【After Winning Majority in LegCo: Beijing's Crackdown May Trigger International Intervention】

***感謝Hong Kong Columns - Translated，將我早前撰寫『議會過半想像：以「#國際攬炒」反制「臨立會2.0」』長文（https://www.facebook.com/joshuawongchifung/photos/a.313299448762570/2887650867994069/）翻譯成英文，鼓勵國際社會關注立會選舉一旦過半的沙盤推演，在最惡劣形勢下的制衡策略。***

中文精簡版本：https://www.facebook.com/joshuawongchifung/photos/a.564294826996363/2888641404561682/

Hongkongers have experienced our revolution for over half a year. They no longer take a consequentialist view to the effectiveness of their movement as they did years ago, or waste time second-guessing the intentions and background of fellow activists. Following the defensive battles at CUHK and PolyU, November’s District Council election saw a great victory of unity. More marvellous is the union between peaceful and “valiant” protesters.

In the process of resisting tyranny, the people have realised that one cannot prioritize one strategy over another. This is also how the common goal of “35+” came into being—the hope that we will win over half of the seats in the Legislative Council (LegCo) this September, such that the political spectrum that represents the majority of Hongkongers is able to gain control of legislative decisions. The political clout of Hongkongers will increase if 35 or more seats are successfully secured on our side. It is certainly one vital step to achieve the five demands within the system.

The possibility of realizing legislative majority

Technically it is not unrealistic to win a majority even under the current undemocratic system. Back in the 2016 LegCo election, we already won 30 seats. In addition to the District Council (First) functional constituency seat that is already in the pocket of the pan-democrats, as long as the candidates in Kowloon East and New Territories West do not start infighting again, we could safely secure 33 seats based on the number of pan-dem votes in 2016.

The other 3 seats required to achieve a majority depend on democrats’ breakthrough among the functional constituencies by dispersing the resources of the Liaison Office. They also count on whether the turnout this September could exceed 71.2% — that of last year’s District Council elections. Some of the factors that could affect the turnout include: will the epidemic persist into the summer? Will there be potential violent repression of protests in the 2 weeks preceding the election? Will Hong Kong-US relations be affected by the downturn of the global economy?

Therefore, the ambition of “35+” is to be prioritised by the resistance as both a means and an end. I have already expressed my support for an intra-party primary at the coordination meeting. In the meantime, it is pleasing to see the ongoing debates reaching a consensus of maximising the seats among geographical constituencies in the upcoming election.

Whilst enthusiastic coordination, we should also assess the post-election landscape and gauge Beijing’s reactions: if we do not reach 35 seats, Hong Kong will be subject to tighter control and more severe repression by China; but if the democratic parties successfully form a majority in LegCo, CCP’s fears of a “constitutional crisis” would become imminent. Hence, the key questions are how the Pan-Democrats should deal with the volatile political situation in Hong Kong and how they are going to meet Beijing’s charge head-on.

Watching out for Beijing’s dismissal of LegCo after reaching majority

To take back control of LegCo such that it faithfully reflects the majority’s principles and needs is the definition of a healthy democracy. Recently, however, DAB’s Tam Yiu-chung has warned that the plan of the Pan-Dems to “usurp power” in the LegCo would only lead to Beijing’s forceful disqualification of certain members or the interpretation of the Basic Law. This proves that winning a majority in LegCo is not only a popular conception but also a realistic challenge that would get on the nerves of Beijing. Could Beijing accept a President James To in LegCo? These unknown variables must be addressed upon achieving a majority.

While there is no telltale sign as to Beijing’s exact strategy, we are already familiar with the way CCP manipulated the Basic Law in the past 4 years. Having experienced three waves of disqualifications in LegCo, twice kicked out of LegCo with my team, and thrice locked up in jail, I have no false hopes of an easy compromise from Beijing: they would not let Pan-Dems control LegCo for half a year and wait (as is the proper procedure) until after having negatived the Budget to dissolve the legislature, and thereby giving them an easy victory in the re-elections. The greater the Pan-Dems threaten Beijing’s rule in Hong Kong, the more likely that it will trigger Beijing’s repression.

Since the disqualification and arrest of lawmakers have already become “normalised”, one can even imagine the police stepping into the LegCo building to force Pan-Dems into voting. Neither is it beyond our imagination to expect the CCP to kick out all 70 lawmakers in a fit of rage and replace them with a provisional LegCo “2.0” [HKCT note: The first was from 25 Jan 1997 to 30 Jun 1998]. To depend on a majority that could lead to a chapter of a “new testament” for One Country, Two Systems is perhaps what many elites long for, but they are overly optimistic:for a ticket to the promised land will not be available at the Chief Executive election campaign a year and a half later.

