［NetFlix 績後升15%創新高，但純利收入都低過預期，升乜？］

拿，唔知我平時在Patreon寫乜文嘅，送篇免費嘅畀你（https://bityl.co/5HGG）。4000字講NetFlix業績。業績後升15%創新高，但純利收入都低過預期，升乜？

完全免費（https://bityl.co/5HGG），所以我建議你去Patreon睇，一來可以用熟個app，二來嗰邊有埋圖。咁睇咗覺得好睇嘅，記得訂Patreon（https://bityl.co/4Y0h）．係呀廣告，但至少我唔搞吊你癮，唔會除衫除到一半叫你畀錢。入去有晒成篇文睇，唔想嘅呢個Post都有晒啲字（但冇圖）

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告個急先：Ivan已被炒，3月開始失業。未訂嘅記得訂Patreon，積小成多呀。訂咗嘅可以考慮加碼（https://bityl.co/4Y0h）。一星期至少出返六篇文，今年我已經寫咗25篇，篇篇三千字，冇苦勞都有肺癆

TLDR：純利收入都低過預期，升乜？冇錯訂戶數係超過預期，但帶唔到純利收入又有乜用？最令人驚喜嘅其實唔係呢啲，係公司卒之燒錢燒成正果，而家話唔使再燒，仲分分鐘有錢做回購。公司原本一路燒錢，但肺炎救佢一命，除咗多人訂，同搞到迪士尼好忙外，最重要係：低息！不過睇返，過去半年公司股價根本橫行，你miss一日就冇咗15%。將來會點？迪士尼定Netflix？Why not both？Amazon都冇殺死Walmart，但殺晒啲中小企。最後我仲會講下Netflix獨特嘅企業文化。

Netflix純利收入都低過預期，升乜？
過去半年Netflix股價只係橫行，搞乜？
Netflix以燒錢出名，但肺炎救佢一命
Netflix而家止血，唔使再舉債，仲話會回購。十年第一次
迪士尼定Netflix做霸主？Why not both？
而家你睇梗係爽，但之前Netflix一樣有無數低潮
最後： Netflix獨特嘅企業文化

Netflix純利收入都低過預期，升乜？

1. Netflix出完第四季（亦即係全年）業績，升14%，股價創新高

2. 但，升乜？你見純利，大幅低過預期。收入，亦都係低過分析員預期。「明明埃汾話業績冇好定壞，只有好過預期定低過預期」（呢啲咪你學藝不精咯，睇多啲文啦）

3. 咁可能都有人留意到，訂戶數目幾好，遠超預期。第四季上咗850萬個新客，遠比市場預期嘅650萬為多。全年上咗3700萬新客，史上最多了。而家去到2.04億訂戶，唔好忘記仲要係入唔到14億人嘅大陸喎。（Facebook Youtube Whatsapp 微訊 instream 抖音嗰啲10億人用，但，免費嘢點同）

4. 不過，如果只係訂戶數字勝預期，但純利同收入差，有乜用？唔足以令股價咁升吧？所以我相信，係因為其他原因。

5. 咩原因？就係因為公司宣佈現金流轉正（講FCF，Free cash flow，唔知係乜有得佢，但呢個唔係純利），應該好多人都知Netflix以燒錢出名，似乎止血了。仲有，話唔使再借錢，唔使債冚債，之後到期嘅債，內部現金夠找。仲話有閒錢可以做share buyback，回購股票，嘩。十年未試過。

過去半年Netflix股價只係橫行，搞乜？

6. 回帶少少，發唔發現，呢半年冇乜聽Netflix呢隻股票嘅新聞？劇集電影就好多，但隻股票極靜。因為半年都係橫行，鳩做，連登仔又可以鬧升市冇自己份（見好多人鬧隻蘋果，但舊年升一個開，之前你又唔買？奉旨要等埋你上車？）

7. 但，事實係嗰句，Success Is Like Being Pregnant Everyone Says Congratulations But Nobody Knows How Many Times You Were 忽ed. 雖然話疫情受惠股，但舊年下半年，股價真係橫行的。而家又梗係個個話成功啦，但之前半年呢？

8. 特別係舊年第三季業績後，隊咗一轉。都幾合理，因為大家覺得，爆到遍地開花，要上台嘅都上晒了（呢個嚟緊都會係Netflix嘅死穴）。舊年第三季都未訂嘅人，應該成世都唔會訂—Turns out 唔係，咪話第四季都仲上咗650萬人—其中一個就係我！

9. 我在台灣隔離十四日，結果join咗兩樣以前唔用嘅嘢：Netflix，同埋外賣平台。外賣平台用咗好多。Netflix？我差不多冇睇過咁滯，但月費照交。幾咁好嘅business model，況且佢marginal cost極低

Netflix以燒錢出名，但肺炎救佢一命

10. 再回帶遠少少，當局者迷。你而家睇返，根本覺得買Netflix係撈兵拿，正如當年買Facebook 買Starbucks一樣，見到呢啲公司點冒起，同埋點趕絶傳統公司。大把時間畀你買。但中間你總會質疑好多嘢，人之常情。Netflix就係畀人質疑得最多嘅（包括我），亦所以升得最勁！

11. 道理好簡單，Starbucks大家都知幾毫子咖啡豆賣你幾十蚊杯賺到笑，頂多畀高少少人工搵幾件四正啲嘅少男少女叫下你個名。貴租？人地交得起。有人租咪合理。但，正係太簡單啦，早早都知道。

