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[爆卦]exceed英文是什麼？優點缺點精華區懶人包

雖然這篇exceed英文鄉民發文沒有被收入到精華區：在exceed英文這個話題中，我們另外找到其它相關的精選爆讚文章

在 exceed英文產品中有15篇Facebook貼文，粉絲數超過53萬的網紅VoiceTube 看影片學英語，也在其Facebook貼文中提到， 【游泳池將開放！「給···殺菌」英文怎麽說？ 🤔】 為配合防疫政策， 相關場地需要強制做定時殺菌😷 跟著小 V 把英文單字筆記下吧！🗒 designate（v.）指定 disinfect（v.）給···殺菌 instructor（n.）教練 exceed（v.）超過 mandatory（adj.）...

　同時也有2部Youtube影片，追蹤數超過2萬的網紅賓狗單字Bingo Bilingual，也在其Youtube影片中提到，【時間碼】 00:00:28 basic income 無條件基本收入 #無條件送你錢 00:01:36 exceed 超過 #全球病例破千萬 00:02:03 rampage 橫衝直撞 #美國回頭封城 00:02:55 shortage 短缺 #印度病床不夠用 00:03:38 swarm 一群 ...

「exceed英文」的推薦目錄

exceed英文 在 Kenneth’s Team ✎ Instagram 的最讚貼文

2020-05-10 16:59:23

/ 👨🏻‍💻👩🏻‍💻即睇👨🏻‍💻👩🏻‍💻 【 2018 施政報告 Summary | #part1 】 #save低呢個post #記下有用嘅terms . 1 | Women’s Development | 婦女發展 . To extend statutory maternity leave fr...

  • VoiceTube 看影片學英語

    exceed英文 在 VoiceTube 看影片學英語 Facebook 的最讚貼文

    2021-08-13 19:30:43
    有 152 人按讚

    【游泳池將開放！「給···殺菌」英文怎麽說？ 🤔】
    為配合防疫政策，
    相關場地需要強制做定時殺菌😷
    跟著小 V 把英文單字筆記下吧！🗒

    designate（v.）指定
    disinfect（v.）給···殺菌
    instructor（n.）教練
    exceed（v.）超過
    mandatory（adj.）強制的

  • Eric's English Lounge

    exceed英文 在 Eric's English Lounge Facebook 的最佳解答

    2020-07-27 19:22:42
    有 318 人按讚

    ［時事英文］到底誰在害怕抖音（TikTok）？
    「在道德和私隱方面存在嚴重的問題」英文怎麼說？
    破千名學員加入！最後優惠倒數 ► https://bit.ly/3eTHIvH

    ★★★★★★★★★★★★
    　
    《華爾街日報》：
    　
    美國大學生對抖音的看法：

    TikTok Is No Free App
    　
    Everyone I know uses TikTok. Especially during the pandemic, the video-sharing app has provided free entertainment for millions of teenagers. But serious ethical and privacy issues remain. ByteDance, TikTok’s parent company, is based in Beijing and subject to Chinese laws that require companies to work with government intelligence agencies if asked. There can be no guarantee that your private information won’t be shared with the Chinese government.
    　
    1. TikTok 抖音（中國公司開發的軟體）
    2. pandemic 全球大流行疫情
    3. ethical and privacy issues 道德與隱私問題
    4. sth’s parent company ……的母公司
    5. be based in 將某地設為總部；以某處為主要地點
    6. subject to 使服從；使隸屬；使遭受
    7. government intelligence agencies 政府情報機構
    　
    我認識的人都在用抖音。尤其在大流行病期間，這個影片分享應用為數以百萬計的青少年提供了免費娛樂。然而，它在道德和私隱方面仍存在嚴重的問題。抖音母公司字節跳動的總部在北京，受中國法律約束，一旦有要求，企業就必須配合中國政府情報機構的工作。所以無法確保你的個人資訊不會被分享給中國政府。
    　
    Furthermore, TikTok censors unflattering information about China. The company says it has updated its moderation guidelines, which no longer reference specific countries and incidents, but whatever the official wording, the intent is clear. Using TikTok means acceding to this suppression of free speech and violation of our privacy. It might be fun to sing and dance with your friends, but don’t make the mistake of thinking it’s free.
    　
    8. censor unflattering information 審查不符上意的資訊
    9. update its moderation guidelines 更新它的審查準則
    10. no longer 不再
    11. reference specific countries and incidents 提及具體的國家與事件
    12. official wording 官方的措辭
    13. the intent is clear 該意圖是明確的
    14. accede to 答應；同意
    15. the suppression of free speech 言論自由的壓迫
    16. make the mistake of 犯下⋯⋯的錯誤
    　
    此外，抖音還會審查有關中國的負面資訊。抖音公司稱他們已經更新了審查準則，不再提及具體的國家和事件，但無論公司官方怎麼說，其審查意圖是明確的。使用抖音就意味著接受了其壓制言論自由和侵犯用戶私隱的做法。和朋友一起唱歌跳舞可能很有趣，但別錯誤地認為這一切是沒有代價的。

