「我們所謂的『種族歧視』」
(大量真實故事XD)
我們有一門教育相關科系都要修的統計,大家叫它「寶寶統計」(Baby stats),因為照理說是一門不難的課,而且還是線上,從來沒見過教授跟助教。今天中堂下課,我一個同學跑來問我,欸寶寶統計難嗎?我說 “You can’t ask me. I’m A...
「我們所謂的『種族歧視』」
(大量真實故事XD)
我們有一門教育相關科系都要修的統計,大家叫它「寶寶統計」(Baby stats),因為照理說是一門不難的課,而且還是線上,從來沒見過教授跟助教。今天中堂下課,我一個同學跑來問我,欸寶寶統計難嗎?我說 “You can’t ask me. I’m Asian.” 大家大爆笑,因為我是全班唯一可以開這個玩笑的人。在國外,「亞洲人數學好」是一個刻板印象。種族玩笑在國外是非常敏感的,即使像「數學很好」這種相對正面的刻板印象,也會被認為racist。 乍聽之下可能覺得,亞洲人的正面刻板印象,像是勤勞、數學好、當醫生這類的話,應該不會讓人不舒服?
我曾經有個類似長輩的人對我說,”Oh! I can tell that you’re really ambitious. I really hope that everyone can be as hard-working as Asian people. Imagine how great that will be.” …
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WTF?
在亞洲,種族比較單一,對種族主義的意識比較低,認為「歧視」基本上是「貶低」。我現在在線上教英文,公司的老師都是美國人或加拿大人,而家長下課後可以給老師寫評價。之前老師FB群組裡就出現家長對老師留下「普普,以後不請黑人老師了」的評價,湧入一堆”I’m so sorry”的留言。這種連結「種族」與「負面印象」的言論,無疑是種族歧視,不過貼正面標籤,像是亞洲人都認真努力、身懷抱負這類正面評價,為何也是「歧視」? .
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Racism在中文會叫「種族歧視」,不過這樣的翻譯反而模糊了很多意義,理解成「種族主義」或許更合適一點。
Racist不一定是看不起特定的族群,而是對於種族平面且單一的理解。例如「全世界的人都跟亞洲人一樣努力,那就太棒了」,這樣的評論無疑平面化了一整個族群,也是racism的一種展現,即使他沒有貶低。其他相似的言論有「(填入任何種族)都長很像」,「亞洲人數學都很好」,或是路人在街上對你大叫Ni Hao或是Konnichiwa都可以被理解成racism的展現(這樣平面化所有「亞洲人」,看到亞洲人就是Ni Hao)。 .
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我常常被問,加拿大有歧視嗎?老實說,前面提到的已經是我遇到過最糟的了(而且不在加拿大發生,所以也不太算)。不過有些事件就遊走在邊緣 。有一次和朋友去Mall,我們正要上車趕路卻還沒吃飯,其中一個朋友就對我說,Hey Lily! Aren’t you hungry? I saw that there’s Chinese food. 呃,當下老實說我蠻不舒服,我就一定要吃Panda express嗎?(可能是因為被跟這麼難吃的亞洲菜做聯想,心裡不爽),不過我也很難直指說「哦No no歧視」,因為我確定這不是她的本意。
另外一次是上禮拜,班上一個葉門的同學,下課時跑來跟我說,Lily! You look really Japanese. 當下我也只是笑笑,畢竟他英文也不是很好。上課時做檢討跟回饋時,我提出這件事,老師跟同學都OHHHH NOOOOO RACIST!! 反應比我還激烈,我說有這麼嚴重嗎?He didn’t mean to be rude. 同學就說,他背後的概念可能是亞洲人都長很像。也是啦!他最好是會分日本人、韓國人跟台灣人。
總之我今天說寶寶統計對亞洲人來說太簡單,是因為這群同學是我覺得相處起來舒服的, 所以自己開了一個玩笑,大家也非常買帳XD 對於常常抓不到美式幽默的我來說,也算是有點成就感。總之,以後路上有人大喊Ni Hao,絕對不要理他⋯⋯這不是歧視,什麼才是歧視。
ps. 照片是我去年考寶寶統計的考場。國外考試都是固定在學期結束後的幾天,利用體育館佈置考場,然後不同科目、年級會一起考試。模犯生的場景都是真的!(我剛剛一直打成模仿犯⋯⋯有宮部美幸的粉絲嗎XD)
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#Exam #exam #example #examen #examination #examtime #exame #examweek #exames #examensvorbereitung #examseason #examstress #examedeordem #examenes #examprep #examples #examenoinsta #examperiod #examens #examsweek #examedaordem #examine #examedesangue #examsover #exameoab #examsdone #examsarecoming #examineyourself #examday #examstime
examine中文 在 陳冠廷 Kuan-Ting Chen Facebook 的最讚貼文
I have recently perused Nicholas Kristof’s NYT piece “China’s Man in Washington, Named Trump”(https://nyti.ms/3h2JXh8). One paragraph in particular caught my attention: “A joke in China suggests that Trump’s Chinese name is Chuan Jianguo, or “Build-the-Country Trump.” That’s because Build-the-Country is a common revolutionary name among Communist patriots, and it’s mockingly suggested that Trump’s misrule of the United States is actually bolstering Xi’s regime.”