12. Netflix Tesla唔同，呢啲公司一來太劃時代，二來太出位，三來太進取，一路有人質疑。創辦人都話你知公司一度生死邊緣（Starbucks應該冇試過）。但正係因為咁，先升到你笑。

13. 講返，即使我唔上Netflix，都知道你地上，人人都見到。但啲人質疑乜？就係公司一直不停燒錢，燒得好勁。搶market share，買內容，整內容，搶人（Netflix出撚名人工高，但，請你先算啦，我夠知美斯C朗人工高）。一直唔少人質疑，玩呢個燒錢遊戲玩到幾耐？公司嘅護城河亦好似唔夠高，傳統公司（主要係迪士尼）大把錢燒，你點夠佢嚟？

Netflix而家止血，唔使再舉債，仲話會回購。十年第一次

14. 但，好大程度上，Netflix先係最大嘅肺炎受惠股。冇工返冇學返留在屋企睇Netflix就好明顯，但仲有三個層面：第一，迪士尼火燒後欄（戲院收皮，樂園唔開，ESPN冇波播），唔得閒應付你住。第二，戲院唔開，直頭加速晒啲人睇戲睇電視嘅習慣改變，我估第時同啲新一代講阿叔以前去戲院拍拖，等於我老豆同我講佢當年去涼茶舖聽歌睇電視咁。

15. 但重要嘅係，第三：低息，買債，印銀紙。如果而家5厘息甚至10厘息，Netflix嘅情況可能都幾唔同。低息，當然係有利啲借大錢搏老命嘅公司，例如Netflix同Tesla，or to a certain extent恒大之類嘅內房，同時懲罰債主同埋儲錢嘅人（睇咗咁多年仲未睇穿？）。

16. 好啦，結果Netflix搏一搏單車變摩托，突襲荷里活同迪士尼成功，燒錢有回報，再嚟一場肺炎真係天助我也，利率低令利息開支冇乜壓力，要發債融資亦大把人願意。結果公司而家話正現金流（Free Cash flow，唔同純利），唔使再燒錢

17. 再講白啲，公司話明嚟緊幾個月到期嘅5億債，唔使re finance （即係新債冚舊債），直頭內部現金夠找，仲話唔使再倚賴外部融資。仲痴線到話可以有能力回購股票！十年冇試過

18. 回購嘛，當然係好東西。唔好執著於啲乜鬼「回購只係財技」嘅廢話。咁派息係咪財技？你又鬧公司唔派息？美國公司好多都只回購，唔派息，原因之一係有股息稅。回購是甚麼？你咪當係印公仔紙集資嘅反向過程，公司用入面嘅錢（留意！唔同大股東增持！），買返街度嘅股票。並唔止係「托價」（反正完全合法），而係我公司如果有錢冇地方洗，與其派息畀股東股東仲要畀人扣稅，與其管理層做埋啲白痴收購，不如就買返自己股票。買完公司冇錢會少咗錢—但總股數都少咗，咪拉高個每股盈利（Earnings per share）。你睇蘋果每股盈利嘅升幅，係明顯高過佢純利升幅，因為不停回購。

19. 如果玩得再盡啲？我以前都寫過，啲公司借錢然後拎啲錢做回購都仲得！啲巨型科企發債咁平，根本有數計。借平錢不停買自己啲股票，幾咁簡單。

20. 所以你而家明點解低息環境有助股市啦！亦明白點解美國啲左翼（包括好多民主黨嘅後生）鬧聯儲局劫貧濟富。你睇到個騙局未？長期低息，有事就救企業，印錢。作為散仔，不投資，你係肯定向下流的。

21. 我唯一有少少懷疑係，Netflix真係有必要回購股票？股價都在高位，亦都要大量投資，係咪批新股會著數啲？

迪士尼定Netflix做霸主？Why not both？

22. 將來會點？上個月舊文（到底我一個月寫幾多文？）有寫過迪士尼 vs Netflix（但主要由迪士尼角度出發）（https://bityl.co/5HDV）。你可以當Netflix偷襲成功，巨人迪士尼未識反應，加埋一場肺炎幫到Netflix，一度Netflix市值大過迪士尼，十分有意義嘅一刻。但講咗，舊年下半年Netflix原地踏步，迪士尼就越升越有，因為企穩陣腳，你識串流我唔識？迪士尼始終有品牌有內容同有錢，點會坐以待斃？

23. 誰死誰負？我估係大家都贏，super！講真的，你見Amazon都冇打死Walmart，人地啲CEO拎咁高人工唔係流的，唔係坐定定講句「網購大勢所趨冇得搞」就得，否則請你返嚟把托？

24. 睇嘢唔好咁表面，冇話唔係你死就我亡，亦唔只係咩新一代挑戰廢老。出嚟行求財唔係求氣嘛。有話根本Netflix根本冇改變荷里活，係荷里活改變Netflix（https://bityl.co/5HDn），Netflix都要跟荷里活玩拍戲拎奧斯卡嘅遊戲（我諗起話滿人蒙古人被漢化咁）。甚至有人話，而家迪士尼先係挑戰者，Netflix係Incumbent 舊勢力（即係，「建制」）（https://bityl.co/5HDr）。也不無道理，反正兩間公司咁高咁大，市值差不多，叮噹馬頭，大衞已經變到哥利亞咁大

25. 咁咩公司死？咪就係其他小型公司。Go Bear舊文都有講（https://bityl.co/5HDf），啲咩二三線媒體公司，特別係只做內容冇平台嘅，應該好快死得。呢，話口未完美高梅（MGM）就似乎要賣，得啲占士邦片咋，冇戲院你點算（https://bityl.co/5HDo）。

26. 你估真係Content is King？時代唔同啦，Facebook 啲content 差不多全部唔係自己，亦都一個仙都畀你，但你自動免費幫佢做content．係咪令你諗到啲乜？

