law there. So it’s not surprising that people are so worried about what is happening.

I know that when people talk about the particular problem in relation to Taiwan, the leaders of the Hong Kong Bar Association over the last few years, I think a dozen of them, have put forward proposals which show how you could deal with that issue building on the existing common law.

So these proposals are bad for Hong Kong, they - I think - raise all sorts of questions which the government hasn’t even thought through, not least about Hong Kong’s economic importance and economic stability. We know very well that Hong Kong needs to be treated separately in economic and commercial matters from the rest of China. When I was governor a long time ago, I used to travel to Washington fairly regularly to argue the case for treating Hong Kong differently from, say, Shenzhen and Shanghai. But if you appear to be regarding Hong Kong from Beijing as though it was just another China city, then sooner or later, economic governments around the world, businesses around the world, when they’re looking even at things like the Belt and Road Initiative, they’re going to regard Hong Kong as just another part of China, and that would be really bad for the standard of living, for the quality of life in Hong Kong!

Above all, of course, if we go ahead, if the government goes ahead with this extradition agreement, it will cause unnecessary worries and anxieties in Hong Kong. That’s a really bad thing. I hope that even at this late stage, the government will back off and leave well alone. It doesn’t have to happen, it shouldn’t happen, and Hong Kong should carry on as a free society, under the rule of law, without having to worry about this extradition.

前港督彭定康錄影講話翻譯

我知道這星期在香港，成千上萬的人將會到街上遊行表達自己的意見，反對政府所提出將會容許引渡到中國的引渡修例建議。這是一項，或者應該說是一系列我及國際社會認為將會對香港的法治、香港的穩定和社會安全造成很大打擊的建議，它將會嚴重傷害香港作為一個國際貿易中心的地位。令人驚訝的是，香港政府似乎並不理解這一點。這確實令人懷疑這些日子究竟是誰在管治香港：是香港政府還是代表北京共產黨政權的中聯辦？

為甚麼這修例是這麼重要？這是近年來發生的一系列容許北京強行控制香港的事件之一，而這一直以來都讓人深感憂慮。我覺得在1997年之後的十年至十幾年，香港的情況進展尚算順利。當然，是本來可以更好，我很遺憾北京扼殺了香港民主的發展，違背了之前所作出的承諾。但總的來說，香港在那個時候仍然是一個非常自由和成功的社會。

但是，自北京政權開始推翻鄧小平的改革以及在江澤民、朱熔基、胡錦濤和溫家寶時期所推行的發展以後，共產黨控制着一切，打擊持不同政見的人，打擊人權，在新疆把人民關押等等。從那時起，我們就知道北京一直在試圖加緊控制香港。我認為最新的引渡建議就是一個例子。

現在香港政府提出了許多非常虛假的論點，它說目前的情況是展現了一個需要填補的「洞」，這絕對是胡說八道。大家多年來都確切地清楚知道不應該與中國達成引渡協議的原因。而政府提出的許多論點實際上也沒有一個不令你拍案大笑。政府認為制定引渡條約比從香港非法綁架人民更好，你認真覺得人們應該相信這個說法嗎？

當然他們又會說歐洲的西方民主國家與中國已經簽訂了引渡協議，但它們與香港根本處於完全不同的地位。國際商會、律師、商人及各國政府之所以提出反對意見的原因非常簡單：因為這些修例將會摧毀香港法治與中國共產黨的法治概念之間的防火牆。中國的法律觀念不包括任何獨立的法院，並把法院、國安部門以及黨的規則 （黨規則亦有時相當模糊）完全混在一起。這就是為甚麼我們最近看到被關起來的加拿大公民被用為人質，反對加拿大本身在她自己國家的法治下所發生的事情。因此，人們如此擔心這修例所帶來的影響並不奇怪。

我知道當人們都正在談到與台灣有關的問題之際，過去幾年的香港大律師公會領導人，應該是有十幾位，都已經提出意見，說明你如何就着香港現行的普通法來處理這個問題。

這些修例對香港不利，我認為這些修例所引發的疑問是甚至政府都沒有仔細考慮過的，尤其是對香港經濟重要性和經濟穩定性的影響。我們非常清楚在經濟和商業方面是需要把香港與中國其他地區分開對待。很久以前，當我還是港督的時候，我經常前往華盛頓游說對方看待香港的時候要跟對待深圳和上海之類的中國城市有所不同。但是如果以北京的角度看香港，將香港當為另一個普通中國城市，那麼世界各地的政府及企業將會視香港為中國的一部分（而不是特區），就算是看待「一帶一路」之類倡議時亦會是如此。這對香港的生活水平和生活質素都是非常不利的！

