【After Winning Majority in LegCo: Beijing's Crackdown May Trigger International Intervention】

***感謝Hong Kong Columns - Translated，將我早前撰寫『議會過半想像：以「#國際攬炒」反制「臨立會2.0」』長文（https://www.facebook.com/joshuawongchifung/photos/a.313299448762570/2887650867994069/）翻譯成英文，鼓勵國際社會關注立會選舉一旦過半的沙盤推演，在最惡劣形勢下的制衡策略。***

中文精簡版本：https://www.facebook.com/joshuawongchifung/photos/a.564294826996363/2888641404561682/

Hongkongers have experienced our revolution for over half a year. They no longer take a consequentialist view to the effectiveness of their movement as they did years ago, or waste time second-guessing the intentions and background of fellow activists. Following the defensive battles at CUHK and PolyU, November’s District Council election saw a great victory of unity. More marvellous is the union between peaceful and “valiant” protesters.

In the process of resisting tyranny, the people have realised that one cannot prioritize one strategy over another. This is also how the common goal of “35+” came into being—the hope that we will win over half of the seats in the Legislative Council (LegCo) this September, such that the political spectrum that represents the majority of Hongkongers is able to gain control of legislative decisions. The political clout of Hongkongers will increase if 35 or more seats are successfully secured on our side. It is certainly one vital step to achieve the five demands within the system.

The possibility of realizing legislative majority

Technically it is not unrealistic to win a majority even under the current undemocratic system. Back in the 2016 LegCo election, we already won 30 seats. In addition to the District Council (First) functional constituency seat that is already in the pocket of the pan-democrats, as long as the candidates in Kowloon East and New Territories West do not start infighting again, we could safely secure 33 seats based on the number of pan-dem votes in 2016.

The other 3 seats required to achieve a majority depend on democrats’ breakthrough among the functional constituencies by dispersing the resources of the Liaison Office. They also count on whether the turnout this September could exceed 71.2% — that of last year’s District Council elections. Some of the factors that could affect the turnout include: will the epidemic persist into the summer? Will there be potential violent repression of protests in the 2 weeks preceding the election? Will Hong Kong-US relations be affected by the downturn of the global economy?

Therefore, the ambition of “35+” is to be prioritised by the resistance as both a means and an end. I have already expressed my support for an intra-party primary at the coordination meeting. In the meantime, it is pleasing to see the ongoing debates reaching a consensus of maximising the seats among geographical constituencies in the upcoming election.

Whilst enthusiastic coordination, we should also assess the post-election landscape and gauge Beijing’s reactions: if we do not reach 35 seats, Hong Kong will be subject to tighter control and more severe repression by China; but if the democratic parties successfully form a majority in LegCo, CCP’s fears of a “constitutional crisis” would become imminent. Hence, the key questions are how the Pan-Democrats should deal with the volatile political situation in Hong Kong and how they are going to meet Beijing’s charge head-on.

Watching out for Beijing’s dismissal of LegCo after reaching majority

To take back control of LegCo such that it faithfully reflects the majority’s principles and needs is the definition of a healthy democracy. Recently, however, DAB’s Tam Yiu-chung has warned that the plan of the Pan-Dems to “usurp power” in the LegCo would only lead to Beijing’s forceful disqualification of certain members or the interpretation of the Basic Law. This proves that winning a majority in LegCo is not only a popular conception but also a realistic challenge that would get on the nerves of Beijing. Could Beijing accept a President James To in LegCo? These unknown variables must be addressed upon achieving a majority.

While there is no telltale sign as to Beijing’s exact strategy, we are already familiar with the way CCP manipulated the Basic Law in the past 4 years. Having experienced three waves of disqualifications in LegCo, twice kicked out of LegCo with my team, and thrice locked up in jail, I have no false hopes of an easy compromise from Beijing: they would not let Pan-Dems control LegCo for half a year and wait (as is the proper procedure) until after having negatived the Budget to dissolve the legislature, and thereby giving them an easy victory in the re-elections. The greater the Pan-Dems threaten Beijing’s rule in Hong Kong, the more likely that it will trigger Beijing’s repression.