而家你睇梗係爽，但之前Netflix一樣有無數低潮

27. 最後補多幾樣。首先再係講，Stay invested．今時今日嘅Netflix，都話市值同迪士尼咁大，已經係幾成熟嘅公司。可能升多幾倍，但照計唔會升十倍。甚至話，你當佢一年升15%，已經交到貨，美股一路以嚟長期回報都係咁上下。咁你見，15%，往往就係一晚之間升晒！之前半年橫行。你走漏一日，就冇。

28. 哦，你話咁好易，我出業績前買，出完就沽咗佢。但，如果差過預期咁點？你而家睇返係簡單，Netflix連續31季收入增長超過20%。但你見2012年尾時，增長一樣由50%跌到單位數，當時啲股價一樣坐過山車，十個有九個都震走啦，「止蝕」嘛

29. 事實你見到，雖然連續31季收入增長超過20%，但最新增長係2013年中以嚟最慢。亦所以話間公司已經開始成熟。早前講過，「而家去到2.04億訂戶，唔好忘記仲要係入唔到14億人嘅大陸喎。（Facebook Youtube Whatsapp 微訊 instream 抖音嗰啲10億人用，但，免費嘢點同）」

30. 但另一角度睇，仲有幾多空間？不過管理層當然一早知你會問（知道出面擔心乜嘢，呢啲真係基本功），就答你，Netflix暫時只係佔美國人睇電視時間嘅10%，仲有空間上。又當然，公司應該係有啲加價空間的，我唔覺得加10%會有超過5%嘅人走佬，個total income應該仲大。最後，會唔會做收購？

最後： Netflix獨特嘅企業文化

31. 真係最後，我睇到一半，但推介大家睇No Rules Rules呢本書。唔好只係用用家嘅角度去睇間公司，Netflix在商界，最出面係獨特嘅「企業文化」—好多公司（特別係香港公司）都濫用呢個字，根本就冇文化。

32. Netflix嘅文化就出晒名，精英主義，自由，好Q高人工（人地工程師一年出幾十萬花紅，美金啦梗係），但極之高壓，炒人全不手軟，先唔會理你啲KOL講咩影響士氣（個個生意都未做過去教人地美國巨企管人，好好笑）。天才嘅天堂，平庸者嘅地獄。

33. 想快睇嘅，可以睇呢篇文，中文嘢，易入口（https://bityl.co/5HEU）。但簡單嚟講，精英文化，好似歐洲頂級球會或者NBA咁，唔使講人情，我地唔係一家人，你掂嘅你上，唔掂嘅即時收工。你放工做乜我唔理你，上到場冇貨交嘅即死，唔使講咩「我為公司打咁多年江山」。阿丕嫂就係批鬥大會，聞說好似人工都完全公開。

34. 你稍為有啲自己之明嘅，就知道呢啲公司唔係正常人可以入到，正如你都唔會去皇馬巴塞踢正選。亦所以你啲濕鳩公司唔好諗住學人地。打工更加唔好怨咩「才華同收入唔成正比」，有冇諗過如果真係成正比，你可能仲低人工？

35. 幸好，你冇料在Netflix做都好，你都可以買佢嘅股票！分享人地嘅成果。係咪好偉大？

36. 仲有，唔好以為搞間公司只係識拍戲 識搞算法就得。踢波都仲只係場上嗰十幾個人，Netflix咁大，唔通創辦人自己去拍戲？去睇韓劇？一定係靠其他人。佢點請到好嘅人？就係靠以上講嘅嘢，而唔係講埋啲乜撚work life balance（但唔畀錢），”we offer competitive salary and benefits”。Netflix最叻，可能係管人。人地offer NON - competitive salary and benefits—高到你根本match唔到。

37. 仲有，財務呢？你可以話佢大膽，但咁大間公司點都係calculated risk，夠膽咁樣燒錢去搶份額，而唔係坐定定講「巨企霸權打壓我呀」。而家梗係個個都識講燒錢搶市場，但人地幾多年前做？

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你嘅2020年點？我嘅2020年就幾好。Ivan Patreon，港美市場評點，專題號外，每日一圖，好文推介。每星期6篇，月費100唔使，5個月已1200人訂！（https://bityl.co/4Y0h）。年費仲有85折，仲係睇13個月添。

轉載Chenchen Chen fb
🛠《大家來找碴welcome strict proofreader 》

看到Christopher Chen附在獨立觀察的連結，披露日本記者黑木亮著手調查東京知事小池百合子的埃及開羅大學學歴史，所以整理了文章一半的中英對照如下，另外一半預期周末整理好再另外貼新版。

大家可以比較東京知事和她的大貴人(埃及前副首相Dr Hatem)如何促使她主張她1976年確從埃及開羅大學畢業的做法。台灣媒體不敢報導此日本疑似假學歷的新聞，倒是刷了很多東京知事抗疫好棒棒的中文報導－想必是要洗嬰粉的腦「會做事就好了，學歷有什麼重要」哈哈😄⋯⋯

✳️原文連結： https://jbpress.ismedia.jp/articles/-/60643

🔥偽造大學學位的指控困擾東京都知事小池百合子（Vol.4）
Allegations of fake university degree haunt Tokyo Governor Yuriko Koike (vol.4)

💥自從現任東京都知事小池百合子（Yuriko Koike）於1992年成為國會議員以來，一直有謠言流傳稱，小池百合子（Koike）文飾美化她的學歷。
Ever since the incumbent Governor of Tokyo, Yuriko Koike became a Member of Parliament in 1992, rumors have been circulating that Koike embellished her academic credentials.

小池聲稱自己曾自開羅大學畢業，但是如果以阿拉伯語為母語的人去聽她的阿拉伯語，那麼她公開身為開羅大學畢業生的學歷，似乎就顯得更加可疑了。
Koike claims to have graduated from Cairo University but if an Arabic speaker listens to her Arabic, her published academic credentials as a Cairo University graduate seems more than dubious.