當然，最重要的是如果香港政府繼續硬推這些引渡修例，這將會在香港引起不必要的憂慮和焦慮。這些都是非常糟糕的事情。我希望即使在這個最後階段，政府仍然可以退讓，撤回方案，不要再添亂。這修例不需要通過，亦不應該通過，香港應該繼續是一個有法治、有自由的社會，而不應該面對這些令人憂心的引渡修例。

【前港督彭定康錄影發言　促香港政府撤回修訂逃犯條例】

「我希望即使在這個最後階段，政府仍然可以退讓，撤回方案，不要再添亂。這修例不需要通過，亦不應該通過，香港應該繼續是一個有法治、有自由的社會，而不應該面對這些令人憂心的引渡修例。」

發言英文紀錄及中文翻譯：

Former Hong Kong Governor Lord Chris Patten video message Transcript

I know that this week in Hong Kong, thousands of people will be making their views clear, demonstrating against the proposals on extradition, which the government has put forward, extradition to China. It’s a proposal, or a set of proposals, which strike a terrible blow - I think - and so, I think to most people in Hong Kong and so does the international community, against the rule of law, against Hong Kong’s stability and security, against Hong Kong’s position as a great international trading hub. And the surprise is that the government in Hong Kong doesn’t seem to understand that. It does make you wonder sometimes who actually runs Hong Kong these days: is it the Hong Kong government or is it the joint liaison office acting on behalf of the communist regime in Beijing?

Why is this important? Well it’s the latest in a number of things that have happened in recent years which have tightened Beijing’s grip on Hong Kong, and which have profoundly worried people. I think for ten or a dozen years after 1997, things in Hong Kong went pretty well. Of course they could have gone better, I’m sorry that Beijing throttled the development of democracy, much against the promises that have been made earlier. But by and large, I think, Hong Kong remained a very free and successful society.

But ever since the regime in Beijing started to roll back Deng Xiaoping’s reforms and the developments that have taken place under Jiang Zemin and Zhu Rongji and Hu Jintao, and Wen Jiabao; ever since then, with the Party taking control over everything, cracking down on dissidents, cracking down on human rights, locking people up, incarcerating them in Xinjiang and so on. Ever since then, we know that Beijing has also been tightening its grip, or trying to, in Hong Kong. And I think that the latest proposals on extradition are an example of that.

Now a lot of very spurious arguments are put forward, it said that the present situation is a “loophole” which needs to be filled up - that’s absolute nonsense. People have known exactly why there shouldn’t be an extradition agreement with China for years, and many of the arguments put for the government’s proposals don’t actually pass the laugh-off-your-seat test. The argument that, well, it’s better to have an extradition treaty than to abduct people illegally from Hong Kong - are people really supposed to believe that?

Except for, but of course, Western democracies in Europe have extradition agreements with China, but they’re in a very different position to the position that Hong Kong is in. The reason why international chambers of commerce, why lawyers, why business around the world, why governments have raised their objections is very simple: because what these proposals do is to remove the firewall between Hong Kong’s rule of law and the idea of law - which prevails in Communist China - an idea of law where there aren’t any independent courts, where the courts and the security services and the party’s rules - which are, sometimes, pretty obscure - are rolled altogether. That’s why we’ve seen recently Canadian citizens that are locked up are taken as if it were hostage against things happening in Canada itself under the rule of law there. So it’s not surprising that people are so worried about what is happening.

I know that when people talk about the particular problem in relation to Taiwan, the leaders of the Hong Kong Bar Association over the last few years, I think a dozen of them, have put forward proposals which show how you could deal with that issue building on the existing common law.

So these proposals are bad for Hong Kong, they - I think - raise all sorts of questions which the government hasn’t even thought through, not least about Hong Kong’s economic importance and economic stability. We know very well that Hong Kong needs to be treated separately in economic and commercial matters from the rest of China. When I was governor a long time ago, I used to travel to Washington fairly regularly to argue the case for treating Hong Kong differently from, say, Shenzhen and Shanghai. But if you appear to be regarding Hong Kong from Beijing as though it was just another China city, then sooner or later, economic governments around the world, businesses around the world, when they’re looking even at things like the Belt and Road Initiative, they’re going to regard Hong Kong as just another part of China, and that would be really bad for the standard of living, for the quality of life in Hong Kong!

