📜 [專欄新文章] Tornado Cash 實例解析

✍️ Johnson

📥 歡迎投稿： https://medium.com/taipei-ethereum-meetup #徵技術分享文 #使用心得 #教學文 #medium

Tornado Cash 是一個使用 zk-SNARKs 建立的 Dapp，它實現了匿名的代幣交易，這篇文章就用一些程式碼片段，來分享它是怎麼運作的。

本文為 Tornado Cash 研究系列的 Part 3，本系列以 tornado-core 為教材，學習開發 ZKP 的應用，另兩篇為：

Part 1：Merkle Tree in JavaScript

Part 2：ZKP 與智能合約的開發入門

Special thanks to C.C. Liang for review and enlightenment.

我們知道在以太坊上的交易紀錄都是公開的，你可以在 etherscan 上看到某個地址的所有歷史交易紀錄，當然地址是合約的話也是一樣。

也許創建一個新的錢包和地址就好了？假設一個情境是 Alice 想要匿名傳送 1 ETH 給 Bob，Alice 原本的錢包是 A，但她不想讓 A 地址傳給 Bob 的交易紀錄被看到，所以 Alice 創建另一個錢包 B，顯然 B 錢包是空的，Alice 必須把 A 錢包的 1 ETH 傳到 B 錢包，再用 B 錢包的地址傳給 Bob。

但問題就在於，只要追蹤 B 錢包的地址，就能看到 B 的歷史交易紀錄中 A 錢包曾經打幣給 B 錢包，於是到頭來交易還是被追蹤到了。

Tornado Cash 的解決方案，簡單來說，它是一份合約，當你要匿名傳送代幣時，就把一定數量的幣丟進合約裡 (Deposit)，此時你會拿到一個 note，長得像這樣：

tornado-eth-0.1-5-0x3863c2e16abc85d72b64d78c68fca5936db2501832e26345226efdfb2bc45804977f167d86b711bb6b4095ddaa646ec93f0a93ac4884a66c1d881f4fc985

note 就是一串字串，擁有這字串的人，就能提領 (Withdraw) 剛剛傳入合約的代幣。握有 note 就代表擁有提款的權利，所以 note 一旦被別人知道，別人就可以把錢給提走。

其中，後面那段亂碼，本篇文章就以「秘密」來稱呼，這個秘密是由 secret 與 nullifier 組成，而這兩個都是在鏈下隨機產生的亂數。

因此 Tornado 的合約基本上會有兩個函式：

Deposit

Withdraw

有興趣的人可以先到 Dapp 上先玩一次看看，使用 Goerli 測試網，這裡可以領 Goerli 的代幣：https://goerli-faucet.slock.it/

Deposit

我們就從 Deposit 開始說起，簡單來說， Deposit 是將資料儲存到合約的 Merkle Tree 上。

剛剛提到的秘密，它是在鏈下產生，由 secret 跟 nullifier 組成，合在一起之後也稱作 preimage，因為我們要對這個 preimage 進行 hash，就會成為 commitment。

合約中 Deposit 如下：

deposit 除了傳送代幣到合約之外，需填入一個參數 _commitment。

我們對 preimage 使用 Pedersen 作為 hash function 加密後產生 commitment，以偽代碼表示如下：

const preimage = secret + nullifier;const commitment = pedersenHash(preimage);

這個 commitment 會成為 Merkle Tree 的葉子，所以合約中的 _insert(commitment) 來自 MerkleTreeWithHistory.sol 的合約，將我們的資料插入 Merkle Tree，然後回傳一個 index 給你，告訴你這個 commitment 在 Merkle Tree 上的位置，最後一起發布成公開的 Deposit 事件。

我們知道 MerkleTree 是將一大筆資料兩兩做雜湊後產生一個唯一值 root，這個 root 就是合約上所儲存的歷史資料。

root 的特性就是只要底下的資料一有更動，就會重新產生新的 root。

所以只要一有用戶 deposit ，就會插入新的葉子到 Merkle Tree 上，於是就會產生新的 root，所以在合約中有一個陣列是用來儲存所有的 root 的 roots：

bytes32[ROOT_HISTORY_SIZE] public roots;

roots 是用來紀錄每個 deposit 的歷史，每一次 deposit 都會創造新的 root，而所有 root 都會被儲存進 roots 裡，於是當你要提領的時候，就要證明你的 commitment 所算出的 root 曾經出現在 roots 裡，代表曾經有 deposit 的動作，因此才可以進行提領。

Withdraw

在 Deposit 之前 Tornado Cash 就會在鏈下產生秘密後交給使用者，擁有這個秘密的人等於擁有提款的權利。

提領的時候，秘密會在鏈下計算後產生 proof，proof 是 withdraw 需要的參數，所以只要確保這個 proof 能夠被驗證，那麼代幣的接收地址 (recipient) 就可以隨便我們填，只要不填上當初拿來 deposit 用的地址，基本上就做到匿名交易的效果了。

也就是說，產生這個 proof 並提交給合約，能夠證明此人知道秘密，但卻不告訴合約秘密本身是什麼。

function withdraw(bytes calldata _proof, bytes32 _root, bytes32 _nullifierHash, address payable _recipient, address payable _relayer, uint256 _fee, uint256 _refund) external payable nonReentrant;

我們可以清楚看到 withdraw 函式裡沒有接收有關秘密的任何資訊作為參數，也就是秘密不會與合約有所接觸，也不會暴露在 etherscan 上。

回顧 ZKP 所帶來的效果：

鏈下計算

隱藏秘密

在 Tornado Cash 的例子中，我們用秘密來產生證明，完成的鏈下計算包括：

將秘密 hash 成 commitment

算出 Merkle Tree 的 root。

以下是簡化後的 withdraw.circom：

template Withdraw(levels) { signal input root; signal input nullifierHash;

signal private input nullifier; signal private input secret; signal private input pathElements[levels]; signal private input pathIndices[levels];

component hasher = CommitmentHasher(); // Pedersen hasher.nullifier <== nullifier; hasher.secret <== secret; hasher.nullifierHash === nullifierHash;

component tree = MerkleTreeChecker(levels); // MiMC tree.leaf <== hasher.commitment; tree.root <== root; for (var i = 0; i < levels; i++) { tree.pathElements[i] <== pathElements[i]; tree.pathIndices[i] <== pathIndices[i]; }}

component main = Withdraw(20);

