Jenna Cody :

Is Taiwan a real China?
No, and with the exception of a few intervening decades - here’s the part that’ll surprise you - it never has been.

This’ll blow your mind too: that it never has been doesn’t matter.

So let’s start with what doesn’t actually matter.

Until the 1600s, Taiwan was indigenous. Indigenous Taiwanese are not Chinese, they’re Austronesian. Then it was a Dutch colony (note: I do not say “it was Dutch”, I say it was a Dutch colony). Then it was taken over by Ming loyalists at the end of the Ming dynasty (the Ming loyalists were breakaways, not a part of the new Qing court. Any overlap in Ming rule and Ming loyalist conquest of Taiwan was so brief as to be inconsequential).

Only then, in the late 1600s, was it taken over by the Chinese (Qing). But here’s the thing, it was more like a colony of the Qing, treated as - to use Emma Teng’s wording in Taiwan’s Imagined Geography - a barrier or barricade keeping the ‘real’ Qing China safe. In fact, the Qing didn’t even want Taiwan at first, the emperor called it “a ball of mud beyond the pale of civilization”. Prior to that, and to a great extent at that time, there was no concept on the part of China that Taiwan was Chinese, even though Chinese immigrants began moving to Taiwan under Dutch colonial rule (mostly encouraged by the Dutch, to work as laborers). When the Spanish landed in the north of Taiwan, it was the Dutch, not the Chinese, who kicked them out.

Under Qing colonial rule - and yes, I am choosing my words carefully - China only controlled the Western half of Taiwan. They didn’t even have maps for the eastern half. That’s how uninterested in it they were. I can’t say that the Qing controlled “Taiwan”, they only had power over part of it.

Note that the Qing were Manchu, which at the time of their conquest had not been a part of China: China itself essentially became a Manchu imperial holding, and Taiwan did as well, once they were convinced it was not a “ball of mud” but actually worth taking. Taiwan was not treated the same way as the rest of “Qing China”, and was not administered as a province until (I believe) 1887. So that’s around 200 years of Taiwan being a colony of the Qing.

What happened in the late 19th century to change China’s mind? Japan. A Japanese ship was shipwrecked in eastern Taiwan in the 1870s, and the crew was killed by hostile indigenous people in what is known as the Mudan Incident. A Japanese emissary mission went to China to inquire about what could be done, only to be told that China had no control there and if they went to eastern Taiwan, they did so at their own peril. China had not intended to imply that Taiwan wasn’t theirs, but they did. Japan - and other foreign powers, as France also attempted an invasion - were showing an interest in Taiwan, so China decided to cement its claim, started mapping the entire island, and made it a province.

So, I suppose for a decade or so Taiwan was a part of China. A China that no longer exists.

It remained a province until 1895, when it was ceded to Japan after the (first) Sino-Japanese War. Before that could happen, Taiwan declared itself a Republic, although it was essentially a Qing puppet state (though the history here is interesting - correspondence at the time indicates that the leaders of this ‘Republic of Taiwan’ considered themselves Chinese, and the tiger flag hints at this as well. However, the constitution was a very republican document, not something you’d expect to see in Qing-era China.) That lasted for less than a year, when the Japanese took it by force.

This is important for two reasons - the first is that some interpretations of IR theory state that when a colonial holding is released, it should revert to the state it was in before it was taken as a colony. In this case, that would actually be The Republic of Taiwan, not Qing-era China. Secondly, it puts to rest all notions that there was no Taiwan autonomy movement prior to 1947.

In any case, it would be impossible to revert to its previous state, as the government that controlled it - the Qing empire - no longer exists. The current government of China - the PRC - has never controlled it.

After the Japanese colonial era, there is a whole web of treaties and agreements that do not satisfactorily settle the status of Taiwan. None of them actually do so - those which explicitly state that Taiwan is to be given to the Republic of China (such as the Cairo declaration) are non-binding. Those that are binding do not settle the status of Taiwan (neither the treaty of San Francisco nor the Treaty of Taipei definitively say that Taiwan is a part of China, or even which China it is - the Treaty of Taipei sets out what nationality the Taiwanese are to be considered, but that doesn’t determine territorial claims). Treaty-wise, the status of Taiwan is “undetermined”.

Under more modern interpretations, what a state needs to be a state is…lessee…a contiguous territory, a government, a military, a currency…maybe I’m forgetting something, but Taiwan has all of it. For all intents and purposes it is independent already.