Since the disqualification and arrest of lawmakers have already become “normalised”, one can even imagine the police stepping into the LegCo building to force Pan-Dems into voting. Neither is it beyond our imagination to expect the CCP to kick out all 70 lawmakers in a fit of rage and replace them with a provisional LegCo “2.0” [HKCT note: The first was from 25 Jan 1997 to 30 Jun 1998]. To depend on a majority that could lead to a chapter of a “new testament” for One Country, Two Systems is perhaps what many elites long for, but they are overly optimistic:for a ticket to the promised land will not be available at the Chief Executive election campaign a year and a half later.

Admittedly, the Pan-Dems cannot unilaterally initiate “Laam-chaau” [HKCT note: mostly translated into “scorched-earth” mentality or “mutual destruction”; some even translated into “If I burn, you burn with us”]. The most they can do is to force a standstill of the government, and not for long the LegCo will have been eliminated from the equation to make the wheels turn again. It all leaves the plan of “Negativing the motion → Dissolving LegCo → Re-election after re-election → the stepping down of Carrie Lam” merely as overly positive speculation, probably resulting from their overestimate of CCP's capacity for rational calculation. The Pan-Dems must guard their frontlines and recognise what the biggest threat from Hong Kong to China could be. In this case, should LegCo sessions be disrupted or suspended, the Pan-Dems would have to be well prepared to surmount the expected obstacles and prevent the disqualification crisis 4 years ago—a Catch-22 indeed.

Productive tension from global intervention: Using Laam-chaau against the CCP

What aggravates the CCP the most is the potential threat to Hong Kong’s unique status as the one and only “separate customs territory”. Any miscalculation will compromise its role as the Chinese economy’s “white gloves”. Imagine if CCP were to disqualify all 70 elected lawmakers and convene a meeting north of the Shenzhen River to pass a resolution to Hong Kong’s affairs (much like the Provisional Legislative Council “1.0" in 1997), how great will the shock be in a world with an effective Hong Kong Human Rights and Democracy Act? However hard it is to predict the future one thing is certain: With the US presidential election just around the corner, blows to the separation of powers would not be tolerated, and the West would necessarily effect countermeasures against the Hong Kong government.

Beijing has been relying upon Hong Kong to navigate the international community for decades. While clamping down on the political freedom of the cosmopolitan city, Beijing desires to maintain the financial centre’s economic freedom. Hence, we started lobbying for the Hong Kong Human Rights and Democracy Act four years ago, and today we are determined to promote “Laam-chaau” on an international scale.

The will of the voters must be reflected in an election. If a “35+” legislature were to be dismissed and replaced, such flagrant violation of democracy would assuredly cause a greater backlash than the infamous extradition bill. Knowing what the reality ahead of us could be, we have to combine our election and international strategies to oppose the placement of a 35+ LegCo with an “Emergency Legislative Council 2.0”, to advance an international “Laam-chaau” to Hong Kong’s status as “separate customs territory”. Only then will we stand a chance to resist the regime and to realise the five demands.

Adjusting our mindset: Overcoming the “constitutional crisis” to reach a resolution

Upon the realization of the “35+” LegCo, it is expected that the CCP will launch a devastating counterattack. The Pan-Dems should not expect LegCo to run normally; neither can the lawmakers realise their governing blueprints they have for Hong Kong. Rather, candidates will be able to compete against one another with visions of a liberated Hong Kong through popular vote. Bringing this point up has nothing to do with undermining the common goal of reaching a majority in LegCo, but rather channels the battle of LegCo to positive use upon the rule of law’s death and a “constitutional crisis” ahead. Knowing that Hongkongers have nothing to fall back on, all Pan-Dems should not miss the only way to the realization of “35+”.

Thus, be they partisans, nonpartisans, incumbent politicians, amateur politicians, or the civil society as a whole – if we stay in the political discourse of 2016 and continue to perpetuate old stereotypes, that is to deal with the divisions on the pan-democratic camp by favouring the most “local” faction; to consider only resource allocation and self-aggrandizement as the purpose of a LegCo campaign; to ignore how potential lawmakers are fitted to what specific roles; to turn a blind eye to the journey of resistance since last summer (extending indefinitely into the future)—They would lead as astray and cost us lose a precious opportunity for change by winning a 35+ majority.