Kristoff also avows that since Trump’s ascension to presidency, the American nation became highly polarized. This is reflected in the current administration’s policies on climate change, foreign relations with established U.S. allies, and COVID-19 prevention, all of which are rather ineffective. It also seems like Mr. Trump and his team diverged from the traditional priorities, including promoting free trade, human rights, and other quintessentially American values. As described thoroughly by John Bolton, all these factors contributed to the declining standing of the U.S. in global politics.
What is more, many people fall prey to CCP’s propaganda and its interpretations of Trump’s actions, which only enhances China’s reputation.
But that might not exactly be the case.
The CCP apparently failed to utilize the window of opportunity created by the ineptness of the Trump administration, as China could have grown to the position of a leader by filling in the void left by the U.S.
During the 2016 APEC Ministerial Meeting in Lima, Peru, Xi Jinping and his team actively supported the plans to establish the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) and a Free Trade Area of the Asia Pacific, or FTAAP. In contrast, the United States withdrew its signature from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) in early 2017. Coupled with China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and the establishment of the Asian Infrastructure and Investment Bank (AIIB), this move bolstered China’s capacity to influence global investments and trade, high-tech mergers and acquisitions, and, overall, expand its geostrategic influence on the entire globe.
At the same time, various propaganda films about great power competition, military industry, and science and technology surged all at once, and gained remarkable following around the world.
All this provided a window of opportunity for the CCP to slowly change its course. Around the same time, the distrust for POTUS among U.S. allies’ reached its apex. According to polls conducted by the Pew Research Center, the distrust for the U.S. president in the U.K. reached 75%, 72% in Japan, 70% in Australia, and stunning 86% in France.
Had the C.C.P,. begun to open up at that time, or at least resumed the governance style of the Hu-Wen administration, it could have reaped the benefits of promoting liberalism where the U.S. failed to deliver. It was the time for Beijing to gradually enhance freedom of speech domestically, pursue sustainable infrastructural projects, gradually reform unfair barriers to trade, transform its S.O.E.s, strengthen protections for private ownership, and vitalize its start-ups and enterprises.
Moreover, were China to cease the genocide in East Turkestan and refrain from cracking down on Hong Kong's semi-autonomy, it would have greatly enhanced its global international image. Additionally, if paired with slow but steady reforms, Beijing’s respect for sovereignty of its peoples would have attracted a large amount of foreign investment, which in turn would have continued to buttress the country’s growth.
It is China prerogative to remain idle.
It might still be possible for Chinese “Dream” to come true.
Yet, a historic window of opportunity is now closed.
Xi assumed the tools of proscribing and stalling, which are completely antithetical to the aforementioned window of opportunity.
Today, China is more authoritarian, less flexible, and fully deprived of horizontal accountability. Its reliance on wolf warrior diplomacy backfired: for example, the Swedish parliament sought to expel the Chinese ambassador to Stockholm. Also, Prague, the capital of Czechia, terminated its sister-city agreement with Shanghai and instead signed a new one with Taipei. Last but not least, we ought not to forget about the recent fiasco in the relations with the United States who ordered the shutdown of China’s consulate in Houston. All of this took its toll on China’s reputation.
Its international standing and inability to replace the U.S. as the major global power are not the only issues China is currently facing.
As it experiences multiple domestic and international shocks, China struggles to combat the COVID-19 pandemic and tame the disastrous floods of Yangtze River. The swarm of locusts of biblical proportions is also crippling Beijing’s institutional capacity and may soon lead to food shortages. In fact, the precarity of food supply further diminishes the level of trust for Chinese authorities.
In 2019, the Pew Research Center conducted a public opinion survey to examine the international views of China. In the U.S., Argentina, the U.K., Canada, Germany, and Ukraine, only about 30% of respondents claim a favorable view of China.