Above all, of course, if we go ahead, if the government goes ahead with this extradition agreement, it will cause unnecessary worries and anxieties in Hong Kong. That’s a really bad thing. I hope that even at this late stage, the government will back off and leave well alone. It doesn’t have to happen, it shouldn’t happen, and Hong Kong should carry on as a free society, under the rule of law, without having to worry about this extradition.

前港督彭定康錄影講話翻譯

我知道這星期在香港，成千上萬的人將會到街上遊行表達自己的意見，反對政府所提出將會容許引渡到中國的引渡修例建議。這是一項，或者應該說是一系列我及國際社會認為將會對香港的法治、香港的穩定和社會安全造成很大打擊的建議，它將會嚴重傷害香港作為一個國際貿易中心的地位。令人驚訝的是，香港政府似乎並不理解這一點。這確實令人懷疑這些日子究竟是誰在管治香港：是香港政府還是代表北京共產黨政權的中聯辦？

為甚麼這修例是這麼重要？這是近年來發生的一系列容許北京強行控制香港的事件之一，而這一直以來都讓人深感憂慮。我覺得在1997年之後的十年至十幾年，香港的情況進展尚算順利。當然，是本來可以更好，我很遺憾北京扼殺了香港民主的發展，違背了之前所作出的承諾。但總的來說，香港在那個時候仍然是一個非常自由和成功的社會。

但是，自北京政權開始推翻鄧小平的改革以及在江澤民、朱熔基、胡錦濤和溫家寶時期所推行的發展以後，共產黨控制着一切，打擊持不同政見的人，打擊人權，在新疆把人民關押等等。從那時起，我們就知道北京一直在試圖加緊控制香港。我認為最新的引渡建議就是一個例子。

現在香港政府提出了許多非常虛假的論點，它說目前的情況是展現了一個需要填補的「洞」，這絕對是胡說八道。大家多年來都確切地清楚知道不應該與中國達成引渡協議的原因。而政府提出的許多論點實際上也沒有一個不令你拍案大笑。政府認為制定引渡條約比從香港非法綁架人民更好，你認真覺得人們應該相信這個說法嗎？

當然他們又會說歐洲的西方民主國家與中國已經簽訂了引渡協議，但它們與香港根本處於完全不同的地位。國際商會、律師、商人及各國政府之所以提出反對意見的原因非常簡單：因為這些修例將會摧毀香港法治與中國共產黨的法治概念之間的防火牆。中國的法律觀念不包括任何獨立的法院，並把法院、國安部門以及黨的規則 （黨規則亦有時相當模糊）完全混在一起。這就是為甚麼我們最近看到被關起來的加拿大公民被用為人質，反對加拿大本身在她自己國家的法治下所發生的事情。因此，人們如此擔心這修例所帶來的影響並不奇怪。

我知道當人們都正在談到與台灣有關的問題之際，過去幾年的香港大律師公會領導人，應該是有十幾位，都已經提出意見，說明你如何就着香港現行的普通法來處理這個問題。

這些修例對香港不利，我認為這些修例所引發的疑問是甚至政府都沒有仔細考慮過的，尤其是對香港經濟重要性和經濟穩定性的影響。我們非常清楚在經濟和商業方面是需要把香港與中國其他地區分開對待。很久以前，當我還是港督的時候，我經常前往華盛頓游說對方看待香港的時候要跟對待深圳和上海之類的中國城市有所不同。但是如果以北京的角度看香港，將香港當為另一個普通中國城市，那麼世界各地的政府及企業將會視香港為中國的一部分（而不是特區），就算是看待「一帶一路」之類倡議時亦會是如此。這對香港的生活水平和生活質素都是非常不利的！

當然，最重要的是如果香港政府繼續硬推這些引渡修例，這將會在香港引起不必要的憂慮和焦慮。這些都是非常糟糕的事情。我希望即使在這個最後階段，政府仍然可以退讓，撤回方案，不要再添亂。這修例不需要通過，亦不應該通過，香港應該繼續是一個有法治、有自由的社會，而不應該面對這些令人憂心的引渡修例。