【美國為什麼要「#對等外交」？ 聽聽美駐華外交官的遭遇】

9月2日，川普政府對駐美中國外交官實施新的限制，以推進美中關係的對等原則。多位前美國外交官對此表示認同，「早該這麼做了」。

採訪了三位曾在不同年代派駐中國的外交官們，他們在中國經歷了什麼？


▫️報導全文：

https://www.rfa.org/mandarin/yataibaodao/junshiwaijiao/jt-09032020125718.html

▪️川普政府對中國🇨🇳外交官祭出新規

美國國務卿蓬佩奧在9月2日發出新規，基於「對等」原則，下列情況都需要先經過國務院批准：

1. 中國外交官訪問美國大學

2. 會見美國當地政府官員

3. 在駐地以外的地方舉行超過50人的文化活動

聲明稱，多年來，美國外交人員在中國「面臨嚴重障礙，遠遠超出外交常規」。


▪️🕵🏻美國駐華外交官面對了什麼？


🗣「不管到哪裡都要先（向中國政府）申請，個人旅遊或公差，那是一個很官僚的過程。」

1990年代派駐北京的外交官、前AIT處長 #楊甦棣 接受自由亞洲電臺訪問時回憶道：「我當時負責中國的內政事務，每六個星期我會有至少7天到10天到中國各地旅行。我的態度是，盡可能去瞭解中國，聆聽當地人真實的聲音。」

不過，出行的層層審批及地方官員的隨時跟蹤、監控，總讓楊甦棣的行程不太順利。

🤘🏻「上有政策、下有對策。」採訪中楊甦棣突然冒出這句中文。

他說當時自己的小訣竅是利用傍晚五點，隨行監控的中國官員下班後，他會遛出被安排的酒店，找尋跟當地人談話的機會。

「我記得走在 #西藏 拉薩的小巷子裡，天已經暗了，但當地老百姓找我到家裡坐坐，我有了那趟旅程最真心的交談。」

楊甦棣說，在他三十多年的外交生涯裡，只有 #俄羅斯 及 #中國 對他國外交官有這樣的要求及對待。據他的瞭解，在中國的美國外交官處境近幾年越來越糟。

反覆與中方溝通未果後，對中國官僚機構累積的「沮喪」及「反感」情緒在駐地使館及外交官中彌漫。


▪️🧞‍♀️跟蹤、🧟監控、🧚🏻小動作


🗣「數十年來，我們一直在跟中方溝通，要求對等。中共持續說不，甚至是一種不在乎的態度。我們早就該這麼做（對中國外交官發出限制反擊）了。」

2016至2017年曾派駐在北京、擔任駐華高級國防官員的準將羅伯特• #史帕丁（Robert Spalding）告訴自由亞洲電臺。

數十年過去，派駐中國的史帕丁甚至已經沒有像楊甦棣那樣能夠到西藏、新疆等各地旅行的自由。他的多次旅行申請都被拒絕。

🗣「美國外交官的活動範圍通常被限制在派駐的城市，只能在非常嚴苛的申請下才有可能到中國其他城市，甚至包含私人行程。美國防部官員需要向解放軍對口單位申請（出行），外交官則需要向外交部申請。有時候同意、有時不同意，有時根本等不到回音。」

史帕丁提到，中國對美國外交人員的一些「小動作」更是讓人感到氣憤。他舉例，中共限制了美國的外交包裹大小，或是在外交人員的居所進行監控、派人尾隨外交人員等。


▪️層層限制 🙅🏻美外交官「根本沒有辦法進行工作」

曾派駐過中國的退役外交官、華盛頓智庫威爾遜中心基辛格中美研究所主任 #戴博（Robert Daly）提到一段近期在中國的經驗。

2016年，美國大使館的文化交流活動，邀請中文流利且熟知中美文化的戴博到中國幾個大城市及高校進行公開演講，主題是分析共和黨、民主黨黨大會和美國政治。戴博告訴本台，他本來興致盎然地準備跟中國人民交流，如實地談談民主的利弊。