    —John, Brown University, neuroscience
    　
    ★★★★★★★★★★★★

    Less Hype, More Fun

    When it comes to privacy, TikTok worries me no more than U.S. social-media apps do. Mobile apps live in what technologists call a “sandbox.” Unlike apps on your computer, which have access to the whole machine, mobile apps can only view a limited portion of your data—the parts to which users give it access, such as your contacts. Sometimes they exceed the user agreements in certain limited ways, but deleting TikTok out of anxiety that the Chinese are reading your private text messages is irrational.
    　
    17. when it comes to… 當提及⋯⋯
    18. no more than 最多；不超過；僅僅*
    19. social-media apps 社群媒體應用程式
    20. sandbox 沙盒
    21. have access to 可以進入⋯⋯
    22. a limited portion of ⋯⋯的一小部分
    23. exceed the user agreements 超越用戶協議
    24. out of anxiety 出於焦慮
    25. irrational 不合理的；沒有理性的
    　
    說到私隱，抖音並不比美國的社交媒體應用更讓我擔心。行動應用程式位於技術專家所謂的「沙盒」當中，它與電腦上的應用程式不同，後者可連接訪問整臺機器，而前者只能查看到一小部分數據，即用戶允許它訪問的部分，比如你的通訊錄。雖然他們有時採取有限的方式超越用戶協議，但因擔心中國人會看到你私人資訊而刪除抖音是不理性的。
    　
    —Reed, University of Texas, finance

    *no more than: https://bit.ly/2OXMbSK, https://bit.ly/3g71mVA
    　
    ★★★★★★★★★★★★

    The Real Problem
    　
    Privacy should be a concern, and it’s good to hear the federal government is at least looking into it. But the bigger issue with TikTok is the drain on productivity. If Instagram is caffeine, addictive but with a clear purpose, TikTok is cocaine. I have in mind friends of mine who rot their brains watching TikTok videos for hours at a time—all while on “five-minute study breaks.”
    　
    26. it’s good to hear 很高興聽到……
    27. the federal government 聯邦政府
    28. looking into sth 調查；研究
    29. the drain on productivity 生產力耗盡
    30. caffeine 咖啡因
    31. addictive 使人上癮的
    32. cocaine 古柯鹼
    33. have sth in mind 想好；慮及
    34. five-minute study breaks 讀書時的五分鐘休息時間
    　
    私隱問題應當受到關注，我很高興聽到聯邦政府至少在調查此事。但是抖音更大的問題是對生產力的消耗。如果說Instagram是令人上癮的咖啡因，但它至少目的明確，那麼抖音就是古柯鹼。我想起了我的一些朋友在「五分鐘學習休息」間隙，一看起抖音影片就是好幾個小時，看多了腦子都壞了。
    　
    —Sam, Columbia University, financial economics
    　
    ★★★★★★★★★★★★
    　
    Join the Club