[我有]強有力的證據可以證明她偽造學歷，例如由室友提供的證詞－有紀錄片可查的證詞；小池的自相矛盾的說法表明，儘管第一年不及格，她仍然在四年之內畢業，她的初階程度阿拉伯語，以及關於畢業論文的謊言，和她拒絕向東京都議會提交畢業文件的頑強行為。
There are strong evidence about her fake academic credentials such as testimony by the flatmate supported by documentary evidence, Koike's self-contradictory statement in her book to have graduated in four years despite failing her first year, her rudimentary Arabic, her lie about the graduation thesis and her stubbornness in refusing to submit her graduation documents to the Tokyo Metropolitan Assembly.

身為一個通曉阿拉伯語並從埃及大學（開羅美國大學的中東研究專業）畢業的人，我自有一種任務感，因此我決定對這些指控進行調查。 經過兩年的調查，我找不到任何證據，甚至沒有一絲一毫的最低線索，可以證明小池是從開羅大學畢業的。
Feeling a sense of duty as someone who learnt Arabic and graduated from an Egyptian university (MA, Middle East Studies from the American University in Cairo), I decided to investigate the allegations. After two years of investigation, I could not find any evidence, nor even the slightest hint that Koike graduated from Cairo University.

在這個共由六大部組成的文章中，我詳細介紹了我的調查結果。這裡是第四部的內容：
In this six-part article, I present the results of my investigation in detail.Here is the fourth part of it;

💥小池有符合[埃及大學]轉學資格嗎？
Was Koike eligible to transfer?

"小池在她的書中和其他地方聲稱，她於1972年10月開學以一年級（新鮮人）生身分進入開羅大學。
Koike claims in her books and other places that she entered Cairo University as a first year student (freshman) in October 1972.

但是，她室友在＂假簡歷”紀錄片中說：“小池是於1973年10月以二年級學生身分進入開羅大學。
However, in the ""Fake CV"" the flatmate says, ""Koike entered Cairo University in October 1973 as a second year student.

「小池高興地對我說：“我父親先請當時的哈特姆博士，當時也是埃及副首相，還兼任文化和信息部長，依據我在關西學院大學－是一間日本兵庫縣的私立大學－所上課的幾個月[學程]，加上另外在開羅美國大學的上語言課程的幾個月，一起調整合併當成是我在開羅大學就讀的第一學年[學程時間]。」
Koike happily told me ‘My father asked Dr. Hatem, then Egypt's Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Culture and Information, to swap my few months at Kwansei Gakuin University, a private university in Hyogo prefecture, and a few months at the language course at the American University in Cairo for the first year at Cairo University. ‘

「哈特姆博士接受了這一要求。此外，我的學雜費和申請費全免除了。 」
‘Dr. Hatem accepted the request. In addition, my tuition and admission fees have been waived’ .

這顯然是寫在室友1972年11月19日給她在日本母親的信中的。根據“假簡歷”該部分陳述的內容，她(室友)大部分信都附有信件日期和郵戳。 如果是這樣，他們這些人都將會被埃及法院起訴。
This is apparently written in the flatmate’s letter to her mother in Japan dated 19 November 1972. According to the ""Fake CV"" most of her letters were dated and postmarked. If so, they will be admissible to court."

呈現在“假簡歷”的內容中，含當時也正在埃及另一所大學就讀的另一名日本女性，她說，她對小池當時可以轉入開羅大學二年級就讀感到驚訝。 我(作者：黑木亮)所採訪過的另一位開羅大學的日本畢業生也記得：小池當年是[直接]轉入開羅大學二年級。
In the ""Fake CV"" another Japanese woman who was attending another university in Egypt at the time says she was surprised that Koike had transferred in the second year at Cairo University. Another Japanese graduate of Cairo University whom I interviewed also remembered that Koike had transferred to the second year."

然而，轉學到包括開羅大學在內的埃及國立大學訂有嚴格的規定。為了進行轉學，學生必須在另一所大學獲得與埃及國立大學課程相同或相似的內容和學習時數的學分，並且必須獲得一定程度的成績。 開羅大學轉學中心辦公室向我證實了這一點。
However, strict rules are in place to transfer to Egypt's state universities, including Cairo University. In order to transfer, a student must have earned credits at another university with the same or similar content and number of hours as the Egyptian state university’s curriculum and must have earned a certain number of grades. This was confirmed to me by the Central Transfers Office of Cairo University.

例如，在2016-17學年，如果學生希望：
－轉學到工程或醫學學院，則必須從其他大學獲得至少imtiyaaz（優秀）成績。
－轉學實務研究學院，則必須從其他大學獲得至少jaiid jiddab(非常好)的成績。
－轉學理論學習研究學院，則必須從其他大學獲得至少jaiid (好)的成績。
In the case of the 2016-17 academic year, for example, students are required to have at least imtiyaaz (excellent) grade from other university if the student wishes to transfer to the Faculty of Engineering or Medicine and at least jaiid jiddan (very good) grade in the case of faculties of practical study and at least jaiid (good) grade for those of theoretical study.

前面如曾經提到的記者，達莉亞·施貝爾（Dalia Shibel）這樣告訴我：“在埃及，國立大學和私立大學是兩個完全不同的系統。即使您在開羅的美國大學學習了10年並獲得了必要的學分，您還是必須從開羅(國立)大學的一年級學生重新開始。這是我國的法律”。 因此，像小池這樣沒有在另一所大學讀完一年（也沒有獲得任何學分）的人是完全不可能被核准轉學的。
The aforementioned journalist Dalia Shibel told me that ""In Egypt state universities and private universities are two completely different systems. Even if you study at the American University in Cairo for 10 years obtaining necessary credits, you have to start as a first year student in Cairo University. This is the law of our country"". Therefore it is totally impossible that a person like Koike who has not finished a year at another university (and has not earned any credits) would be allowed to transfer."