As the COVID-19 pandemic rages in the U.S., as many as 73% of U.S. respondents view China unfavorably.
Recently, the C.C.P. is losing its focus by continuously shifting targets. In fact, I believe there is no need for the C.C.P.to rely on nationalistic appeals, since in this new century values, business relations, and fair competition are all far more important than greater than delusive blood ties.
China lies only 130 kilometers away from us. Of course, we welcome dialogue and seek to avoid misjudgments. But we also distinguish between the C.C.P. and China. While we do welcome dialogue, but we will not be coerced to talk under unjust preconditions or in fear.
The only fair prerequisites are those of reciprocity, mutual respect as well as fairness and openness with respect for the rule of law.
Source: Pew Research Center
最近看到紐約時報中文版的一篇文章
<美國的川普,中國的「川建國」>,其中一小段是這樣的
「在中國,人們戲稱川普的中文名字是川建國。那是因為建國是共產黨愛國者中一個普遍的革命人名。它在諷刺地暗示川普對美國的治理不當實際上是在鞏固習近平的政權。」
裡面也提到,川普在任的幾年,國家更分裂,對於氣候變遷,傳統美國盟友,乃至於疫情處理等都相當拙劣,對於美國傳統的自由貿易、人權等價值也基本上都沒有太大興趣。這些方針,導致美國在世界的評價降低,波頓的新書也多有描述。
除此之外,許多不幸相信中共宣傳,又或者是中共圈養的小粉紅,特別故意愛宣傳川普增強中國的威望。
但這不是真的。
中共完全沒有掌握美國做得不夠好的地方,去增強其在世界的領導力。
在2016年時,秘魯的亞太峰會舉行期間,習近平政權爭取(RCEP)及亞太自由貿易區(FTAAP)談判;對比2017年初,美國剛宣布退出TPP,加上中國到「一帶一路」和亞洲基礎設施投資銀行,中國當時在世界全面發揮投資貿易、高科技併購還有其地緣戰略的影響力。
也是那個時候,各種的大國崛起、大國軍工、大國科技的宣傳影片此起彼落,似乎正準備要在世界舞台發光發熱。
這曾經是中共慢慢轉向的一個機會之窗。彼時(2017)美國盟友對美國總統的不信任度達到歷史新高,根據皮尤研究中心的資訊,英國對於美國總統的不信任度達到75%、日本72% 澳洲70% 法國更高達86%
如果那時中共開始有限度的改革,對內放寬言論自由,或者至少維持在胡溫當時的水中,對外追求有責任的基礎建設,逐步緩慢減低不公平的貿易壁壘,對於國有企業改革,增強私營企業、新創企業的活力。
停止對新疆迫害,不干預香港自治,不僅國際形象會大幅改善,哪怕是緩慢但是穩健的改革,也會讓大量吸引外資,讓中國的活力持續前進。
哪怕是什麼都不做也好
那或許有這麽一點可能性,中國「夢」是可以前行的
但是歷史機緣的大門已經關上。
習、禁、停、放棄了這個機會之窗,徹底的走向相反的方向。
更專制、更沒有彈性,更沒有任何制衡的力量。各種戰狼外交,讓瑞典議員提案驅逐中國大使,捷克布拉格市長與台北簽訂姊妹是,就解散上海與該市關係、被美國關閉領事館、各種讓中國形象低下的事情,中共都沒有少做。
中共不但完全沒有辦法取代美國,在多重國內外的衝擊之下,又是瘟疫,又是超大水患,緊接著蝗害,還有進來的糧食不足問題,正在面臨巨大的瓶頸。
而糧食的命脈,卻恰恰又在對他最不信任,對中共價值最反對的國家聯盟
根據皮尤研究中心:Pew Research Center2019調查各國對中國的喜好度,美國、阿根廷、英國、加拿大、德國、烏克蘭等,對於中國的喜好度都在30%上下
而2020疫情後美國對於中國的不信任度,更高達73%。
最近中共在演習,又要玩轉移目標的手段,對於中共,其實不必再有民族主義的同情,因為新的世紀,價值、商業模式、公平競爭的制度大於血緣幻想。
中國離我們只有130公里的距離,我們當然歡迎對話,避免誤判。但我們同時也區分中共與中國,歡迎對話,但不在前提、條件、恐懼之下對話。
如果真的要有前提,那就是對等、尊重,還有公平公開法治的方式會晤。
資料來源:皮尤研究中心:Pew Research Center
(美國著名的民調機構和智庫機構,https://www.pewresearch.org/)
examine中文 在 國家衛生研究院-論壇 Facebook 的最佳解答