    TikTok’s connection to China doesn’t concern me—almost every other social-media platform has equally difficult privacy concerns. Facebook is paying a $5 billion fine to the Federal Trade Commission for violating user privacy. Google keeps every search a user makes, and many Google services on Android devices and iPhones track the user’s location. I’ve no doubt that my iPhone, which was made largely in China and contains all my banking information, emails, text messages and more, gives Apple a frightening amount of information about me.
    　
    35. connection to 與⋯⋯的關係
    36. privacy concerns 隱私顧慮
    37. pay a fine 繳交罰金
    38. violate user privacy 違反用戶隱私
    39. track the user’s location 追蹤用戶的位置
    40. have no doubt 毫無疑問
    41. be made in china 是中國製造
    42. banking information 銀行資訊
    43. a frightening amount of information 數量驚人的資訊
    　
    我並不是很在意抖音與中國的關係，幾乎所有其他社交媒體平臺都存在同樣棘手的私隱問題。Facebook因侵犯用戶私隱被聯邦貿易委員會罰了５０億美元。Google會記錄用戶的每一次搜索，且許多安卓設備和iPhone上的Google服務會追蹤用戶位置。我絕對相信我的iPhone給了蘋果公司大量關於我的資訊，裡面有我所有的銀行資訊、電子郵件、訊息等等，而iPhone大多是中國製造。
    　
    —Andrew, Georgetown University, government

    ★★★★★★★★★★★★
    　
    《華爾街日報》完整內容：https://on.wsj.com/30PYx4L
    　
    圖片出處：https://bit.ly/3g6o0gJ

    事實查核: https://bit.ly/30PaeZE

    tick sb off: https://www.ldoceonline.com/dictionary/tick-off

  • 黃之鋒 Joshua Wong

    exceed英文 在 黃之鋒 Joshua Wong Facebook 的最佳貼文

    2020-04-08 18:22:53
    有 400 人按讚

    【After Winning Majority in LegCo: Beijing's Crackdown May Trigger International Intervention】

    ***感謝Hong Kong Columns - Translated，將我早前撰寫『議會過半想像：以「#國際攬炒」反制「臨立會2.0」』長文（https://www.facebook.com/joshuawongchifung/photos/a.313299448762570/2887650867994069/）翻譯成英文，鼓勵國際社會關注立會選舉一旦過半的沙盤推演，在最惡劣形勢下的制衡策略。***

    中文精簡版本：https://www.facebook.com/joshuawongchifung/photos/a.564294826996363/2888641404561682/

    Hongkongers have experienced our revolution for over half a year. They no longer take a consequentialist view to the effectiveness of their movement as they did years ago, or waste time second-guessing the intentions and background of fellow activists. Following the defensive battles at CUHK and PolyU, November’s District Council election saw a great victory of unity. More marvellous is the union between peaceful and “valiant” protesters.

    In the process of resisting tyranny, the people have realised that one cannot prioritize one strategy over another. This is also how the common goal of “35+” came into being—the hope that we will win over half of the seats in the Legislative Council (LegCo) this September, such that the political spectrum that represents the majority of Hongkongers is able to gain control of legislative decisions. The political clout of Hongkongers will increase if 35 or more seats are successfully secured on our side. It is certainly one vital step to achieve the five demands within the system.

    The possibility of realizing legislative majority

    Technically it is not unrealistic to win a majority even under the current undemocratic system. Back in the 2016 LegCo election, we already won 30 seats. In addition to the District Council (First) functional constituency seat that is already in the pocket of the pan-democrats, as long as the candidates in Kowloon East and New Territories West do not start infighting again, we could safely secure 33 seats based on the number of pan-dem votes in 2016.