小池最多只在關西學院大學學習了幾個月。 她在開羅的美國大學CASA那裡學習阿拉伯語只是一所語言學校，不提供任何學分或學位。 如果像一些日本人指出的那樣，小池真果真是在1973年轉入開羅大學第二年級的話，那不過是欺詐性的轉學而已。 這意味著她從一開始就沒有資格畢業。
Koike only attended Kwansei Gakuin University for several months at most. CASA at the American University in Cairo where she learnt Arabic is just a language school and does not offer any credits or degrees. If, as some Japanese people point out, Koike actually transferred to the second year at Cairo University in 1973, that is nothing but a fraudulent transfer. That means she was not eligible for graduation from the beginning.

💥關於小池入學許可的問題並沒有得到答案
No answer to the question about Koike’s admittance

2019年，有51人因以慈善機構樂捐名義為幌子，賄賂美國一個組織而受到起訴，該組織通過提升名人和其他人的孩子的SAT（大學才能測驗）分數，以欺詐手段允許他們的子女因此能夠進入著名的大學。
In 2019, 51 people were prosecuted in the United States for paying bribes under the guise of charity to an organization that allows celebrities and others to increase their children's SAT (college aptitude test) scores and fraudulently admit them to prestigious universities.

其中一位女演員費利西蒂·霍夫曼（Felicity Huffman）曾出演電視劇《欲望師奶(台灣翻譯)》，被判處14天監禁，並於去年10月在加利福尼亞州的女性監獄中被監禁。 霍夫曼的女兒索菲亞（Sophia）尚未上大學，據報導他將重考SAT。
One of them, actress Felicity Huffman, who starred in the TV drama Desperate Housewives, was sentenced to 14 days in prison and was incarcerated last October in a women's prison in California. Huffman's daughter Sophia has not enrolled in college and is reported to be retaking the SAT.

斯坦福大學以’非合法入學申請’為由，開除一名中國學生，原因在於他的父母為了可以濫用體育贊助(入學)名額，使他得以註冊該校學習課程，向該(同一)組織支付了650萬美元。
Stanford University expelled a Chinese student, whose parents paid $6.5 million to the organization for misusing a sports endorsement slot to enroll in the program, citing irregularities in submissions.

由於小池似乎未達到轉學入埃及國立大學的要求，因此我致信小池，詢問小池是在1972年還是1973年被錄取，但未得到任何答复（有關我詢問的信件內容，以及小池回應的所有完整文件，將在此報告的稍後部分中顯示）。
As Koike does not appear to have fulfilled the requirements for transferring to a state university in Egypt, I sent a letter to Koike, to ask whether she was admitted in 1972 or 1973 but received no response (the full text of my questions to and response from Koike will appear later in this report).

開羅大學是阿拉伯世界著名的大學之一，醫學，工程學，經濟和政治學係有許多優秀的埃及學生。 但是，該校在全球地位並不是很高。
Cairo University is one of the prominent universities in the Arab world and there are many excellent Egyptian students in the Faculties of Medicine, Engineering, and Economics and Political Science. However, its global standing is not very high.

在英國Quacquarelli Symonds Ltd.發布的2020年QS世界大學排名中，開羅大學在全球排名521-530，在埃及排名第二，與日本的熊本大學和長崎大學相當。 埃及最好的大學是開羅的美國大學（私立和美國認可大學），在世界上排名第395（與日本神戶大學並列）。 埃及排名第三的是艾因沙姆斯大學，亞歷山大大學和阿修特大學（所有國立大學），在世界範圍內排名第801-1000。
In the 2020 edition of the QS World University Rankings published by Quacquarelli Symonds Ltd. in the United Kingdom, Cairo University ranks 521-530 in the world and second in Egypt, on par with Kumamoto University and Nagasaki University in Japan. The best university in Egypt is the American University in Cairo (private and American-accredit university) which ranks 395th in the world (tied with Kobe University in Japan). Third place in Egypt are Ain Shams University, Alexandria University, and Assiut University (all state universities) which rank 801-1000th in the world.

💥小池與Abdel-Kader Hatem博士的關係
Koike’s Connections with Dr. Abdel-Kader Hatem

協助小池進行了“可能是欺詐性轉學＂的埃及政客的名字出現在“假經歷”這部分的內容中。 這個室友證明，小池在1973年通過著名的埃及政治家阿卜杜勒·卡德爾·哈特姆博士的關係轉入開羅大學二年級。
The name of an Egyptian politician who assisted Koike's possible ""fraudulent transfer"" appears in the ""Fake CV"". The flatmate testifies that Koike transferred to the second grade at Cairo University in 1973 through the connections of Dr. Abdel- Kader Hatem, a prominent Egyptian politician."

Hatem於1917年生於亞歷山大。他畢業於軍事學院和開羅大學。 他參與了1952年的埃及革命（是一個推翻君主制的政變，次年埃及共和國成立），當時他是在由Gamal Abdel Nasser中校領導的自由軍運動中的一名年輕成員。
Hatem was born in Alexandria in 1917. A graduate of the Military Academy and Cairo University. He participated in the Egyptian revolution in 1952 (a coup to overthrow the monarchy which was followed by the foundation of the republic the following year) as a young member of the Free Officers Movement led by then Lieutenant Colonel Gamal Abdel Nasser.