In fact, in the time when all of these agreements were made, the Allied powers weren’t as sure as you might have learned about what to do with Taiwan. They weren’t a big fan of Chiang Kai-shek, didn’t want it to go Communist, and discussed an Allied trusteeship (which would have led to independence) or backing local autonomy movements (which did exist). That it became what it did - “the ROC” but not China - was an accident (as Hsiao-ting Lin lays out in Accidental State).

In fact, the KMT knew this, and at the time the foreign minister (George Yeh) stated something to the effect that they were aware they were ‘squatters’ in Taiwan.

Since then, it’s true that the ROC claims to be the rightful government of Taiwan, however, that hardly matters when considering the future of Taiwan simply because they have no choice. To divest themselves of all such claims (and, presumably, change their name) would be considered by the PRC to be a declaration of formal independence. So that they have not done so is not a sign that they wish to retain the claim, merely that they wish to avoid a war.

It’s also true that most Taiwanese are ethnically “Han” (alongside indigenous and Hakka, although Hakka are, according to many, technically Han…but I don’t think that’s relevant here). But biology is not destiny: what ethnicity someone is shouldn’t determine what government they must be ruled by.

Through all of this, the Taiwanese have evolved their own culture, identity and sense of history. They are diverse in a way unique to Taiwan, having been a part of Austronesian and later Hoklo trade routes through Southeast Asia for millenia. Now, one in five (I’ve heard one in four, actually) Taiwanese children has a foreign parent. The Taiwanese language (which is not Mandarin - that’s a KMT transplant language forced on Taiwanese) is gaining popularity as people discover their history. Visiting Taiwan and China, it is clear where the cultural differences are, not least in terms of civic engagement. This morning, a group of legislators were removed after a weekend-long pro-labor hunger strike in front of the presidential palace. They were not arrested and will not be. Right now, a group of pro-labor protesters is lying down on the tracks at Taipei Main Station to protest the new labor law amendments.

This would never be allowed in China, but Taiwanese take it as a fiercely-guarded basic right.

*

Now, as I said, none of this matters.

What matters is self-determination. If you believe in democracy, you believe that every state (and Taiwan does fit the definition of a state) that wants to be democratic - that already is democratic and wishes to remain that way - has the right to self-determination. In fact, every nation does. You cannot be pro-democracy and also believe that it is acceptable to deprive people of this right, especially if they already have it.

Taiwan is already a democracy. That means it has the right to determine its own future. Period.

Even under the ROC, Taiwan was not allowed to determine its future. The KMT just arrived from China and claimed it. The Taiwanese were never asked if they consented. What do we call it when a foreign government arrives in land they had not previously governed and declares itself the legitimate governing power of that land without the consent of the local people? We call that colonialism.

Under this definition, the ROC can also be said to be a colonial power in Taiwan. They forced Mandarin - previously not a language native to Taiwan - onto the people, taught Chinese history, geography and culture, and insisted that the Taiwanese learn they were Chinese - not Taiwanese (and certainly not Japanese). This was forced on them. It was not chosen. Some, for awhile, swallowed it. Many didn’t. The independence movement only grew, and truly blossomed after democratization - something the Taiwanese fought for and won, not something handed to them by the KMT.

So what matters is what the Taiwanese want, not what the ROC is forced to claim. I cannot stress this enough - if you do not believe Taiwan has the right to this, you do not believe in democracy.

And poll after poll shows it: Taiwanese identify more as Taiwanese than Chinese (those who identify as both primarily identify as Taiwanese, just as I identify as American and Armenian, but primarily as American. Armenian is merely my ethnicity). They overwhelmingly support not unifying with China. The vast majority who support the status quo support one that leads to eventual de jure independence, not unification. The status quo is not - and cannot be - an endgame (if only because China has declared so, but also because it is untenable). Less than 10% want unification. Only a small number (a very small minority) would countenance unification in the future…even if China were to democratize.

The issue isn’t the incompatibility of the systems - it’s that the Taiwanese fundamentally do not see themselves as Chinese.