    The other 3 seats required to achieve a majority depend on democrats’ breakthrough among the functional constituencies by dispersing the resources of the Liaison Office. They also count on whether the turnout this September could exceed 71.2% — that of last year’s District Council elections. Some of the factors that could affect the turnout include: will the epidemic persist into the summer? Will there be potential violent repression of protests in the 2 weeks preceding the election? Will Hong Kong-US relations be affected by the downturn of the global economy?

    Therefore, the ambition of “35+” is to be prioritised by the resistance as both a means and an end. I have already expressed my support for an intra-party primary at the coordination meeting. In the meantime, it is pleasing to see the ongoing debates reaching a consensus of maximising the seats among geographical constituencies in the upcoming election.

    Whilst enthusiastic coordination, we should also assess the post-election landscape and gauge Beijing’s reactions: if we do not reach 35 seats, Hong Kong will be subject to tighter control and more severe repression by China; but if the democratic parties successfully form a majority in LegCo, CCP’s fears of a “constitutional crisis” would become imminent. Hence, the key questions are how the Pan-Democrats should deal with the volatile political situation in Hong Kong and how they are going to meet Beijing’s charge head-on.

    Watching out for Beijing’s dismissal of LegCo after reaching majority

    To take back control of LegCo such that it faithfully reflects the majority’s principles and needs is the definition of a healthy democracy. Recently, however, DAB’s Tam Yiu-chung has warned that the plan of the Pan-Dems to “usurp power” in the LegCo would only lead to Beijing’s forceful disqualification of certain members or the interpretation of the Basic Law. This proves that winning a majority in LegCo is not only a popular conception but also a realistic challenge that would get on the nerves of Beijing. Could Beijing accept a President James To in LegCo? These unknown variables must be addressed upon achieving a majority.

    While there is no telltale sign as to Beijing’s exact strategy, we are already familiar with the way CCP manipulated the Basic Law in the past 4 years. Having experienced three waves of disqualifications in LegCo, twice kicked out of LegCo with my team, and thrice locked up in jail, I have no false hopes of an easy compromise from Beijing: they would not let Pan-Dems control LegCo for half a year and wait (as is the proper procedure) until after having negatived the Budget to dissolve the legislature, and thereby giving them an easy victory in the re-elections. The greater the Pan-Dems threaten Beijing’s rule in Hong Kong, the more likely that it will trigger Beijing’s repression.

    Since the disqualification and arrest of lawmakers have already become “normalised”, one can even imagine the police stepping into the LegCo building to force Pan-Dems into voting. Neither is it beyond our imagination to expect the CCP to kick out all 70 lawmakers in a fit of rage and replace them with a provisional LegCo “2.0” [HKCT note: The first was from 25 Jan 1997 to 30 Jun 1998]. To depend on a majority that could lead to a chapter of a “new testament” for One Country, Two Systems is perhaps what many elites long for, but they are overly optimistic:for a ticket to the promised land will not be available at the Chief Executive election campaign a year and a half later.

    Admittedly, the Pan-Dems cannot unilaterally initiate “Laam-chaau” [HKCT note: mostly translated into “scorched-earth” mentality or “mutual destruction”; some even translated into “If I burn, you burn with us”]. The most they can do is to force a standstill of the government, and not for long the LegCo will have been eliminated from the equation to make the wheels turn again. It all leaves the plan of “Negativing the motion → Dissolving LegCo → Re-election after re-election → the stepping down of Carrie Lam” merely as overly positive speculation, probably resulting from their overestimate of CCP's capacity for rational calculation. The Pan-Dems must guard their frontlines and recognise what the biggest threat from Hong Kong to China could be. In this case, should LegCo sessions be disrupted or suspended, the Pan-Dems would have to be well prepared to surmount the expected obstacles and prevent the disqualification crisis 4 years ago—a Catch-22 indeed.