The extent to which the pan-democrats can stay united in light of the political atmosphere since last summer is another problem that our side must to address. Before the watershed moment of 12th June 2019, many democratic delegates were trapped in the mentality of needing to “preserve people’s livelihood”, “be content of what we have accomplished”, and other strategies that favours stability. As the government refuses to heed to the five demands, whether the democrats, especially those in the functional constituencies, have the political will to go all-in is the real difficult question that confronts us in the upcoming LegCo election.

All in all, if “35+” cannot be realised, it is unsurprising to see LegCo being more heavily suppressed in the next 4 years; even if "35+" is achieved, it is questionable whether the pan-democrats are able to weather multiple attacks, verbal or physical, from the regime (judging from its power in the last four years) and utilise the international Laam-chaau strategy against the displacement of LegCo. Adhering to the motto of “we fight on, each in his own way”, I can only hope that Hongkongers in elections, street confrontations and international front can reconcile with each other, so that we may collectively compel the government to yield to our demands in the next six months. It is only by reaching a resolution before a real constitutional crisis that we can combat the institutional violence of the regime and not be devoured by it.

https://hkcolumn.blogspot.com/2020/04/joshua-wong-after-winning-majority-in.html?fbclid=IwAR216gf53pG_j9JOpDfr2GItvjLfrFSekKTPzoEs3-s9KBqvPEwz865P8vw

【聊聊玩家偏好Affinity這件事】

Affinity, 中文可以翻作喜好、或是親和力。代表對於某件事物的喜愛或受吸引之處在哪裡，

Google在Medium中發布了一篇對於用戶Affinity的文章，介紹了玩家對於"遊戲類型"的偏好變化行為。

這篇文章針對玩家的偏好，分成以下兩個部份來分析：

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●首先是不同品類間用戶偏好行為Inter-genre affinity

做所有的產品或市場分析前，都會先問玩家的喜好在哪裡? 如果這是個射擊遊戲，就會做關於射擊遊戲的市場調查；如果是個MMO-RPG，就會研究目前市場上最主流的RPG遊戲是什麼，視他們為競爭對手。

然而，喜歡MMO的用戶，會喜歡射擊遊戲嗎? 哪些類型的用戶，對於喜好的移轉更容易呢?

在Google的分析資料中，發現arcade(單機)/hyper-casual(超休閒)的玩家，有著非常高的流動性。這個品類的用戶，有95%的機率，會接觸其他的品類進行遊戲，最主要是射擊與跑酷類遊戲。但他們對於MMO-RPG、策略、卡牌的移動狀況相對來說就是最差的。

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我覺得這個分析很值得探究的有幾點。

第一：如果我們去看arcade與hyper-casual這兩個品類實際的遊戲，其實都非常的強調手動操作與變化性。而這個喜好和射擊與跑酷的核心訴求高度相符，所以這類的用戶喜好流動是可以理解的。

第二：看Google提供的資料，運動遊戲有83%的遷移可能，射擊遊戲有81%，三消也有75%的遷移性。在遊戲玩法邊界越來越模糊的現在，嚴格依據玩法類型來制定策略的意義其實越來越低。

遊戲跟一般消費性產品不一樣的是，它的進入障礙大部分是免費的，這就造成了它的流動性。而每個遊戲的核心訴求只有一件事「好玩」，只是每個用戶習慣的，會被吸引的方式不同，但因為它的流動性高，即使你之前沒玩過某個遊戲類型，在朋友都玩的狀況下，還是有可能去下載。

最有趣的案例就是「弓箭傳說」，如果你是這個遊戲的行銷策略規劃者，現在回頭來看，制定市場區隔的意義幾乎沒有。因為如果只把它定義為射擊遊戲，那跟目前幾乎全品類用戶都願意去玩的狀況相比，實在太限制自己與玩家的可能性了。

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●另外是相同品類的用戶偏好行為Intra-genre affinity

即使很多遊戲玩法已經非常模糊，但還是有另外那些，堅守玩法分際的遊戲類型，譬如MMORPG、MOBA等。也有些用戶只玩某種遊戲，譬如有些上班族只有空玩放置類，有些喜歡歷史的玩家就只玩三國遊戲。