A change in China’s system won’t change that. It’s not an ethnic nationalism - there is no ethnic argument for Taiwan (or any nation - didn’t we learn in the 20th century what ethnicity-based nation-building leads to? Nothing good). It’s not a jingoistic or xenophobic nationalism - Taiwanese know that to be dangerous. It’s a nationalism based on shared identity, culture, history and civics. The healthiest kind of nationalism there is. Taiwan exists because the Taiwanese identify with it. Period.

There are debates about how long the status quo should go on, and what we should risk to insist on formal recognition. However, the question of whether or not to be Taiwan, not China…

…well, that’s already settled.

The Taiwanese have spoken and they are not Chinese.

Whatever y’all think about that doesn’t matter. That’s what they want, and if you believe in self-determination you will respect it.

If you don’t, good luck with your authoritarian nonsense, but Taiwan wants nothing to do with it.

#Opinion by Tsang Chi-ho 曾志豪｜"Nonetheless, the cistern in Bishop Hill is certainly telling you that at the end of the Qing dynasty, when Hong Kong, a territory ceded for a war, was ruled by Britain as a colony, it was taken care of very well by the governors, as evidenced by the lives of the people who had used to live on water from wells having been improved. Will such period pieces stir up a sentiment of affection for the colonial times? As the ICAC and courts left behind by British colonialists have been torn apart, can Bishop Hill successfully escape the queen’s chase?"

Read more: https://bit.ly/3n0tKv9

"但這個主教山蓄水池實實在在告訴你，在滿清仍未滅亡之際，香港這個因為戰爭而割讓的地方，被英殖統治期間，得到了統治者的照顧，改善了當日中國人只靠打井水的生活。這些歷史文物，會刺激戀殖的情緒嗎？當英殖留下的ICAC、法院都拆得七七八八，這個主教山，能逃過皇后追捕嗎？"
____________
📱Download the app:
http://onelink.to/appledailyapp
📰 Latest news:
http://appledaily.com/engnews/
🐤 Follow us on Twitter:
https://twitter.com/appledaily_hk
💪🏻 Subscribe and show your support:
https://bit.ly/2ZYKpHP

#AppleDailyENG

泰晤士報人物專訪【Joshua Wong interview: Xi won’t win this battle, says Hong Kong activist】

Beijing believes punitive prison sentences will put an end to pro-democracy protests. It couldn’t be more wrong, the 23-year-old says.

https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/joshua-wong-interview-xi-wont-win-this-battle-says-hong-kong-activist-p52wlmd0t

For Joshua Wong, activism began early and in his Hong Kong school canteen. The 13-year-old was so appalled by the bland, oily meals served for lunch at the United Christian College that he organised a petition to lobby for better fare. His precocious behaviour earned him and his parents a summons to the headmaster’s office. His mother played peacemaker, but the episode delivered a valuable message to the teenage rebel.

“It was an important lesson in political activism,” Wong concluded. “You can try as hard as you want, but until you force them to pay attention, those in power won’t listen to you.”

It was also the first stage in a remarkable journey that has transformed the bespectacled, geeky child into the globally recognised face of Hong Kong’s struggle for democracy. Wong is the most prominent international advocate for the protests that have convulsed the former British colony since last summer.

At 23, few people would have the material for a memoir. But that is certainly not a problem for Wong, whose book, #UnfreeSpeech, will be published in Britain this week.

We meet in a cafe in the Admiralty district, amid the skyscrapers of Hong Kong’s waterfront, close to the site of the most famous scenes in his decade of protest. Wong explains that he remains optimistic about his home city’s prospects in its showdown with the might of communist China under President Xi Jinping.

“It’s not enough just to be dissidents or youth activists. We really need to enter politics and make some change inside the institution,” says Wong, hinting at his own ambitions to pursue elected office.

He has been jailed twice for his activism. He could face a third stint as a result of a case now going through the courts, a possibility he treats with equanimity. “Others have been given much longer sentences,” he says. Indeed, 7,000 people have been arrested since the protests broke out some seven months ago; 1,000 of them have been charged, with many facing a sentence of as much as 10 years.

There is a widespread belief that Beijing hopes such sentences will dampen support for future protests. Wong brushes off that argument. “It’s gone too far. Who would imagine that Generation Z and the millennials would be confronting rubber bullets and teargas, and be fully engaged in politics, instead of Instagram or Snapchat? The Hong Kong government may claim the worst is over, but Hong Kong will never be peaceful as long as police violence persists.”