從上述代碼就可以看出這份 circuit 的 private 變數有：

secret

nullifier

pathElements

pathIndices

而 public 變數有：

root

nullifierHash

如同我們一開始說過的，秘密就是指 secret 與 nullifier。這裡進行的鏈下計算就是對 secret 與 nullifier 雜湊成 commitment。而使用的 hash function 叫做 Pedersen。

在進行 Merkle Tree 的計算之前，我們還檢查了 nullifier 雜湊後的 nullifierHash 跟 public 變數 nullifierHash 是不是一樣的。

hasher.nullifierHash === nullifierHash;

接下來，開始計算 Merkle Proof，用意是確認經過雜湊後的 commitment 有沒有出現在 Merkle Tree 上，所以我們的 private input 還有 pathElements 與 pathIndices（詳情參考 Part 1 Merkle Tree in JavaScript），讓它跑一趟 Merkle Proof 的計算，最後就能夠算出一個 root，再確認計算後的 root 與我們的 public 變數 root 是否一樣。

tree.root <== root;

於是我們就能產生一個 ZKP 的證明 — 證明 private 變數：secret, nullifier, pathElements, pathIndices 可以計算出 public 變數：root 與 nullifierHash。

把這個證明提交給合約，合約透過 Verifier 驗證 proof 是否正確，以及必須事先確認：

public 變數 root 有在合約的 roots 裡面。

public 變數 nullifierHash 在合約中是第一次出現。

以下附上完整的 withdraw 原始碼：

必須注意 ZKP 是向合約證明使用者填入的 secret 和 nullifier 可以計算出某個 root，但無法保證這個 root 曾經在合約的 roots 歷史上。

所以合約的 withdraw 中，除了 verifyProof 之外，還要事先檢查 ZKP 算出來的 root 是不是真的在歷史上發生過，所以需要 isKnownRoot 的檢查：

function isKnownRoot(bytes32 _root) public view returns(bool)

必須先檢查 isKnownRoot 後才能進行 verifyProof。

經過 verifyProof 驗證成功後，合約就開始進行提款的動作，也就會將代幣傳到 recipient 的地址，最後拋出 Withdrawal 的事件。

nullifier 與 nullifierHash

為什麼我們的秘密不是只有 secret 還要額外加一個 nullifier？

簡單來說，這是為了防止已經提領過的 note 又再提領一次，也就是所謂的 double spend。

require(!nullifierHashes[_nullifierHash], "The note has been already spent");

可以看到 withdraw 需要填入參數 nullifierHash，跟 isKnownRoot 一樣的狀況，我們需要對電路的 public 變數先經過一層檢查之後，才能帶入到 verifyProof 裡面。

nullifierHash 可以理解為這個 note 的 id，但它不會連結到 deposit，因此可以用來紀錄這個 note 是否已經被提領過。

所以當 verifyProof 驗證成功之後，我們要紀錄 nullifierHash 已完成提領：

nullifierHashes[_nullifierHash] = true;

有關為什麼需要事先檢查 public 變數後，才能帶入 verifyProof ，可以參考 Part 2：ZKP 與智能合約的開發入門 提到的 publicSignals 的部分。

附上 Tornado Cash 的架構圖：

簡化版的 tornado-core

tornado-core 的程式碼很簡潔漂亮，所以我模仿該專案自己實作一遍：

simple-tornado：https://github.com/chnejohnson/simple-tornado

這份專案只完成了 tornado-core 的核心部分，不一樣的是我的開發環境使用 hardhat 與 ethers 寫成，而 circom 與 snarkjs 使用官方當前的版本，合約用 0.7.0，測試使用 Typescript 。

比起兩年前的 tornado-core ，simple-tornado 使用的技術更新，可能更適合初學者理解這份專案，但是它有 bug…我在 issues 的地方有紀錄說明。

在開發的過程中，我的順序是先從最小單位的 MiMC hash function 開始玩，發現必須 javascript 算一次 hash、solidity 算一次、circom 再算一次，確保這三個語言對同一個值算出同樣的 hash 之後，才能放心去做更複雜的 Merkle Tree。

總結

我們可以看到 Tornado Cash 簡單的兩個函式：Deposit 與 Withdraw，透過將代幣送入合約後再提領到另一個地址的流程，應用 ZKP 達成匿名的交易。

除了斷開 Deposit 與 Withdraw 的地址關聯性之外，Tornado Cash 還有做了一層「藏樹於林」的隱私防護，這部份的解釋就請參考 ZKP 讀書會 Tornado Cash。

網路上很多關於 ZKP 的文章或專案都是在 2019 年後出產的，經過許多人對這項技術的嘗試，讓我們對 ZKP 有了更清晰的理解，如今兩年後，開發工具也變得更加成熟，期待未來在 web 隱私議題上能看到更多 ZKP 大放異彩的應用。

原始碼

tornado-core

simple-tornado

參考資料

ZKP 讀書會 Tornado Cash

Tornado Privacy Solution Cryptographic Review

Tornado Cash 實例解析 was originally published in Taipei Ethereum Meetup on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.