那這些玩家的行為是如何的呢? 簡單來說，越耗心神的遊戲玩法，玩家就越只能專注一款遊戲。

就像Moba類遊戲在各國都幾乎只能容納一款的分額，因為這類遊戲對於操作玩法、專注力、以及對遊戲的鑽研都非常的深。而放置類遊戲的用戶幾乎可以同時玩2~3款，因為對於專注力的要求有明顯不同。

這件事情也體現了為何很多媒體都預期2020是放置類型噴發的一年，因為在各大廠的頂級產品下，這是少數幾個可以在各種3A級遊戲旁邊共存的玩法類型。

因此在做遊戲競品的市場調查時，有些類型是可以共生，有些玩法排他性很強，兩款MMO上線會互相影響，但兩款放置或三消遊戲上線可能還可以一同拉抬市場聲量。不同品類的競爭策略，在做法上應該有不同的調整。

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●那對一個已經有成功作品的公司，將如何依據用戶偏好來制定下一款遊戲的策略呢?

簡單來說，要探究用戶喜歡你的原因，不應該被品類所限制。以Google的案例來說，《夢幻花園》的內部研究顯示，很少玩家只玩三消而不玩布置與建造，且對於遊戲劇情有高度的偏好。

因此新遊戲《Homescapes》就藉由主角奧斯汀，帶領用戶進入更多樣的布置與建造，並輔以更多有趣的劇情，而不是強化三消的玩法，就帶來了更好的用戶留存。

另一個我覺得更好的案例是《劍與遠征》。莉莉絲開山之作的《刀塔傳奇》，最吸引玩家的就是半即時的可斷招戰鬥玩法。而這個用戶偏好在放置類型幾乎沒有被採用過，兩相結合下就開創了屬於自己的特殊玩法，也承接了兩個品類的用戶。(不過也有放置玩家覺得這其實是披著放置的RPG，太肝太累而離去，這方面的延伸討論就見仁見智了)

再舉一個案例是，我自己在看女性向遊戲時，發現很多女性向遊戲設計者都會忽略「劇情」的重要性，而過多專注於外觀與裝扮上。譬如當時《熹妃傳》剛出來時，連我一個男生看遊戲劇情都看到忘我，又是皇后與太監亂搞，又是女主角懷了皇帝的兒子被關到柴房，不知不覺就玩了好幾天。

而當該公司下一款遊戲《京門風月》出來後，雖然畫質與流暢性大幅提升，但劇情的緊湊度大幅下滑，就是女主角在師傅旁邊砍柴，打雜，完全沒有高潮起伏。雖然服飾更漂亮，畫面更繽紛，但後來這遊戲的表現也大幅不如《熹妃傳》，我個人一直認為劇情表現不佳是很重要的因素之一。

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小結：

每次看各種市場分析報告，都覺得很矛盾。譬如，某某國家RPG市場份額佔了50%，代表這個品類大有可為。每次看到這類分析小結，都覺得有點啼笑皆非。

這種小結對於3A級大廠才有意義，因為他們才有資源去攻克那個已經存在的紅海。但對於中小型的遊戲廠商來說，找到流動性高的品類，確認最核心的用戶偏好，不要被玩法所限制住，應該才是夾縫中求生存的最佳法門。

希望對你有啟發。

#No102
#一不小心就變成長文了乾
#用戶偏好
#Affinity

[時事英文] What is 「晶晶體」?

看到各位老師都在網路上對「晶晶體」發表意見，我也來湊一腳好了。

在社會語言學（sociolinguistics）中，「語碼轉換」（code switching）──包含雙語及多語的轉換──有許多不同的定義，學者們對語碼轉換也有不同的理解。

首先，讓我們來釐清一些詞彙的定義：

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１、語碼轉換（code switching）係指於對話的語句中，使用一種以上的語言進行交替，一些學者也稱為句間轉換（inter-sentential switching）。例如：你為什麼要用「雞」這個字？What were you thinking？

２、語碼混用（code mixing）係指語句內的語言轉換（intra-sentential switching）。例如：Actually，寫這篇文章可能不是好的idea，可能會被haters罵。

語碼轉換可視為一種社會現象，亦可根據社會文化的脈絡（sociocultural contexts）將語碼轉換分為兩種：

ａ．情境語碼轉換（situational code-switching）
「情境語碼轉換」係指情境的轉變所引起的語碼轉換──「說話者需要改變自己的語言，以適應不同的情境。」例如，我在與朋友討論政治新聞時，可能會用正式的中文；但聊一般的生活議題時，則使用臺語。