Admittedly, the Pan-Dems cannot unilaterally initiate “Laam-chaau” [HKCT note: mostly translated into “scorched-earth” mentality or “mutual destruction”; some even translated into “If I burn, you burn with us”]. The most they can do is to force a standstill of the government, and not for long the LegCo will have been eliminated from the equation to make the wheels turn again. It all leaves the plan of “Negativing the motion → Dissolving LegCo → Re-election after re-election → the stepping down of Carrie Lam” merely as overly positive speculation, probably resulting from their overestimate of CCP's capacity for rational calculation. The Pan-Dems must guard their frontlines and recognise what the biggest threat from Hong Kong to China could be. In this case, should LegCo sessions be disrupted or suspended, the Pan-Dems would have to be well prepared to surmount the expected obstacles and prevent the disqualification crisis 4 years ago—a Catch-22 indeed.

Productive tension from global intervention: Using Laam-chaau against the CCP

What aggravates the CCP the most is the potential threat to Hong Kong’s unique status as the one and only “separate customs territory”. Any miscalculation will compromise its role as the Chinese economy’s “white gloves”. Imagine if CCP were to disqualify all 70 elected lawmakers and convene a meeting north of the Shenzhen River to pass a resolution to Hong Kong’s affairs (much like the Provisional Legislative Council “1.0" in 1997), how great will the shock be in a world with an effective Hong Kong Human Rights and Democracy Act? However hard it is to predict the future one thing is certain: With the US presidential election just around the corner, blows to the separation of powers would not be tolerated, and the West would necessarily effect countermeasures against the Hong Kong government.

Beijing has been relying upon Hong Kong to navigate the international community for decades. While clamping down on the political freedom of the cosmopolitan city, Beijing desires to maintain the financial centre’s economic freedom. Hence, we started lobbying for the Hong Kong Human Rights and Democracy Act four years ago, and today we are determined to promote “Laam-chaau” on an international scale.

The will of the voters must be reflected in an election. If a “35+” legislature were to be dismissed and replaced, such flagrant violation of democracy would assuredly cause a greater backlash than the infamous extradition bill. Knowing what the reality ahead of us could be, we have to combine our election and international strategies to oppose the placement of a 35+ LegCo with an “Emergency Legislative Council 2.0”, to advance an international “Laam-chaau” to Hong Kong’s status as “separate customs territory”. Only then will we stand a chance to resist the regime and to realise the five demands.

Adjusting our mindset: Overcoming the “constitutional crisis” to reach a resolution

Upon the realization of the “35+” LegCo, it is expected that the CCP will launch a devastating counterattack. The Pan-Dems should not expect LegCo to run normally; neither can the lawmakers realise their governing blueprints they have for Hong Kong. Rather, candidates will be able to compete against one another with visions of a liberated Hong Kong through popular vote. Bringing this point up has nothing to do with undermining the common goal of reaching a majority in LegCo, but rather channels the battle of LegCo to positive use upon the rule of law’s death and a “constitutional crisis” ahead. Knowing that Hongkongers have nothing to fall back on, all Pan-Dems should not miss the only way to the realization of “35+”.

Thus, be they partisans, nonpartisans, incumbent politicians, amateur politicians, or the civil society as a whole – if we stay in the political discourse of 2016 and continue to perpetuate old stereotypes, that is to deal with the divisions on the pan-democratic camp by favouring the most “local” faction; to consider only resource allocation and self-aggrandizement as the purpose of a LegCo campaign; to ignore how potential lawmakers are fitted to what specific roles; to turn a blind eye to the journey of resistance since last summer (extending indefinitely into the future)—They would lead as astray and cost us lose a precious opportunity for change by winning a 35+ majority.

The extent to which the pan-democrats can stay united in light of the political atmosphere since last summer is another problem that our side must to address. Before the watershed moment of 12th June 2019, many democratic delegates were trapped in the mentality of needing to “preserve people’s livelihood”, “be content of what we have accomplished”, and other strategies that favours stability. As the government refuses to heed to the five demands, whether the democrats, especially those in the functional constituencies, have the political will to go all-in is the real difficult question that confronts us in the upcoming LegCo election.