👏 歡迎轉載分享鼓掌

確診之後濺血急診室！醫護人員有多少情緒讓你消耗？

看著新聞播報的急診室濺血事件，看了讓人憤慨不以，你確診了很痛苦、很恐懼，不代表你可以將情緒宣洩在努力做好感染醫治工作的醫護人員身上！
確診了你很不願意，而傳染病流行醫護人員更不願意！當人們習慣被服務，甚至將醫療專業視為服務業時，就會要求與索取更多照顧，醫護人員需要付出專業知識，同時要情緒支持患者，除了加速患者的康復外，同時也為了維繫良好醫病關係。

而醫療專業的確是「高度情緒勞動」的產業。

在1983年Hochschild達美航空公司空服員情緒表達的個案研究時，提出情緒勞務(Emotional labor)一詞，指工作者對客戶密集接觸過程中，對自身情緒的控制，以展現出組織制度下的情緒期待。近十年臺灣博碩士論文的研究對象中， 以專業性、技術性工作者，如護士、醫師與教師等高情緒勞動類別者為主。

因此根本不用疫情爆發，醫護人員的情緒勞動本身就很值得關注與謹慎對待，而當這麼多雙眼睛盯著、期待著醫護人員時，又有多少行動與言語是肯定與支持他們在專業與情緒上的付出？

更進一步來談，什麼是情緒付出。當你沒有辦法隨時隨地表達真實感受時，就是情緒付出的過程，當你覺得因為你的角色「你必須」，也是情緒付出過程。

在面對病患時的情緒表達又有兩種類型：
1.「表層展演(surface acting)」也就是表裡不一的情況，內心覺得對方很煩，但表面依舊耐心的服務，最常見的情況會壓抑情緒來做到；

2.「深層展演(deep acting)」即使表裡不一，也會修正自己的想法，來做到情緒要求，像是將奧客當成沒長大的孩子來降低自己的情緒衝擊或轉移自己的負面情緒。當然也有醫護人員有能力展現深層同理，完全不用「演」，而這種內外完全一致的是專業同理心的修煉，一般專業工作者往往需要長期心性的淬煉才有機會達到，但當專業訓練已經沈重負擔，難道要要求每個醫護人員都能秉持人溺己溺的精神與信仰，才能成為醫護工作者嗎？

聽到這裡，你也許會說，是的，我當媽媽也在情緒勞動，當女兒也在情緒勞動，我們每天面對多少人對你有多少期待，基本上都可廣泛包含在情緒勞動的範圍中。

在逐漸專業有價的社會意識抬頭後，大家又是否可以開始體認情緒有限的存在？
願意在他人情緒付出時，能夠「有意識地接收」，不視為理所當然的，甚至多一點帶著情感的回應？

談談我最憂慮的：情緒耗竭到專業耗竭(burnout)

當高強度的情緒付出，會有不斷覺得心累的狀態，原本日常工作內容，會在長期情緒消磨下，變得越發缺乏成就感，不斷「輸出output」自己的時間、精力與壓抑情緒，而太少「輸入input」，包括知識的增長、情緒的滋養和陪伴，最終導致的是一觸即發的情緒崩潰，以及專業工作意願被消耗殆盡。

醫護人員的焦慮與孤獨，醫護人員的堅強與嚴謹，在疫情之下更讓人擔憂，也許你我能做的，就是多一點同樣為人的「尊重」少一點歧視，多一點「感謝」少一點應該，多一點愛人如己的心思，保護好醫護人員，如同保護好自己的健康一樣，那麼你也是這社會上有力的支援者了。

🎨愛心理提供「防疫情緒支持方案」
提供五大類人群免費線上心理支持與相關線上課程
報名連結請見留言網址

這是前些日子爆出已經被加拿大法院接理對藏傳佛教噶舉派法王的訟訴。（加拿大法院鏈接在此：https://www.bccourts.ca/jdb-txt/sc/21/09/2021BCSC0939cor1.htm?fbclid=IwAR2FLZlzmUIGTBaTuKPVchEqqngcE3Qy6G_C0TWNWVKa2ksbIYkVJVMQ8f8）

這位法王的桃色事件，我是幾年前才聽到。但，藏傳佛教的高層有這些性醜聞，我已經聽了幾十年。我以前的一位前女友也被一些堪布藉故上她的家摟抱過，也有一些活佛跟她表白。（這不只是她，其他地方我也聽過不少）

這是一個藏傳佛教裡面系統式的問題。

很多時候發生這種事情，信徒和教主往往都是說女方得不到寵而報仇，或者說她們也精神病，或者說她們撒謊。

我不排除有這種可能性，但，多過一位，甚至多位出來指證的時候，我是傾向於相信『沒有那麼巧這麼多有精神病的女人要撒謊來報仇』。

大寶法王的桃色事件，最先吹哨的是一位台灣的在家信徒，第二位是香港的女出家人，現在加拿大又多一位公開舉報上法庭。

對大寶法王信徒來說，這一次的比較麻煩，因為是有孩子的。（關於有孩子的，我早在法王的桃色事件曝光時，就有聽聞）

如果法庭勒令要驗證DNA，這對法王和他的信徒來說，會很尷尬和矛盾，因為做或不做，都死。

你若問我，我覺得『人數是有力量的』，同時我也覺得之後有更多的人站出來，是不出奇的。

我也藉此呼籲各方佛教徒，如果你們真的愛佛教，先別說批判，但如鴕鳥般不討論這些爭議，你是間接害了佛教。

（下面是我從加拿大法院鏈接拷貝下來的內容，當中有很多細節。）

Table of Contents

INTRODUCTION

BACKGROUND

ANALYSIS

A. The Spousal Support Claim in this Case

B. The Test to Amend Pleadings

C. Pleadings in Family Law Cases

D. The Legal Concept of a Marriage-Like Relationship

E. Is There a Reasonable Claim of a Marriage-Like Relationship?

F. Delay / Prejudice

CONCLUSION



INTRODUCTION
[1] The claimant applies to amend her notice of family claim to seek spousal support. At issue is whether the claimant’s allegations give rise to a reasonable claim she lived with the respondent in a marriage-like relationship, so as to give rise to a potential entitlement to spousal support under the Family Law Act, S.B.C. 2011, c. 25 (“FLA”).