🗣「最後一刻，我到中國以後，一個個城市，長春、成都等（中國）地方外交事務官員突然通知說‘不方便’，活動全都給取消了。明明是原來中方都同意的文化交流活動。而且這（突然被取消活動）不是稀有的情況。」

在1987年派駐中國的戴博回憶，#六四 以前，是他印象中國最自由的時刻，人們還能有相對自由的交流空間。他觀察，#習近平 上臺以後，這個空間快速縮緊。

🗣「限制一年比一年多，美國國務院外交官的感受我是非常能瞭解的，他們根本沒有辦法進行工作。相反，在美國的中國外交官是自由的跑來跑去，利用媒體、社交平臺寫帖子，宣傳他們的想法、進入美國的地方政府、美國的大學…這是不對等的！ 」

戴博坦言，美國內部在討論如何回擊中國時也面臨難處：如何在反擊專制時，同時保有自身自由社會的優勢。


▪️🌼🌸華春瑩批美無大國擔當 美前外交官：詭辯

對於美國國務院對中國外交官的新限制，中國外交部發言人 #華春瑩 2日在記者會上反批美國干擾雙邊正常交往，無大國擔當，還說中國外交官在美國一貫「依法依規」，進行「正常活動」。

🗣「中國政府非常清楚他們在占這些便宜。當他們說中國外交官在美國遵守美國法律，美國外交官在中國遵守中國的法律，這個是詭辯。」

戴博引用《禮記》的一句話回應：「#來而不往非禮也。」


▫️報導全文：

https://www.rfa.org/mandarin/yataibaodao/junshiwaijiao/jt-09032020125718.html

▫️國務院聲明：

https://www.state.gov/advancing-reciprocity-in-u-s-china-diplomatic-relations/?fbclid=IwAR0CfIstV2At1XzPuyRIBPbHWQmhS592qKDzb2W7N5DJ2hJR9E_JTLYzilU

I have recently perused Nicholas Kristof’s NYT piece “China’s Man in Washington, Named Trump”(https://nyti.ms/3h2JXh8). One paragraph in particular caught my attention: “A joke in China suggests that Trump’s Chinese name is Chuan Jianguo, or “Build-the-Country Trump.” That’s because Build-the-Country is a common revolutionary name among Communist patriots, and it’s mockingly suggested that Trump’s misrule of the United States is actually bolstering Xi’s regime.”

Kristoff also avows that since Trump’s ascension to presidency, the American nation became highly polarized. This is reflected in the current administration’s policies on climate change, foreign relations with established U.S. allies, and COVID-19 prevention, all of which are rather ineffective. It also seems like Mr. Trump and his team diverged from the traditional priorities, including promoting free trade, human rights, and other quintessentially American values. As described thoroughly by John Bolton, all these factors contributed to the declining standing of the U.S. in global politics.

What is more, many people fall prey to CCP’s propaganda and its interpretations of Trump’s actions, which only enhances China’s reputation.

But that might not exactly be the case.

The CCP apparently failed to utilize the window of opportunity created by the ineptness of the Trump administration, as China could have grown to the position of a leader by filling in the void left by the U.S.

During the 2016 APEC Ministerial Meeting in Lima, Peru, Xi Jinping and his team actively supported the plans to establish the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) and a Free Trade Area of the Asia Pacific, or FTAAP. In contrast, the United States withdrew its signature from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) in early 2017. Coupled with China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and the establishment of the Asian Infrastructure and Investment Bank (AIIB), this move bolstered China’s capacity to influence global investments and trade, high-tech mergers and acquisitions, and, overall, expand its geostrategic influence on the entire globe.

At the same time, various propaganda films about great power competition, military industry, and science and technology surged all at once, and gained remarkable following around the world.

All this provided a window of opportunity for the CCP to slowly change its course. Around the same time, the distrust for POTUS among U.S. allies’ reached its apex. According to polls conducted by the Pew Research Center, the distrust for the U.S. president in the U.K. reached 75%, 72% in Japan, 70% in Australia, and stunning 86% in France.