ｂ．隱喻語碼轉換 （metaphorical code-switching）
「隱喻語碼轉換」係指在情境不變的情況下，說話者為了改變語氣或雙方的關係而轉換語碼，以表達某種特定的意圖。此舉打破了情境與語言選擇的關係，因此交際的對象就需要花費更多心力來揣測語碼轉換的用意。例如，我以親切的臺語叫孩子來吃飯，他們卻不予理會；但當我使用較正式的中文時，則可增強語氣並賦予語言更多的力量。

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３、語域（register）係指於不同場合或領域中所使用的特定語言風格。好比新聞用語、辦公用語、課堂用語、廣告用語或日常談話。例如，我在非正式的場合中可能會用「爸爸」(dad) 而不是「父親」(father)。

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４、外來語，又稱外來詞或借詞（loanword），意即從別的語言借來的辭彙。例如，披薩（pizza）、冰淇淋（ice cream）、吐司（toast）、與三明治（sandwich）（不好意思肚子有一點餓，還沒吃晚餐）都是外來語。

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５、洋涇浜語 (pidgin) 又稱「混雜語言」，是一種簡化的自然語言。由缺乏共同語言的群體所發展而成，其地位低於一般語言。例如，洋涇浜英語（Chinese Pidgin English）是１９世紀中外商人所使用的混雜語言。僅有口頭形式，而無統一的書面用語，其變體亦相當繁複（long time no see、no can do、look see）。

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６、克里奧爾語 (creole) 是一種穩定的自然語言，由洋涇浜語發展而成。其特徵為混合各種語言的詞彙，有時也會摻雜其它語言的文法，故亦稱作混成語或混合語。例如，港式英語的「yum cha」（飲茶），以及星式英語（Singlish）中「wah」（吃驚）與「shiok」（酷）等詞彙。

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７、跨語言實踐 (translanguaging) 是由多元識讀與多模態的概念衍生而來，旨在強調語言實踐中的變動性。由於當代語言的使用，習慣混雜各種不同的語言，並結合多元媒介來建構意義以進行溝通，因此「跨語言實踐」常使用在語言教學。

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語碼轉換不僅是一種語言現象，也是一種社會現象，乃因社會對人們的言行產生約束力──「語言行為策略及語言形式的選擇，常取決於說話者與聆聽者的社會地位」。沒有任何一種論述，能夠全面地解釋「語碼轉換」此一社會語言學現象。但通過不同學者的研究，我們得以對該現象有更深入的瞭解。

我個人認為，李晶晶的「晶晶體」乃出於習慣，亦能藉此拉近其與觀眾之間的距離。而韓市長於美國商會的演說，是否屬於「code switching」的範疇？就讓同學們自行下結論了，因為我想－－keep living。

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參考資料：
Auer, P. (Ed.). (2013). Code-switching in conversation: Language, interaction and identity. Routledge.

周振鶴. (2013). 中國洋涇浜英語的形成. 復旦學報:社會科學版,55(5), 1-18.

Cohen, L., Manion, L., & Morrison, K. (2007). Research methods in education (London and New York, Routledge).

許朝陽。 （1999年）。語碼轉換的社會功能與心理。外國語文，（2），57-60。

何萬順. (2009). 語言與族群認同: 從台灣外省族群的母語與台灣華語談起. 語言暨語言學, 10(2), 375-419.

Joshi, A. K. (1982, July). Processing of sentences with intra-sentential code-switching. In Proceedings of the 9th conference on Computational linguistics-Volume 1 (pp. 145-150). Academia Praha.

Ke, I. C., & Lin, S. (2017). A translanguaging approach to TESOL in Taiwan. English Teaching & Learning, 41(1), 33-61.

Muysken, P., & Muysken, P. C. (2000). Bilingual speech: A typology of code-mixing. Cambridge University Press.

Tan, L. K. (2003). 台灣雙語併用者的語言使用與語言功能的分化. In 中國社會語言學國際學術研討會.

Photo: Google.com

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關於Singlish的相關報導lah: http://www.bbc.com/culture/story/20160919-the-language-the-government-tried-to-suppress

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