[2] The facts alleged by the claimant do not fit within a traditional concept of marriage. The claimant does not allege that she and the respondent ever lived together. Indeed, she has only met the respondent in person four times: twice very briefly in a public setting; a third time in private, when she alleges the respondent sexually assaulted her; and a fourth and final occasion, when she informed the respondent she was pregnant with his child.

[3] The claimant’s case is that what began as a non-consensual sexual encounter evolved into a loving and affectionate relationship. That relationship occurred almost entirely over private text messages. The parties rarely spoke on the telephone, and never saw one another during the relationship, even over video. The claimant says they could not be together because the respondent is forbidden by his station and religious beliefs from intimate relationships or marriage. Nonetheless, she alleges, they formed a marriage-like relationship that lasted from January 2018 to January 2019.

[4] The respondent denies any romantic relationship with the claimant. While he acknowledges providing emotional and financial support to the claimant, he says it was for the benefit of the child the claimant told him was his daughter.

[5] The claimant’s proposed amendment raises a novel question: can a secret relationship that began on-line and never moved into the physical world be like a marriage? In my view, that question should be answered by a trial judge after hearing all of the evidence. The alleged facts give rise to a reasonable claim the claimant lived with the respondent in a marriage-like relationship. Accordingly, I grant the claimant leave to amend her notice of family claim.

BACKGROUND
[6] It should be emphasized that this is an application to amend pleadings only. The allegations by the claimant are presumed to be true for the purposes of this application. Those allegations have not been tested in a court of law.

[7] The respondent, Ogyen Trinley Dorje, is a high lama of the Karma Kagyu School of Tibetan Buddhism. He has been recognized and enthroned as His Holiness, the 17th Gyalwang Karmapa. Without meaning any disrespect, I will refer to him as Mr. Dorje in these reasons for judgment.

[8] Mr. Dorje leads a monastic and nomadic lifestyle. His true home is Tibet, but he currently resides in India. He receives followers from around the world at the Gyuto Monetary in India. He also travels the world teaching Tibetan Buddhist Dharma and hosting pujas, ceremonies at which Buddhists express their gratitude and devotion to the Buddha.

[9] The claimant, Vikki Hui Xin Han, is a former nun of Tibetan Buddhism. Ms. Han first encountered Mr. Dorje briefly at a large puja in 2014. The experience of the puja convinced Ms. Han she wanted to become a Buddhist nun. She met briefly with Mr. Dorje, in accordance with Kagyu traditions, to obtain his approval to become a nun.

[10] In October 2016, Ms. Han began a three-year, three-month meditation retreat at a monastery in New York State. Her objective was to learn the practices and teachings of the Kagyu Lineage. Mr. Dorje was present at the retreat twice during the time Ms. Han was at the monastery.

[11] Ms. Han alleges that on October 14, 2017, Mr. Dorje sexually assaulted her in her room at the monastery. She alleges that she became pregnant from the assault.

[12] After she learned that she was pregnant, Ms. Han requested a private audience with Mr. Dorje. In November 2017, in the presence of his bodyguards, Ms. Han informed Mr. Dorje she was pregnant with his child. Mr. Dorje initially denied responsibility; however, he provided Ms. Han with his email address and a cellphone number, and, according to Ms. Han, said he would “prepare some money” for her.

[13] Ms. Han abandoned her plan to become a nun, left the retreat and returned to Canada. She never saw Mr. Dorje again.

[14] After Ms. Han returned to Canada, she and Mr. Dorje began a regular communication over an instant messaging app called Line. They also exchanged emails and occasionally spoke on the telephone.

[15] The parties appear to have expressed care and affection for one another in these communications. I say “appear to” because it is difficult to fully understand the meaning and intentions of another person from brief text messages, especially those originally written in a different language. The parties wrote in a private shorthand, sharing jokes, emojis, cartoon portraits and “hugs” or “kisses”. Ms. Han was the more expressive of the two, writing more frequently and in longer messages. Mr. Dorje generally participated in response to questions or prompting from Ms. Han, sometimes in single word messages.

[16] Ms. Han deposes that she believed Mr. Dorje was in love with her and that, by January 2018, she and Mr. Dorje were living in a “conjugal relationship”.

[17] During their communications, Ms. Han expressed concern that her child would be “illegitimate”. She appears to have asked Mr. Dorje to marry her, and he appears to have responded that he was “not ready”.

[18] Throughout 2018, Mr. Dorje transferred funds in various denominations to Ms. Han through various third parties. Ms. Han deposes that these funds were:

a) $50,000 CDN to deliver the child and for postpartum care she was to receive at a facility in Seattle;

b) $300,000 CDN for the first year of the child’s life;

c) $20,000 USD for a wedding ring, because Ms. Han wrote “Even if we cannot get married, you must buy me a wedding ring”;

d) $400,000 USD to purchase a home for the mother and child.

[19] On June 19, 2018, Ms. Han gave birth to a daughter in Richmond, B.C.

[20] On September 17, 2018, Mr. Dorje wrote, ”Taking care of her and you are my duty for life”.

[21] Ms. Han’s expectation was that the parties would live together in the future. She says they planned to live together. Those plans evolved over time. Initially they involved purchasing a property in Toronto, so that Mr. Dorje could visit when he was in New York. They also discussed purchasing property in Calgary or renting a home in Vancouver for that purpose. Ms. Han eventually purchased a condominium in Richmond using funds provided by Mr. Dorje.

[22] Ms. Han deposes that the parties made plans for Mr. Dorje to visit her and meet the child in Richmond. In October 2018, however, Mr. Dorje wrote that he needed to “disappear” to Europe. He wrote:

I will definitely find a way to meet her

And you

Remember to take care of yourself if something happens

[23] The final plan the parties discussed, according to Ms. Han, was that Mr. Dorje would sponsor Ms. Han and the child to immigrate to the United States and live at the Kagyu retreat centre in New York State.

[24] In January 2019, Ms. Han lost contact with Mr. Dorje.