Had the C.C.P,. begun to open up at that time, or at least resumed the governance style of the Hu-Wen administration, it could have reaped the benefits of promoting liberalism where the U.S. failed to deliver. It was the time for Beijing to gradually enhance freedom of speech domestically, pursue sustainable infrastructural projects, gradually reform unfair barriers to trade, transform its S.O.E.s, strengthen protections for private ownership, and vitalize its start-ups and enterprises.

Moreover, were China to cease the genocide in East Turkestan and refrain from cracking down on Hong Kong's semi-autonomy, it would have greatly enhanced its global international image. Additionally, if paired with slow but steady reforms, Beijing’s respect for sovereignty of its peoples would have attracted a large amount of foreign investment, which in turn would have continued to buttress the country’s growth.

It is China prerogative to remain idle.
It might still be possible for Chinese “Dream” to come true.
Yet, a historic window of opportunity is now closed.

Xi assumed the tools of proscribing and stalling, which are completely antithetical to the aforementioned window of opportunity.

Today, China is more authoritarian, less flexible, and fully deprived of horizontal accountability. Its reliance on wolf warrior diplomacy backfired: for example, the Swedish parliament sought to expel the Chinese ambassador to Stockholm. Also, Prague, the capital of Czechia, terminated its sister-city agreement with Shanghai and instead signed a new one with Taipei. Last but not least, we ought not to forget about the recent fiasco in the relations with the United States who ordered the shutdown of China’s consulate in Houston. All of this took its toll on China’s reputation.

Its international standing and inability to replace the U.S. as the major global power are not the only issues China is currently facing.
As it experiences multiple domestic and international shocks, China struggles to combat the COVID-19 pandemic and tame the disastrous floods of Yangtze River. The swarm of locusts of biblical proportions is also crippling Beijing’s institutional capacity and may soon lead to food shortages. In fact, the precarity of food supply further diminishes the level of trust for Chinese authorities.

In 2019, the Pew Research Center conducted a public opinion survey to examine the international views of China. In the U.S., Argentina, the U.K., Canada, Germany, and Ukraine, only about 30% of respondents claim a favorable view of China.

As the COVID-19 pandemic rages in the U.S., as many as 73% of U.S. respondents view China unfavorably.

Recently, the C.C.P. is losing its focus by continuously shifting targets. In fact, I believe there is no need for the C.C.P.to rely on nationalistic appeals, since in this new century values, business relations, and fair competition are all far more important than greater than delusive blood ties.
China lies only 130 kilometers away from us. Of course, we welcome dialogue and seek to avoid misjudgments. But we also distinguish between the C.C.P. and China. While we do welcome dialogue, but we will not be coerced to talk under unjust preconditions or in fear.

The only fair prerequisites are those of reciprocity, mutual respect as well as fairness and openness with respect for the rule of law.
Source: Pew Research Center

最近看到紐約時報中文版的一篇文章
<美國的川普，中國的「川建國」>，其中一小段是這樣的

「在中國，人們戲稱川普的中文名字是川建國。那是因為建國是共產黨愛國者中一個普遍的革命人名。它在諷刺地暗示川普對美國的治理不當實際上是在鞏固習近平的政權。」

裡面也提到，川普在任的幾年，國家更分裂，對於氣候變遷，傳統美國盟友，乃至於疫情處理等都相當拙劣，對於美國傳統的自由貿易、人權等價值也基本上都沒有太大興趣。這些方針，導致美國在世界的評價降低，波頓的新書也多有描述。

除此之外，許多不幸相信中共宣傳，又或者是中共圈養的小粉紅，特別故意愛宣傳川普增強中國的威望。

但這不是真的。

中共完全沒有掌握美國做得不夠好的地方，去增強其在世界的領導力。

在2016年時，秘魯的亞太峰會舉行期間，習近平政權爭取（RCEP）及亞太自由貿易區（FTAAP）談判；對比2017年初，美國剛宣布退出ＴＰＰ，加上中國到「一帶一路」和亞洲基礎設施投資銀行，中國當時在世界全面發揮投資貿易、高科技併購還有其地緣戰略的影響力。