他於1957年成為國民議會議員，總統府副部長，1959年廣播電視國務部長，1962年文化部長，國家指導和旅遊部長，1971年副首相兼文化信息部長 ，曾任全國專業委員會常務理事兼埃及-日本友好協會主席。 他於2015年去世，享年97歲。
He became a member of the National Assembly in 1957, Deputy Minister in the Presidential Office, Minister of State for Radio and Television in 1959, Minister of Culture and Minister of National Guidance and Tourism in 1962, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Culture and Information in 1971, then longtime General Supervisor of the Specialized National Councils and President of the Egyptian-Japanese Friendship Association. He died in 2015 at the age of 97.

1974年2月，當時掌控文化和信息的副首相，哈特姆，以正式外賓的身份訪問了日本，並會見了日本首相田中角榮，副首相三木武夫，並參觀了皇宮與天皇會面。 1982年，他被日本政府授予＂旭日東昇頭等大勳章”。
In February 1974, Hatem, who was then the Deputy Prime Minister in charge of Culture and Information visited Japan as an official guest and met Japan’s Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka, Deputy Prime Minister Takeo Miki and visited the Imperial Palace to meet the Emperor. In 1982 he was awarded the Grand Cordon of the Order of the Rising Sun, First Class by the Japanese government.

"在1974年Hatem訪日之際，日本駐埃及大使Tsutomu Wada在1974年2月12日給日本外交大臣的正式電報中寫道：“埃及政治的最新發展，哈特姆副首相的職位（曾擔任首相的代理者）得到了進一步鞏固，正如我經常報導的那樣，埃及副首相在6名媒體記者的陪同下訪問日本，這是非同尋常的，這清楚地表明了哈特姆博士的權力，並表明了他認為這次訪問的重要性。”
On the occasion of Hatem's visit to Japan in 1974 the Japanese Ambassador to Egypt Tsutomu Wada wrote in an official telegram dated 12 February 1974 to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Japan ""As a result of recent developments in Egyptian politics the position of Deputy Prime Minister Hatem (who had been acting as a substitute for the Prime Minister) has been further strengthened as I have often reported. It is remarkable for an Egyptian Deputy Prime Minister to visit Japan accompanied by 6 media reporters and that clearly shows Dr. Hatem’s power. It also shows how important he thinks this visit is."""

"哈特姆的阿拉伯文傳記《阿卜杜勒·卡德·哈特姆日記-十月戰爭政府首腦》於2016年在開羅出版（由埃及記者易卜拉欣·阿卜杜勒·阿齊茲撰寫）指出，哈特姆與中曾根康弘保持著良好的關係， 自1954年起擔任日本前首相，中曾根將當時的在校學生，小池百合子－他朋友的女兒，介紹給哈特姆，哈特姆照顧小池，小池稱哈特姆為教父，並給了小池零用錢， 每月14埃及鎊。(小池在《長袖和服的金字塔攀登》第250頁上寫道，她每月從埃及政府獲得12英鎊的獎學金）。
🌐Chenchen註：Furisode是日本年輕未婚女性穿著的最正式的和服風格－以長袖為其特色，小池應是以Furisode做為自己的意象代名詞，唯美的描繪她以一介日本年輕嬌嬌女，如何在陌生的中東環境－埃及地，逐步攀登權力金字塔。中東地區非常保守，不但男尊女卑，金字塔也不容許遊客任意攀登，更何況是穿著舉步維艱的長袖正式和服，所以小池以一個浮誇的畫面來增飾自己在埃及留學生活的映象。
The Arabic-language biography of Hatem “The Diary of Abdel-Kader Hatem - Head of the October War Government"" published in Cairo in 2016 (written by an Egyptian journalist Ibrahim Abdel Aziz) states that Hatem had been on good terms with Yasuhiro Nakasone, former Prime Minister of Japan, since 1954 and that Nakasone introduced Yuriko Koike to him, a student at that time, as the daughter of his friend. Hatem took care of Koike. Koike called Hatem a god-father, and he gave Koike an allowance of 14 Egyptian pounds a month (Koike wrote on page 250 of “Furisode Climbing the Pyramid"" that she received a scholarship of 12 pounds a month from the Egyptian government)."

Abdel-Kader Hatem與中曾根康弘
Abdel-Kader Hatem with Yasuhiro Nakasone

"另一方面，小池於1985年出版的書《音譯：Onna女性 no 的Jinmyaku-Zukuri人脈建立 (（我如何以女人的身分經營人脈關係）》指出，她的父親（小池裕郎）很早就認識中曾根。她本人是在小學時代即已見到中曾根，在每個冬天，中曾根都向家人送去了一堆在中曾根選舉區群馬縣產的韭菜，並與他的兄弟一起吃了。
On the other hand Koike's book, ""Onna no Jinmyaku-Zukuri (How I made personal connections as a woman)"" published in 1985 states that her father (Yujiro Koike) had known Nakasone for a long time. She herself first met Nakasone when she was an elementary school student, every winter Nakasone sent her family a bunch of leeks produced in Gunma prefecture, Nakasone’s electoral district, and she ate them with his* brother." 🌐*Chenchen註：應該是She ate them with HER brother.,,