[25] Ms. Han commenced this family law case on July 17, 2019, seeking child support, a declaration of parentage and a parentage test. She did not seek spousal support.

[26] Ms. Han first proposed a claim for spousal support in October 2020 after a change in her counsel. Following an exchange of correspondence concerning an application for leave to amend the notice of family claim, Ms. Han’s counsel wrote that Ms. Han would not be advancing a spousal support claim. On March 16, 2020, counsel reversed course, and advised that Ms. Han had instructed him to proceed with the application.

[27] When this application came on before me, the trial was set to commence on June 7, 2021. The parties were still in the process of discoveries and obtaining translations for hundreds of pages of documents in Chinese characters.

[28] At a trial management conference on May 6, 2021, noting the parties were not ready to proceed, Madam Justice Walkem adjourned the trial to April 11, 2022.

ANALYSIS
A. The Spousal Support Claim in this Case
[29] To claim spousal support in this case, Ms. Han must plead that she lived with Mr. Dorje in a marriage-like relationship. This is because only “spouses” are entitled to spousal support, and s. 3 of the Family Law Act defines a spouse as a person who is married or has lived with another person in a marriage-like relationship:

3 (1) A person is a spouse for the purposes of this Act if the person

(a) is married to another person, or

(b) has lived with another person in a marriage-like relationship, and

(i) has done so for a continuous period of at least 2 years, or

(ii) except in Parts 5 [Property Division] and 6 [Pension Division], has a child with the other person.

[30] Because she alleges she has a child with Mr. Dorje, Ms. Han need not allege that the relationship endured for a continuous period of two years to claim spousal support; but she must allege that she lived in a marriage-like relationship with him at some point in time. Accordingly, she must amend the notice of family claim.

B. The Test to Amend Pleadings
[31] Given that the notice of trial has been served, Ms. Han requires leave of the court to amend the notice of family claim: Supreme Court Family Rule 8-1(1)(b)(i).

[32] A person seeking to amend a notice of family claim must show that there is a reasonable cause of action. This is a low threshold. What the applicant needs to establish is that, if the facts pleaded are proven at trial, they would support a reasonable claim. The applicant’s allegations of fact are assumed to be true for the purposes of this analysis. Cantelon v. Wall, 2015 BCSC 813, at para. 7-8.

[33] The applicant’s delay, the reasons for the delay, and the prejudice to the responding party are also relevant factors. The ultimate consideration is whether it would be just and convenient to allow the amendment. Cantelon, at para. 6, citing Teal Cedar Products Ltd. v. Dale Intermediaries Ltd. et al (1986), 19 B.C.L.R. (3d) 282.

C. Pleadings in Family Law Cases
[34] Supreme Court Family Rules 3-1(1) and 4-1(1) require that a claim to spousal support be pleaded in a notice of family claim in Form F3. Section 2 of Form F3, “Spousal relationship history”, requires a spousal support claimant to check the boxes that apply to them, according to whether they are or have been married or are or have been in a marriage-like relationship. Where a claimant alleges a marriage-like relationship, Form F3 requires that they provide the date on which they began to live together with the respondent in a marriage-like relationship and, where applicable, the date on which they separated. Form F3 does not require a statement of the factual basis for the claim of spousal support.

[35] In this case, Ms. Han seeks to amend the notice of family claim to allege that she and Mr. Dorje began to live in a marriage-like relationship in or around January 2018, and separated in or around January 2019.

[36] An allegation that a person lived with a claimant in a marriage-like relationship is a conclusion of law, not an allegation of fact. Unlike the rules governing pleadings in civil actions, however, the Supreme Court Family Rules do not expressly require family law claimants to plead the material facts in support of conclusions of law.

[37] In other words, there is no express requirement in the Supreme Court Family Rules that Ms. Han plead the facts on which she relies for the allegation she and Mr. Dorje lived in a marriage-like relationship.

[38] Rule 4-6 authorizes a party to demand particulars, and then apply to the court for an order for further and better particulars, of a matter stated in a pleading. However, unless and until she is granted leave and files the proposed amended notice of family claim, Ms. Han’s allegation of a marriage-like relationship is not a matter stated in a pleading.

[39] Ms. Han filed an affidavit in support of her application to amend the notice of family claim. Normally, evidence would not be required or admissible on an application to amend a pleading. However, in the unusual circumstances of this case, the parties agreed I may look to Ms. Han’s affidavit and exhibits for the facts she pleads in support of the allegation of a marriage-like relationship.

[40] Because this is an application to amend - and Ms. Han’s allegations of fact are presumed to be true - I have not considered Mr. Dorje’s responding affidavit.

[41] Relying on affidavit evidence for an application to amend pleadings is less than ideal. It tends to merge and confuse the material facts with the evidence that would be relied on to prove those facts. In a number of places in her affidavit, for example, Ms. Han describes her feelings, impressions and understandings. A person’s hopes and intentions are not normally material facts unless they are mutual or reasonably held. The facts on which Ms. Han alleges she and Mr. Dorje formed a marriage-like relationship are more important for the present purposes than her belief they entered into a conjugal union.

[42] Somewhat unusually, in this case, almost all of the parties’ relevant communications were in writing. This makes it somewhat easier to separate the facts from the evidence; however, as stated above, it is difficult to understand the intentions and actions of a person from brief text messages.

[43] In my view, it would be a good practice for applicants who seek to amend their pleadings in family law cases to provide opposing counsel and the court with a schedule of the material facts on which they rely for the proposed amendment.