也是那個時候，各種的大國崛起、大國軍工、大國科技的宣傳影片此起彼落，似乎正準備要在世界舞台發光發熱。

這曾經是中共慢慢轉向的一個機會之窗。彼時（2017)美國盟友對美國總統的不信任度達到歷史新高，根據皮尤研究中心的資訊，英國對於美國總統的不信任度達到75%、日本72% 澳洲70% 法國更高達86%

如果那時中共開始有限度的改革，對內放寬言論自由，或者至少維持在胡溫當時的水中，對外追求有責任的基礎建設，逐步緩慢減低不公平的貿易壁壘，對於國有企業改革，增強私營企業、新創企業的活力。

停止對新疆迫害，不干預香港自治，不僅國際形象會大幅改善，哪怕是緩慢但是穩健的改革，也會讓大量吸引外資，讓中國的活力持續前進。

哪怕是什麼都不做也好

那或許有這麽一點可能性，中國「夢」是可以前行的

但是歷史機緣的大門已經關上。

習、禁、停、放棄了這個機會之窗，徹底的走向相反的方向。

更專制、更沒有彈性，更沒有任何制衡的力量。各種戰狼外交，讓瑞典議員提案驅逐中國大使，捷克布拉格市長與台北簽訂姊妹是，就解散上海與該市關係、被美國關閉領事館、各種讓中國形象低下的事情，中共都沒有少做。

中共不但完全沒有辦法取代美國，在多重國內外的衝擊之下，又是瘟疫，又是超大水患，緊接著蝗害，還有進來的糧食不足問題，正在面臨巨大的瓶頸。

而糧食的命脈，卻恰恰又在對他最不信任，對中共價值最反對的國家聯盟

根據皮尤研究中心:Pew Research Center2019調查各國對中國的喜好度，美國、阿根廷、英國、加拿大、德國、烏克蘭等，對於中國的喜好度都在30%上下

而2020疫情後美國對於中國的不信任度，更高達73%。

最近中共在演習，又要玩轉移目標的手段，對於中共，其實不必再有民族主義的同情，因為新的世紀，價值、商業模式、公平競爭的制度大於血緣幻想。

中國離我們只有130公里的距離，我們當然歡迎對話，避免誤判。但我們同時也區分中共與中國，歡迎對話，但不在前提、條件、恐懼之下對話。

如果真的要有前提，那就是對等、尊重，還有公平公開法治的方式會晤。

資料來源：皮尤研究中心:Pew Research Center
（美國著名的民調機構和智庫機構，https://www.pewresearch.org/）

[出走地平線：眼高手低]
Flattening The Curve : What I try to touch

中文所謂的「眼高手低」，意指不自量力。若目標定得太高，出手和能力卻沒有那麼高明，便會失敗。

我覺得《阿飛正傳》的前半部正是如此。當時的我仍受困於「電影」這概念，困在怎樣塑造影像風格，困在光的理論之內。

我們希望鏡頭可以像張國榮角色的性格一樣，慢悠悠的，同時流暢得像情感的交流。但是，許多風格上的選擇，都流於理論，做起來毫不實際，也未能前後呼應令影片成為一個整體。我拍得比自己想像中要慢，效率也低。

如今，我把目光放到手頭的工作上。我追求自己能把握的目標、能接觸的或想觸碰的。這就是我每日拍攝，所盡力堅守之道。

In Chinese we say, “The eyes are high but the hand is low.” It means you are trying too hard to do something. You set your goals high, but your hands, your abilities, are not as capable, so you fail.

I feel that the first half of Days of Being Wild is like that. I was still stuck in the concept of a film. Of how to style the image. Of the theory of light.

We wanted the camera to be as languid as Leslie Cheung’s character and as fluid as the reciprocity of the feelings, but many of the stylistic choices were too theoretical, too impractical to the working process, and not organic enough to make the film feel whole. I was slower and less efficient than I wanted to be.

Nowadays, I lower my eyes to what is at hand. I reach for what I can hold onto, what I can touch, or try to touch. This is the way I try to hold on, day by filming day.

#阿飛正傳30週年 #王家衛 #張國榮
#DaysOfBeingWild30thanniversary #WKW #LeslieCheung