1973年10月6日，埃及爆發了十月戰爭（Yom Kippur War）。 埃及和敘利亞軍隊對部署在蘇伊士運河和戈蘭高地的以色列部隊發動了進攻，試圖奪回1967年六日戰爭（六月戰爭）中以色列佔領的領土。
🌐Chenchen註：這是知名的第四次以阿戰爭，後來引發第一次石油危機，各界認為這是阿拉伯國家在二戰之後，第一次聯手反對西方帝國主義。維基百科：贖罪日戰爭，又稱第四次以阿戰爭、齋月戰爭、十月戰爭...起源於埃及與敘利亞分別攻擊六年前被以色列佔領的西奈半島和戈蘭高地。戰爭的頭一至兩日埃敘聯盟佔了上風，但此後戰況逆轉。至第二周，敘軍退出戈蘭高地。在西奈，以軍在兩軍之間攻擊，越過原來的停火線蘇伊士運河。直到聯合國停火令生效為止，以軍甚至包圍了埃及的主力部隊。 https://zh.m.wikipedia.org/zh-tw/%E8%B4%96%E7%BD%AA%E6%97%A5%E6%88%B0%E7%88%AD

On 6 October 1973, the October War (Yom Kippur War) broke out in Egypt. Egyptian and Syrian forces launched an attack on Israeli forces deployed in the Suez Canal and Golan Heights in an attempt to recapture territory occupied by Israel in the Six Day War (June War) in 1967.

"為了支持埃及和敘利亞，阿拉伯石油輸出國組織（OAPEC）將石油價格提高了1.4倍，並引發了第一次石油危機。 日本被OAPEC視為“不友好”國家之一，由於採取了削減石油供應的措施，日本遭受了經濟危機。 日本政府派副首相三木武夫和前外交大臣小坂健太郎等人前往沙烏地阿拉伯，埃及和阿爾及利亞，要求這些國家將日本改變為“友好國家”類別（所謂的“石油乞討外交”）。 。
In support of Egypt and Syria, the Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC), raised oil prices by 1.4 times and caused the First Oil Crisis. Japan was considered one of the ""unfriendly"" countries by OAPEC and suffered an economic crisis as a result of measures to cut oil supplies. The Japanese government sent Deputy Prime Minister Takeo Miki and former Foreign Minister Zentaro Kosaka and others to Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Algeria to ask those countries to change Japan to a ""friendly country"" category (the so-called ""oil begging diplomacy"")."

(待續...或是直接點原文連結)
https://jbpress.ismedia.jp/articles/-/60643

【After Winning Majority in LegCo: Beijing's Crackdown May Trigger International Intervention】

***感謝Hong Kong Columns - Translated，將我早前撰寫『議會過半想像：以「#國際攬炒」反制「臨立會2.0」』長文（https://www.facebook.com/joshuawongchifung/photos/a.313299448762570/2887650867994069/）翻譯成英文，鼓勵國際社會關注立會選舉一旦過半的沙盤推演，在最惡劣形勢下的制衡策略。***

中文精簡版本：https://www.facebook.com/joshuawongchifung/photos/a.564294826996363/2888641404561682/

Hongkongers have experienced our revolution for over half a year. They no longer take a consequentialist view to the effectiveness of their movement as they did years ago, or waste time second-guessing the intentions and background of fellow activists. Following the defensive battles at CUHK and PolyU, November’s District Council election saw a great victory of unity. More marvellous is the union between peaceful and “valiant” protesters.

In the process of resisting tyranny, the people have realised that one cannot prioritize one strategy over another. This is also how the common goal of “35+” came into being—the hope that we will win over half of the seats in the Legislative Council (LegCo) this September, such that the political spectrum that represents the majority of Hongkongers is able to gain control of legislative decisions. The political clout of Hongkongers will increase if 35 or more seats are successfully secured on our side. It is certainly one vital step to achieve the five demands within the system.

The possibility of realizing legislative majority

Technically it is not unrealistic to win a majority even under the current undemocratic system. Back in the 2016 LegCo election, we already won 30 seats. In addition to the District Council (First) functional constituency seat that is already in the pocket of the pan-democrats, as long as the candidates in Kowloon East and New Territories West do not start infighting again, we could safely secure 33 seats based on the number of pan-dem votes in 2016.

The other 3 seats required to achieve a majority depend on democrats’ breakthrough among the functional constituencies by dispersing the resources of the Liaison Office. They also count on whether the turnout this September could exceed 71.2% — that of last year’s District Council elections. Some of the factors that could affect the turnout include: will the epidemic persist into the summer? Will there be potential violent repression of protests in the 2 weeks preceding the election? Will Hong Kong-US relations be affected by the downturn of the global economy?

Therefore, the ambition of “35+” is to be prioritised by the resistance as both a means and an end. I have already expressed my support for an intra-party primary at the coordination meeting. In the meantime, it is pleasing to see the ongoing debates reaching a consensus of maximising the seats among geographical constituencies in the upcoming election.

Whilst enthusiastic coordination, we should also assess the post-election landscape and gauge Beijing’s reactions: if we do not reach 35 seats, Hong Kong will be subject to tighter control and more severe repression by China; but if the democratic parties successfully form a majority in LegCo, CCP’s fears of a “constitutional crisis” would become imminent. Hence, the key questions are how the Pan-Democrats should deal with the volatile political situation in Hong Kong and how they are going to meet Beijing’s charge head-on.

Watching out for Beijing’s dismissal of LegCo after reaching majority

To take back control of LegCo such that it faithfully reflects the majority’s principles and needs is the definition of a healthy democracy. Recently, however, DAB’s Tam Yiu-chung has warned that the plan of the Pan-Dems to “usurp power” in the LegCo would only lead to Beijing’s forceful disqualification of certain members or the interpretation of the Basic Law. This proves that winning a majority in LegCo is not only a popular conception but also a realistic challenge that would get on the nerves of Beijing. Could Beijing accept a President James To in LegCo? These unknown variables must be addressed upon achieving a majority.