D. The Legal Concept of a Marriage-Like Relationship
[44] As Mr. Justice Myers observed in Mother 1 v. Solus Trust Company, 2019 BCSC 200, the concept of a marriage-like relationship is elastic and difficult to define. This elasticity is illustrated by the following passage from Yakiwchuk v. Oaks, 2003 SKQB 124, quoted by Myers J. at para. 133 of Mother 1:

[10] Spousal relationships are many and varied. Individuals in spousal relationships, whether they are married or not, structure their relationships differently. In some relationships there is a complete blending of finances and property - in others, spouses keep their property and finances totally separate and in still others one spouse may totally control those aspects of the relationship with the other spouse having little or no knowledge or input. For some couples, sexual relations are very important - for others, that aspect may take a back seat to companionship. Some spouses do not share the same bed. There may be a variety of reasons for this such as health or personal choice. Some people are affectionate and demonstrative. They show their feelings for their “spouse” by holding hands, touching and kissing in public. Other individuals are not demonstrative and do not engage in public displays of affection. Some “spouses” do everything together - others do nothing together. Some “spouses” vacation together and some spend their holidays apart. Some “spouses” have children - others do not. It is this variation in the way human beings structure their relationships that make the determination of when a “spousal relationship” exists difficult to determine. With married couples, the relationship is easy to establish. The marriage ceremony is a public declaration of their commitment and intent. Relationships outside marriage are much more difficult to ascertain. Rarely is there any type of “public” declaration of intent. Often people begin cohabiting with little forethought or planning. Their motivation is often nothing more than wanting to “be together”. Some individuals have chosen to enter relationships outside marriage because they did not want the legal obligations imposed by that status. Some individuals have simply given no thought as to how their relationship would operate. Often the date when the cohabitation actually began is blurred because people “ease into” situations, spending more and more time together. Agreements between people verifying when their relationship began and how it will operate often do not exist.

[45] In Mother 1, Mr. Justice Myers referred to a list of 22 factors grouped into seven categories, from Maldowich v. Penttinen, (1980), 17 R.F.L. (2d) 376 (Ont. Dist. Ct.), that have frequently been cited in this and other courts for the purpose of determining whether a relationship was marriage-like, at para. 134 of Mother 1:

1. Shelter:

(a) Did the parties live under the same roof?

(b) What were the sleeping arrangements?

(c) Did anyone else occupy or share the available accommodation?

2. Sexual and Personal Behaviour:

(a) Did the parties have sexual relations? If not, why not?

(b) Did they maintain an attitude of fidelity to each other?

(c) What were their feelings toward each other?

(d) Did they communicate on a personal level?

(e) Did they eat their meals together?

(f) What, if anything, did they do to assist each other with problems or during illness?

(g) Did they buy gifts for each other on special occasions?

3. Services:

What was the conduct and habit of the parties in relation to:

(a) preparation of meals;

(b) washing and mending clothes;

(c) shopping;

(d) household maintenance; and

(e) any other domestic services?

4. Social:

(a) Did they participate together or separately in neighbourhood and community activities?

(b) What was the relationship and conduct of each of them toward members of their respective families and how did such families behave towards the parties?

5. Societal:

What was the attitude and conduct of the community toward each of them and as a couple?

6. Support (economic):

(a) What were the financial arrangements between the parties regarding the provision of or contribution toward the necessaries of life (food, clothing, shelter, recreation, etc.)?

(b) What were the arrangements concerning the acquisition and ownership of property?

(c) Was there any special financial arrangement between them which both agreed would be determinant of their overall relationship?

7. Children:

What was the attitude and conduct of the parties concerning children?

[46] In Austin v. Goerz, 2007 BCCA 586, the Court of Appeal cautioned against a “checklist approach”; rather, a court should "holistically" examine all the relevant factors. Cases like Molodowich provide helpful indicators of the sorts of behaviour that society associates with a marital relationship, the Court of Appeal said; however, “the presence or absence of any particular factor cannot be determinative of whether a relationship is marriage-like” (para. 58).

[47] In Weber v. Leclerc, 2015 BCCA 492, the Court of Appeal again affirmed that there is no checklist of characteristics that will be found in all marriages and then concluded with respect to evidence of intentions:

[23] The parties’ intentions – particularly the expectation that the relationship will be of lengthy, indeterminate duration – may be of importance in determining whether a relationship is “marriage-like”. While the court will consider the evidence expressly describing the parties’ intentions during the relationship, it will also test that evidence by considering whether the objective evidence is consonant with those intentions.

[24] The question of whether a relationship is “marriage-like” will also typically depend on more than just their intentions. Objective evidence of the parties’ lifestyle and interactions will also provide direct guidance on the question of whether the relationship was “marriage-like”.

[48] Significantly for this case, the courts have looked to mutual intent in order to find a marriage-like relationship. See, for example, L.E. v. D.J., 2011 BCSC 671 and Buell v. Unger, 2011 BCSC 35; Davey Estate v. Gruyaert, 2005 CarswellBC 3456 at 13 and 35.

[49] In Mother 1, Myers J. concluded his analysis of the law with the following learned comment:

[143] Having canvassed the law relating to the nature of a marriage-like relationship, I will digress to point out the problematic nature of the concept. It may be apparent from the above that determining whether a marriage-like relationship exists sometimes seems like sand running through one's fingers. Simply put, a marriage-like relationship is akin to a marriage without the formality of a marriage. But as the cases mentioned above have noted, people treat their marriages differently and have different conceptions of what marriage entails.

[50] In short, the determination of whether the parties in this case lived in a marriage-like relationship is a fact-specific inquiry that a trial judge would need to make on a “holistic” basis, having regard to all of the evidence. While the trial judge may consider the various factors listed in the authorities, those factors would not be treated as a checklist and no single factor or category of factors would be treated as being decisive.