All in all, if “35+” cannot be realised, it is unsurprising to see LegCo being more heavily suppressed in the next 4 years; even if "35+" is achieved, it is questionable whether the pan-democrats are able to weather multiple attacks, verbal or physical, from the regime (judging from its power in the last four years) and utilise the international Laam-chaau strategy against the displacement of LegCo. Adhering to the motto of “we fight on, each in his own way”, I can only hope that Hongkongers in elections, street confrontations and international front can reconcile with each other, so that we may collectively compel the government to yield to our demands in the next six months. It is only by reaching a resolution before a real constitutional crisis that we can combat the institutional violence of the regime and not be devoured by it.

https://hkcolumn.blogspot.com/2020/04/joshua-wong-after-winning-majority-in.html?fbclid=IwAR216gf53pG_j9JOpDfr2GItvjLfrFSekKTPzoEs3-s9KBqvPEwz865P8vw

On the shortness of life

最近重讀Seneca的On the shortness of life，一般我不會在書上做筆記，但翻開那本薄薄的書的時候，我發現我在上面寫了一個日期和地點，2016年9月2日，台中。三年多前這本書陪我走到了台灣，那是踏入社會前的最後一段旅程。

那時候我讀這本書其實並沒有什麼特別的原因，純粹想把所有Penguin Great Ideas系列的書都讀一遍，現在重讀，卻意識到這本書對生命有多重要，如果之前我讀得懂，或許這三年多來我會把工作放輕一點，把自己看重一些。

看著親人一個一個離去，他們刻苦一生，女的成就了丈夫（及孩子），男的成就了孩子，然而他們自己呢？他們的同輩或許也一個一個的走了，所以他們的朋友圈越來愈小，告別式上大多都是親人，幾乎所有人都坐在大廳的左邊，也就是主人家的親人哪一邊，其他舊同事、朋友極少，可想而知真正會惦記他們的人也就更少了。

當然我也去過一個很多人的告別式，那是我爸爸的。爸爸走的時候只有五十歲，那天除了親人以外許多舊同學、舊同事、當時的同事、老闆們，都有來，他們的樣子有點哀傷，說著「怎麼走得這麼突然啦」或類似的話。當然來的人多也不代表他會被更多的人惦記，我幾乎可以悲觀的肯定，會惦記他的人，大概不會多於十個。

爸爸是突然猝死的，在年初三的凌晨，前一天他還說著我們要趁新年假拍一張全家福，前一天他才剛學會用手機的輸入法打中文，還傳了一則「我愛你」給媽媽，那是他第一則傳給媽媽的短信，也是最後一則。他出門前我正在溫習，他拍拍我的肩，跟我說「加油喔，明天煮飯給你吃」，那天我真的有加油，但卻再也沒有吃到他煮的飯。

自那天起，我開始覺得生命是虛無的脆弱的，就像一個肥皂泡一樣，這一面它在空中飄著，下一秒或許就不見了。

“You live as if you were destined to live forever, no thought of your frailty ever enters your head, of how much time has already gone by you take no heed. You squander time as if you drew from a full and abundant supply, though all the while that day which you bestow on some person or thing is perhaps your last.”
― Seneca, On the Shortness of Life

科學一點來講，生命就等於一個人所存在的時間的總和吧，然而我們到底還有多少時間呢？誰也說不準。時間總是在不知不覺間溜走的，一旦你假設了你明天或將來還有時間，時間就走得更快、更冤枉了。活在當下四個字，有些人覺得很玄，有些人則覺得很簡單，但一個人所存在的時間正正就是由許多個當下所組成的，因為過去已經過去了，而將來也不是我們所能預見或掌控的。

一邊讀著Seneca那些依然在追名逐利而浪費生命的人的吶喊，腦中一遍想起Dead Poets Society（《春風化雨/死亡詩社》中Keating帶學生走到許多年的的校友的老照片前，要他們聽清楚照片中的學長的吶喊：Carpe, Carpe diem。

“I went to the woods because I wanted to live deliberately. I wanted to live deep and suck out all the marrow of life. To put to rout all that was not life; and not, when I had come to die, discover that I had not lived.”

– Henry David Thoreau

Seneca說，如果人們足夠珍惜生命的話，一生的時間其實很夠用，只是那些貪心的人才會覺得生命太短。或許我還是有點貪心，因為爸爸的生命還是太短了，因為他在我學會珍惜前已經走了。無論如何，好好地、狠狠地活著吧，真的。

點播蘇打綠的近未來：https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=j6qKJjSeIo4