    Productive tension from global intervention: Using Laam-chaau against the CCP

    What aggravates the CCP the most is the potential threat to Hong Kong’s unique status as the one and only “separate customs territory”. Any miscalculation will compromise its role as the Chinese economy’s “white gloves”. Imagine if CCP were to disqualify all 70 elected lawmakers and convene a meeting north of the Shenzhen River to pass a resolution to Hong Kong’s affairs (much like the Provisional Legislative Council “1.0" in 1997), how great will the shock be in a world with an effective Hong Kong Human Rights and Democracy Act? However hard it is to predict the future one thing is certain: With the US presidential election just around the corner, blows to the separation of powers would not be tolerated, and the West would necessarily effect countermeasures against the Hong Kong government.

    Beijing has been relying upon Hong Kong to navigate the international community for decades. While clamping down on the political freedom of the cosmopolitan city, Beijing desires to maintain the financial centre’s economic freedom. Hence, we started lobbying for the Hong Kong Human Rights and Democracy Act four years ago, and today we are determined to promote “Laam-chaau” on an international scale.

    The will of the voters must be reflected in an election. If a “35+” legislature were to be dismissed and replaced, such flagrant violation of democracy would assuredly cause a greater backlash than the infamous extradition bill. Knowing what the reality ahead of us could be, we have to combine our election and international strategies to oppose the placement of a 35+ LegCo with an “Emergency Legislative Council 2.0”, to advance an international “Laam-chaau” to Hong Kong’s status as “separate customs territory”. Only then will we stand a chance to resist the regime and to realise the five demands.

    Adjusting our mindset: Overcoming the “constitutional crisis” to reach a resolution

    Upon the realization of the “35+” LegCo, it is expected that the CCP will launch a devastating counterattack. The Pan-Dems should not expect LegCo to run normally; neither can the lawmakers realise their governing blueprints they have for Hong Kong. Rather, candidates will be able to compete against one another with visions of a liberated Hong Kong through popular vote. Bringing this point up has nothing to do with undermining the common goal of reaching a majority in LegCo, but rather channels the battle of LegCo to positive use upon the rule of law’s death and a “constitutional crisis” ahead. Knowing that Hongkongers have nothing to fall back on, all Pan-Dems should not miss the only way to the realization of “35+”.

    Thus, be they partisans, nonpartisans, incumbent politicians, amateur politicians, or the civil society as a whole – if we stay in the political discourse of 2016 and continue to perpetuate old stereotypes, that is to deal with the divisions on the pan-democratic camp by favouring the most “local” faction; to consider only resource allocation and self-aggrandizement as the purpose of a LegCo campaign; to ignore how potential lawmakers are fitted to what specific roles; to turn a blind eye to the journey of resistance since last summer (extending indefinitely into the future)—They would lead as astray and cost us lose a precious opportunity for change by winning a 35+ majority.

    The extent to which the pan-democrats can stay united in light of the political atmosphere since last summer is another problem that our side must to address. Before the watershed moment of 12th June 2019, many democratic delegates were trapped in the mentality of needing to “preserve people’s livelihood”, “be content of what we have accomplished”, and other strategies that favours stability. As the government refuses to heed to the five demands, whether the democrats, especially those in the functional constituencies, have the political will to go all-in is the real difficult question that confronts us in the upcoming LegCo election.

    All in all, if “35+” cannot be realised, it is unsurprising to see LegCo being more heavily suppressed in the next 4 years; even if "35+" is achieved, it is questionable whether the pan-democrats are able to weather multiple attacks, verbal or physical, from the regime (judging from its power in the last four years) and utilise the international Laam-chaau strategy against the displacement of LegCo. Adhering to the motto of “we fight on, each in his own way”, I can only hope that Hongkongers in elections, street confrontations and international front can reconcile with each other, so that we may collectively compel the government to yield to our demands in the next six months. It is only by reaching a resolution before a real constitutional crisis that we can combat the institutional violence of the regime and not be devoured by it.

    https://hkcolumn.blogspot.com/2020/04/joshua-wong-after-winning-majority-in.html?fbclid=IwAR216gf53pG_j9JOpDfr2GItvjLfrFSekKTPzoEs3-s9KBqvPEwz865P8vw

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