E. Is There a Reasonable Claim of a Marriage-Like Relationship?
[51] In this case, many of the Molodowich factors are missing:

a) The parties never lived under the same roof. They never slept together. They were never in the same place at the same time during the relationship. The last time they saw each other in person was in November 2017, before the relationship began.

b) The parties never had consensual sex. They did not hug, kiss or hold hands. With the exception of the alleged sexual assault, they never touched one another physically.

c) The parties expressed care and affection for one another, but they rarely shared personal information or interest in their lives outside of their direct topic of communication. They did not write about their families, their friends, their religious beliefs or their work.

d) They expressed concern and support for one another when the other felt unwell or experienced health issues, but they did not provide any care or assistance during illness or other problems.

e) They did not assist one another with domestic chores.

f) They did not share their relationship with their peers or their community. There is no allegation, for example, that Mr. Dorje told his fellow monks or any of his followers about the relationship. There is no allegation that Ms. Han told her friends or any co-workers. Indeed, there is no allegation that anyone, with the exception of Ms. Han’s mother, knew about the relationship. Although Mr. Dorje gave Ms. Han’s mother a gift, he never met the mother and he never spoke to her.

g) They did not intend to have a child together. The child was conceived as a result of a sexual assault. While Mr. Dorje expressed interest in “meeting” the child, he never followed up. He currently has no relationship with the child. There is no allegation he has sought access or parenting arrangements.

[52] The only Molodowich factor of any real relevance in this case is economic support. Mr. Dorje provided the funds with which Ms. Han purchased a condominium. Mr. Dorje initially wrote that he wanted to buy a property with the money, but, he wrote, “It’s the same thing if you buy [it]”.

[53] Mr. Dorje also provided a significant amount of money for Ms. Han’s postpartum care and the child’s first year of life.

[54] This financial support may have been primarily for the benefit of the child. Even the condominium, Ms. Han wrote, was primarily for the benefit of the child.

[55] However, in my view, a trial judge may attach a broader significance to the financial support from Mr. Dorje than child support alone. A trial judge may find that the money Mr. Dorje provided to Ms. Han at her request was an expression of his commitment to her in circumstances in which he could not commit physically. The money and the gifts may be seen by the trial judge to have been a form of down payment by Mr. Dorje on a promise of continued emotional and financial support for Ms. Han, or, in Mr. Dorje’s own words, “Taking care of her and you are my duty for life” (emphasis added).

[56] On the other hand, I find it difficult to attach any particular significance to the fact that Mr. Dorje agreed to provide funds for Ms. Han to purchase a wedding ring. It appears to me that Ms. Han demanded that Mr. Dorje buy her a wedding ring, not that the ring had any mutual meaning to the parties as a marriage symbol. But it is relevant, in my view, that Mr. Dorje provided $20,000 USD to Ms. Han for something she wanted that was of no benefit to the child.

[57] Further, Ms. Han alleges that the parties intended to live together. At a minimum, a trial judge may find that the discussions about where Ms. Han and the child would live reflected a mutual intention of the parties to see one another and spend time together when they could.

[58] Mr. Dorje argues that an intention to live together at some point in the future is not sufficient to show that an existing relationship was marriage-like. He argues that the question of whether the relationship was marriage-like requires more than just intentions, citing Weber, supra.

[59] In my view, the documentary evidence referred to above provides some objective evidence in this case that the parties progressed beyond mere intentions. As stated, the parties appear to have expressed genuine care and affection for one another. They appear to have discussed marriage, trust, honesty, finances, mutual obligations and acquiring family property. These are not matters one would expect Mr. Dorje to discuss with a friend or a follower, or even with the mother of his child, without a marriage-like element of the relationship.

[60] A trial judge may find on the facts alleged by Ms. Han that the parties loved one another and would have lived together, but were unable to do so because of Mr. Dorje’s religious duties and nomadic lifestyle.

[61] The question I raised in the introduction to these reasons is whether a relationship that began on-line and never moved into the physical world can be marriage-like.

[62] Notably, the definition of a spouse in the Family Law Act does not require that the parties live together, only that they live with another person in a marriage-like relationship.

[63] In Connor Estate, 2017 BCSC 978, Mr. Justice Kent found that a couple that maintained two entirely separate households and never lived under the same roof formed a marriage-like relationship. (Connor Estate was decided under the intestacy provisions of the Wills, Estates and Succession Act, S.B.C. 2009, c. 13 ("WESA"), but courts have relied on cases decided under WESA and the FLA interchangeably for their definitions of a spouse.) Mr. Justice Kent found:

[50] The evidence is overwhelming and I find as a fact that Mr. Chambers and Ms. Connor loved and cared deeply about each other, and that they had a loving and intimate relationship for over 20 years that was far more than mere friendship or even so-called "friendship with benefits". I accept Mr. Chambers' evidence that he would have liked to share a home with Ms. Connor after the separation from his wife, but was unable to do so because of Ms. Connor's hoarding illness. The evidence amply supports, and I find as a fact, that Mr. Chambers and Ms. Connor loved each other, were faithful to each other, communicated with each other almost every day when they were not together, considered themselves to be (and presented themselves to be) "husband and wife" and were accepted by all who knew them as a couple.

[64] Connor Estate may be distinguishable from this case because Mr. Chambers and Ms. Connor were physically intimate for over 20 years, and presented themselves to the world as a married couple.

[65] Other decisions in which a marriage-like relationship has been found to exist despite the parties not living together have involved circumstances in which the couple lived under the same roof at previous points in the relationship, and the issue was whether they continued to be spouses after they took up separate residences: in Thompson v. Floyd, 2001 BCCA 78, the parties had lived together for a period of at least 11 years; in Roach v. Dutra, 2010 BCCA 264, the parties had lived together for approximately three years.

[66] However, as Mr. Justice Kent noted in Connor Estate:

[48] … [W]hile much guidance might be found in this case law, the simple fact is that no two cases are identical (and indeed they usually vary widely) and it is the assessment of evidence as a whole in this particular case which matters.

[67] Mr. Justice Kent concluded:

[53] Like human beings themselves, marriage-like relationships can come in many and various shapes. In this particular case, I have no doubt that such a relationship existed …

[68] As stated, Ms. Han’s claim is novel. It may even be weak. Almost all of the traditional factors are missing. The fact that Ms. Han and Mr. Dorje never lived under the same roof, never shared a bed and never even spent time together in person will militate against a finding they lived with one another in a marriage-like relationship. However, the traditional factors are not a mandatory check-list that confines the “elastic” concept of a marriage-like relationship. And if the COVID pandemic has taught us nothing else, it is that real relationships can form, blossom and end in virtual worlds.