➥【重點摘要】: Chloroquine (CQ)(氯奎寧)及hydroxychloroquine (HCQ)(羥氯奎寧)兩藥物結構相似,除了可治療瘧疾外,也是治療各種自體免疫疾病常用的疾病進程修飾性抗風濕藥物。
細胞激素風暴(cytokine storm)被認為是COVID-19進展到急性呼吸窘迫症候群的重要致病機轉之一,而近來研究發現CQ可以抑制細胞激素釋放,因此已有許多臨床試驗正進行中,評估CQ於COVID-19的療效。
初步試驗觀察顯示CQ可降低發燒天數、改善電腦斷層肺炎病灶及減緩病情惡化,因此CQ已被列入中國國家衛生健康委員會新冠肺炎診療指引中的治療藥物選項。
CQ及HCQ抗病毒機轉推測如下:
1. CQ及HCQ可干擾宿主細胞ACE2的醣基化(glycosylation),進而降低ACE2受體與SARS-CoV-2表面的Spike-protein之間的結合力,減低病毒入侵細胞的機會。
2. CQ及HCQ可增加宿主細胞胞內體(endosome)及溶小體(lysosomes)的PH值,進而干擾病毒進入細胞後與胞內體及溶小體的融合,不利病毒複製。
3. HCQ進入抗原呈獻細胞(antigen presenting cells)後,會抑制抗原處理及與MHC分子形成複合物並呈獻給T細胞的過程(antigen processing and presentation),進而抑制T細胞的活化、CD4+ T細胞表面CD154的表現及B細胞、T細胞細胞激素(如IL-1、IL-6及TNF)的分泌。
4. HCQ會干擾病毒DNA/ RNA與宿主細胞類鐸受體(toll-like receptors)和核酸感受器環GMP-AMP合成酶(cGAS)之間的相互作用,因此促發炎基因(pro-inflammatory genes)的轉錄無法被活化,繼而影響後續type I interferons、IL-1、TNF等促發炎細胞激素的釋放。
綜合而言,CQ及HCQ不只可以阻斷冠狀病毒侵入細胞及複製,也能減弱細胞激素風暴,為治療COVID-19帶來新曙光。此外,兩者為免疫調節劑,不像免疫抑制劑(如methotrexate)會造成免疫抑制,因此預期後續併發感染的風險較低。CQ及HCQ最常見的副作用是腸胃道症狀,如嘔吐、腹瀉。
然而,若長期使用CQ,會出現如視網膜病變及心肌病變等嚴重的副作用;若孕婦使用CQ,也會影響胎兒發展。相對於CQ,HCQ的抗病毒能力推測與CQ相當,但副作用明顯較低、最高可容忍劑量更高、孕婦亦可服用,因此是更為優先推薦的治療藥物。CQ與HCQ在預防新冠肺炎及減緩疾病惡化的療效正待臨床試驗結果來揭曉。(「財團法人國家衛生研究院」吳綺容醫師整理)
📋 COVID-19: a recommendation to examine the effect of hydroxychloroquine in preventing infection and progression(2020/03/20)+中文摘要轉譯
➥Author:Dan Zhou, Sheng-Ming Dai, Qiang Tong, et al.
➥Link: Oxford Academic (Oxford University Press) - Journal of Antimicrobial Chemotherapy
https://academic.oup.com/jac/advance-article/doi/10.1093/jac/dkaa114/5810487
#2019COVID19Academic
衛生福利部
疾病管制署 - 1922防疫達人
疾病管制署
國家衛生研究院-論壇
examine中文 在 方志恒 Brian Fong Facebook 的最佳解答
【#OpEd評論】In this long article published in Diplomat, I examine Hong Kong's autonomy within a framework of three-way interaction between Hongkongers, China and the Free World. Hong Kong’s autonomy will always be structured by big powers particularly China and the U.S.; But Hongkongers as a stateless nation can still influence the geopolitical game, if we can fight in unity and with wisdom. The Chinese version will be published by Taiwan Apple Daily in due course.
我在《外交家雜誌》的最新評論,將香港自治之未來,放置在香港人、中國和自由世界的三方互動框架中分析。香港自治受制於大國政治,特別是中美兩國;但香港人作為無國家共同體,如果能團結地、也有智慧地爭取,仍有能力影響地緣政治格局。中文版稍後在《台灣蘋果日報》刊登。
#香港前途 #香港自治 #香港人 #香港共同體 #新冷戰
#HKFuture #HongKongAutonomy #Hongkonger #HKNation #NewColdWar
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