While there is no telltale sign as to Beijing’s exact strategy, we are already familiar with the way CCP manipulated the Basic Law in the past 4 years. Having experienced three waves of disqualifications in LegCo, twice kicked out of LegCo with my team, and thrice locked up in jail, I have no false hopes of an easy compromise from Beijing: they would not let Pan-Dems control LegCo for half a year and wait (as is the proper procedure) until after having negatived the Budget to dissolve the legislature, and thereby giving them an easy victory in the re-elections. The greater the Pan-Dems threaten Beijing’s rule in Hong Kong, the more likely that it will trigger Beijing’s repression.

Since the disqualification and arrest of lawmakers have already become “normalised”, one can even imagine the police stepping into the LegCo building to force Pan-Dems into voting. Neither is it beyond our imagination to expect the CCP to kick out all 70 lawmakers in a fit of rage and replace them with a provisional LegCo “2.0” [HKCT note: The first was from 25 Jan 1997 to 30 Jun 1998]. To depend on a majority that could lead to a chapter of a “new testament” for One Country, Two Systems is perhaps what many elites long for, but they are overly optimistic:for a ticket to the promised land will not be available at the Chief Executive election campaign a year and a half later.

Admittedly, the Pan-Dems cannot unilaterally initiate “Laam-chaau” [HKCT note: mostly translated into “scorched-earth” mentality or “mutual destruction”; some even translated into “If I burn, you burn with us”]. The most they can do is to force a standstill of the government, and not for long the LegCo will have been eliminated from the equation to make the wheels turn again. It all leaves the plan of “Negativing the motion → Dissolving LegCo → Re-election after re-election → the stepping down of Carrie Lam” merely as overly positive speculation, probably resulting from their overestimate of CCP's capacity for rational calculation. The Pan-Dems must guard their frontlines and recognise what the biggest threat from Hong Kong to China could be. In this case, should LegCo sessions be disrupted or suspended, the Pan-Dems would have to be well prepared to surmount the expected obstacles and prevent the disqualification crisis 4 years ago—a Catch-22 indeed.

Productive tension from global intervention: Using Laam-chaau against the CCP

What aggravates the CCP the most is the potential threat to Hong Kong’s unique status as the one and only “separate customs territory”. Any miscalculation will compromise its role as the Chinese economy’s “white gloves”. Imagine if CCP were to disqualify all 70 elected lawmakers and convene a meeting north of the Shenzhen River to pass a resolution to Hong Kong’s affairs (much like the Provisional Legislative Council “1.0" in 1997), how great will the shock be in a world with an effective Hong Kong Human Rights and Democracy Act? However hard it is to predict the future one thing is certain: With the US presidential election just around the corner, blows to the separation of powers would not be tolerated, and the West would necessarily effect countermeasures against the Hong Kong government.

Beijing has been relying upon Hong Kong to navigate the international community for decades. While clamping down on the political freedom of the cosmopolitan city, Beijing desires to maintain the financial centre’s economic freedom. Hence, we started lobbying for the Hong Kong Human Rights and Democracy Act four years ago, and today we are determined to promote “Laam-chaau” on an international scale.

The will of the voters must be reflected in an election. If a “35+” legislature were to be dismissed and replaced, such flagrant violation of democracy would assuredly cause a greater backlash than the infamous extradition bill. Knowing what the reality ahead of us could be, we have to combine our election and international strategies to oppose the placement of a 35+ LegCo with an “Emergency Legislative Council 2.0”, to advance an international “Laam-chaau” to Hong Kong’s status as “separate customs territory”. Only then will we stand a chance to resist the regime and to realise the five demands.

Adjusting our mindset: Overcoming the “constitutional crisis” to reach a resolution

Upon the realization of the “35+” LegCo, it is expected that the CCP will launch a devastating counterattack. The Pan-Dems should not expect LegCo to run normally; neither can the lawmakers realise their governing blueprints they have for Hong Kong. Rather, candidates will be able to compete against one another with visions of a liberated Hong Kong through popular vote. Bringing this point up has nothing to do with undermining the common goal of reaching a majority in LegCo, but rather channels the battle of LegCo to positive use upon the rule of law’s death and a “constitutional crisis” ahead. Knowing that Hongkongers have nothing to fall back on, all Pan-Dems should not miss the only way to the realization of “35+”.

Thus, be they partisans, nonpartisans, incumbent politicians, amateur politicians, or the civil society as a whole – if we stay in the political discourse of 2016 and continue to perpetuate old stereotypes, that is to deal with the divisions on the pan-democratic camp by favouring the most “local” faction; to consider only resource allocation and self-aggrandizement as the purpose of a LegCo campaign; to ignore how potential lawmakers are fitted to what specific roles; to turn a blind eye to the journey of resistance since last summer (extending indefinitely into the future)—They would lead as astray and cost us lose a precious opportunity for change by winning a 35+ majority.

The extent to which the pan-democrats can stay united in light of the political atmosphere since last summer is another problem that our side must to address. Before the watershed moment of 12th June 2019, many democratic delegates were trapped in the mentality of needing to “preserve people’s livelihood”, “be content of what we have accomplished”, and other strategies that favours stability. As the government refuses to heed to the five demands, whether the democrats, especially those in the functional constituencies, have the political will to go all-in is the real difficult question that confronts us in the upcoming LegCo election.

All in all, if “35+” cannot be realised, it is unsurprising to see LegCo being more heavily suppressed in the next 4 years; even if "35+" is achieved, it is questionable whether the pan-democrats are able to weather multiple attacks, verbal or physical, from the regime (judging from its power in the last four years) and utilise the international Laam-chaau strategy against the displacement of LegCo. Adhering to the motto of “we fight on, each in his own way”, I can only hope that Hongkongers in elections, street confrontations and international front can reconcile with each other, so that we may collectively compel the government to yield to our demands in the next six months. It is only by reaching a resolution before a real constitutional crisis that we can combat the institutional violence of the regime and not be devoured by it.

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