In Unfree Speech, Wong argues that China is not only Hong Kong’s problem (the book’s subtitle is: The Threat to Global Democracy and Why We Must Act, Now). “It is an urgent message that people need to defend their rights, against China and other authoritarians, wherever they live,” he says.

At the heart of the book are Wong’s prison writings from a summer spent behind bars in 2017. Each evening in his cell, “I sat on my hard bed and put pen to paper under dim light” to tell his story.

Wong was born in October 1996, nine months before Britain ceded control of Hong Kong to Beijing. That makes him a fire rat, the same sign of the Chinese zodiac that was celebrated on the first day of the lunar new year yesterday. Fire rats are held to be adventurous, rebellious and garrulous. Wong is a Christian and does not believe in astrology, but those personality traits seem close to the mark.

His parents are Christians — his father quit his job in IT to become a pastor, while his mother works at a community centre that provides counselling — and named their son after the prophet who led the Israelites to the promised land.

Like many young people in Hong Kong, whose housing market has been ranked as the world’s most unaffordable, he still lives at home, in South Horizons, a commuter community on the south side of the main island.

Wong was a dyslexic but talkative child, telling jokes in church groups and bombarding his elders with questions about their faith. “By speaking confidently, I was able to make up for my weaknesses,” he writes. “The microphone loved me and I loved it even more.”

In 2011, he and a group of friends, some of whom are his fellow activists today, launched Scholarism, a student activist group, to oppose the introduction of “moral and national education” to their school curriculum — code for communist brainwashing, critics believed. “I lived the life of Peter Parker,” he says. “Like Spider-Man’s alter-ego, I went to class during the day and rushed out to fight evil after school.”

The next year, the authorities issued a teaching manual that hailed the Chinese Communist Party as an “advanced and selfless regime”. For Wong, “it confirmed all our suspicions and fears about communist propaganda”.

In August 2012, members of Scholarism launched an occupation protest outside the Hong Kong government’s headquarters. Wong told a crowd of 120,000 students and parents: “Tonight we have one message and one message only: withdraw the brainwashing curriculum. We’ve had enough of this government. Hong Kongers will prevail.”

Remarkably, the kids won. Leung Chun-ying, the territory’s chief executive at the time, backed down. Buoyed by their success, the youngsters of Scholarism joined forces with other civil rights groups to protest about the lack of progress towards electing the next chief executive by universal suffrage — laid out as a goal in the Basic Law, Hong Kong’s constitution. Their protests culminated in the “umbrella movement” occupation of central Hong Kong for 79 days in 2014.

Two years later, Wong and other leaders set up a political group, Demosisto. He has always been at pains to emphasise he is not calling for independence — a complete red line for Beijing. Demosisto has even dropped the words “self-determination” from its stated goals — perhaps to ease prospects for its candidates in elections to Legco, the territory’s legislative council, in September.

Wong won’t say whether he will stand himself, but he is emphatically political, making a plea for change from within — not simply for anger on the streets — and for stepping up international pressure: “I am one of the facilitators to let the voices of Hong Kong people be heard in the international community, especially since 2016.”

There are tensions between moderates and radicals. Some of the hardliners on the streets last year considered Wong already to be part of the Establishment, a backer of the failed protests of the past.

So why bother? What’s the point of a city of seven million taking on one of the world’s nastiest authoritarian states, with a population of about 1.4 billion? And in any case, won’t it all be over in 2047, the end of the “one country, two systems” deal agreed between China and Britain, which was supposed to guarantee a high degree of autonomy for another 50 years? Does he fear tanks and a repetition of the Tiananmen Square killings?

Wong acknowledges there are gloomy scenarios but remains a robust optimist. “Freedom and democracy can prevail in the same way that they did in eastern Europe, even though before the Berlin Wall fell, few people believed it would happen.”

He is tired of the predictions of think-tank pundits, journalists and the like. Three decades ago, with the implosion of communism in the Soviet bloc, many were confidently saying that the demise of the people’s republic was only a matter of time. Jump forward 20 years, amid the enthusiasm after the Beijing Olympics, and they were predicting market reforms and a growing middle class would presage liberalisation.

Neither scenario has unfolded, Wong notes. “They are pretending to hold the crystal ball to predict the future, but look at their record and it is clear no one knows what will happen by 2047. Will the Communist Party even still exist?”

https://www.penguin.co.uk/books/111/1119445/unfree-speech