[69] In my view, the merits of Ms. Han’s claim should be decided on the evidence. Subject to an overriding prejudice to Mr. Dorje, she should have leave to amend the notice of family claim. However, she should also provide meaningful particulars of the alleged marriage-like relationship.

F. Delay / Prejudice
[70] Ms. Han filed her notice of family claim on July 17, 2019. She brought this application to amend approximately one year and nine months after she filed the pleading, just over two months before the original trial date.

[71] Ms. Han’s delay was made all that more remarkable by her change in position from January 19, 2021, when she confirmed, through counsel, that she was not seeking spousal support in this case.

[72] Ms. Han gave notice of her intention to proceed with this application to Mr. Dorje on March 16, 2021. By the time the application was heard, the parties had conducted examinations for discovery without covering the issues that would arise from a claim of spousal support.

[73] Also, in April, Ms. Han produced additional documents, primarily text messages, that may be relevant to her claim of spousal support, but were undecipherable to counsel for Mr. Dorje, who does not read Mandarin.

[74] This application proceeded largely on documents selected and translated by counsel for Ms. Han. I was informed that Mandarin translations of the full materials would take 150 days.

[75] Understandably in the circumstances, Mr. Dorje argued that an amendment two months before trial would be neither just nor convenient. He argued that he would be prejudiced by an adjournment so as to allow Ms. Han to advance a late claim of spousal support.

[76] The circumstances changed on May 6, 2021, when Madam Justice Walkem adjourned the trial to July 2022 and reset it for 25 days. Madam Justice Walkem noted that most of the witnesses live internationally and require translators. She also noted that paternity may be in issue, and Mr. Dorje may amend his pleadings to raise that issue. It seems clear that, altogether apart from the potential spousal support claim, the parties were not ready to proceed to trial on June 7, 2021.

[77] In my view, any remaining prejudice to Mr. Dorje is outweighed by the importance of having all of the issues between the parties decided on their merits.

[78] Ms. Han’s delay and changes of position on spousal support may be a matter to de addressed in a future order of costs; but they are not grounds on which to deny her leave to amend the notice of family claim.

CONCLUSION
[79] Ms. Han is granted leave to amend her notice of family claim in the form attached as Appendix A to the notice of application to include a claim for spousal support.

[80] Within 21 days, or such other deadline as the parties may agree, Ms. Han must provide particulars of the marriage-like relationship alleged in the amended notice of family claim.

[81] Ms. Han is entitled to costs of this application in the cause of the spousal support claim.

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李惠仁2004年開始專注台灣禽流感疫情，拍攝《不能戳的祕密》揭開政府防疫漏洞。拍攝過程獨立採集死雞樣本、送檢，並透過專家學者的協助，一層層解讀政府、學者、雞農之間複雜的權力關係與隱瞞的真相。

近期作品《蘋果的滋味》、《并：控制》、《自由．飛》同時關注台、港、中媒體生態與民主發展，以紀錄片形式記錄這個時代的政治、經濟樣態。

《蘋果的滋味》藉由蘋果日報探討台灣媒體界生態的變化，並解讀狗仔文化對新聞製作的影響。拍攝過程中適逢台灣反媒體壟斷運動，進而揭露媒體背後的政治運作。

在《并：控制》中，李惠仁開始關注香港回歸中國二十年後的政治局勢變化，片中他藉由視障朋友的視角，以更為銳利角度揭露香港生活的變化。特別是對資訊控制的層面，他揭露了由政治的機構控制、人民之間的相互控制，再到個人的自我審查等不同控制階段的運作。

《自由．飛》記錄香港反送中事件，藉由香港追尋民主自由的運動，連結台灣戒嚴時期的民主運動。李惠仁坦言，台灣的民主還很幼稚，民眾普遍漠視政治對生活的影響，對於台灣民主得來不易的歷史發展，時常是健忘的。他希望透過紀錄片的方式，將這個時代與過去的歷史連結，保存台、港、中三地的歷史拼圖，提醒人們不要忘記民主的可貴。

小檔案

李惠仁，1969年生，為台灣知名紀錄片導演。李惠仁大學就讀實踐大學服裝設計系，畢業前決定退學。在服兵役期間進入空軍電影隊，開始接觸影片製作。退伍後進入傳統新聞媒體擔任攝影記者，40歲決定辭職，成為獨立紀錄片導演，成立李惠仁電影工作室。

作品《睜開左眼》榮獲2010年世界公視大獎INPUT BUDAPEST，《不能戳的祕密》榮獲卓越新聞獎，《不能戳的秘密2：國家機器》榮獲2014年台北電影節百萬首獎，作品獲獎無數。

┄┄┄┄┄
創辦人 馬立群　監製 王姿佩
採訪　 莊勝涵　剪接 徐珮珊
作品提供 李惠仁
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#一影像專訪 #李惠仁 #紀錄片 #導演

時事ネタ、炎上ネタ、あるある、都市伝説、などを替え歌やオリジナルソングで歌にしちゃうYouTuberウタエルです。

投票フォーム
https://customform.jp/form/input/18938/

投票期間は12月29日（金）まで。
たくさんの投票お待ちしております！よろしくお願い致します！


＜チャンネル登録よろしくお願いします！＞→ http://ur2.link/EZin

＜今まで作ったオリジナル曲はiTunes、LINE music、amazon Musicで発売もしています！＞
→　 https://www.tunecore.co.jp/artist?id=...
（今後の活動継続の為にも購入よろしくお願いします！）

＜ツイッター（動画とか上げてます）＞
ウタエル（白）→ https://twitter.com/utaelchannel
ハモレル（赤）→ https://twitter.com/hamorel_utael

＜おすすめ再生リスト＞ → http://qq4q.biz/GCF5

お問い合わせ
utael2017@gmail.com