原文連結：http://goo.gl/tWt4g

譯者前言

framing是在講捕手如何靠著接球把壞球變成好球的技巧
比方說摸二哥就是其中好手
但是這個概念真的很不好翻，因此我想了一想把他翻成「接捕」
以便和接球啊捕球啊這些捕手的基本動作做個區分
這絕對不是最好的解答，但是用在翻譯這一篇文章應該是夠了
如果有興趣可以去看看原文，因為他除了自己寫之外，也有一些外部連結可以延伸閱讀

這篇很長，分成上下兩篇，祝大家颱風天平安無事，天佑台灣


It's the day before a foul tip off the bat of Rajai Davis will fracture
Francisco Cervelli's hand, and the Yankees' still-intact starting catcher is
in excellent spirits. After spending almost all of 2012 in the minors, he's
happy to be back in the Yankees clubhouse. He's also happy to be off to a
good start with the bat, a start that's about to get better; in a few hours,
he'll take Mark Buehrle deep for his third home run of the season. But how
Cervelli hits is secondary, even to Cervelli."I've been focused on my defense,
and that's it," Cervelli says. "And I'm going to keep doing that no matter
what happens with my bat."

這天是洋基捕手Cervelli被藍鳥Rajai Davis擦棒球打傷的前一天，Cervelli的精神超棒
。2012年幾乎都泡在小聯盟裡，回到大聯盟他真的很開心，另一件開心的事情是他開季打
擊還不錯。再過幾個小時，他就要對Buehrle尻出本季第三轟了。不過Cervelli打得怎麼
樣是其次，就算是Cervelli自己，也是這麼覺得的。他說：「我很專注在我的守備上，不
管我打擊發生什麼事，我還是一樣會專心防守。」

A lot of eyebrows, and maybe a few middle fingers, were raised over the
winter, when the Yankees — the team with the catching legacy of Dickey,
Berra, Howard, Munson, and Posada, not to mention the $200 million–plus
payroll — entrusted their catching duties to Cervelli and backup catcher
Chris Stewart, a duo that entered the season with a combined .249/.315/.332
line in the big leagues. In the past, the Yankees would have dipped into the
free-agent market and signed someone with a bigger bat and a bigger name —
A.J. Pierzynski, perhaps, who was coming off a 27-homer season, or another
offense-first option like Mike Napoli, who signed with the rival Red Sox.
Both players agreed to one-year contracts, so they wouldn't have hampered the
Yankees' goal of getting under the $189 million luxury tax threshold for
2014.1

洋基去年冬天決定讓Cervelli和替補的Chris Sterwart擔綱捕手重責大任，他們兩人過去
在大聯盟的打擊三圍是.249/.315/.332，這讓不少人挑起眉毛，甚至有人豎起中指。畢竟
這是一支出過Dickey、Berra、Howard、Munson和Posada的一代名捕的隊伍啊，何況團隊
薪資還超過兩億美金。以前的洋基會到自由市場上找支有名的大砲，比方說上一季還有27
轟的Pierzynski，又或許是打擊不錯的Napoli，而他最後跑去紅襪了。這兩個球員都會願
意簽一年約，並不妨礙洋基在2014年把薪資砍到1.89億美金的豪華稅門檻之下的計畫。

Instead, they stuck with two players who are earning barely more than the
major league minimum. And they'll probably be better off. Cervelli and
Stewart can do more to help the Yankees win with a subtle shift of the glove
than Mariano Rivera can with his cutter, than Brett Gardner can in the
outfield, than Ichiro can with his arm and his base-running ability combined.
They have an ability that not only doesn't show up in the box score but
doesn't show up in advanced stats like UZR and WAR. Baseball teams have
always known it existed, but they haven't known what it was worth until now.
And one need only look at the lineup card to see how valuable the Yankees
believe it is.

不過呢，他們最終啟用了這兩個薪水比大聯盟底薪高不了多少的捕手，而且他們表現得更
好。Cervelli和Stewart的接捕能幫助洋基贏得的比賽，比Rivera的卡特球還多，比
Gardner在外野的表現還多，比一朗的跑壘和臂力加起來還要多。這兩位捕手有一種能力
，不只不會出現在分數盒裡面，連UZR和WAR這種進階數據都看不到。各個球隊都知道這能
力，但是一直到現在，他們才了解其價值。看看洋基的陣容，就會知道洋基有多麼相信這
價值了。

"They're both exceptional defenders," Yankees GM Brian Cashman said of
Cervelli and Stewart in a recent interview with Mike Ferrin on SiriusXM's MLB
Network Radio. "Tremendous pitch framers. We're big into that."

洋基總管Cashman在一個廣播節目的訪談上說：「他們防守超棒，超會接捕。」

Take a look at these two pitches from 2012:

http://goo.gl/95527 Jose Molina 光芒時期

http://goo.gl/MTGo4　Ryan Doumit 雙城時期

They're both four-seam fastballs thrown by right-handed pitchers to
left-handed hitters. They both pass through the strike zone 21 inches off the
ground, between 11.7 and 12.9 inches from the center of home plate. They both
hit their targets, so the catchers know where they're headed and have time to
prepare. And they're both called by the same umpire, Sam Holbrook.

這兩個球都是右投手對左打者打所投出的四縫線速球，都在21英吋的高度通過好球帶，離
本壘板中心11.7和12.9英吋遠。這兩球都是捕手要的位置，所以捕手老早就知道球的落點
，有充裕時間準備接球，連後面的主審都是同一位Sam Holbrook。

In fact, the two pitches are similar in just about every respect but their
outcomes. The top one, thrown by James Shields last July, is a strike, but
the bottom one, thrown by Liam Hendriks last June, is a ball.

事實上，這兩球除了最後的結果之外，其他的一切都是如此相似。第一球，Shields去年
七月所投出的，是個好球；而第二球，Liam Hendriks去年六月所投出的，是個壞球。

We can't say for sure why only one was a strike; maybe Holbrook was just
feeling generous when the first pitch crossed the plate. But we do know one
important variable that differs between the two pitches — the catcher. The
pitch on the top was caught by the Rays' Jose Molina, one of baseball's best
receivers. The pitch on the bottom was caught by the Twins' Ryan Doumit, one
of the worst. And that may have made all the difference.

我們無法斷定為什麼只有第一球是好球，搞不好只是主審那天比較大方而已。不過我們確
定知道的是，這兩球之間有一個重要的變異：捕手。第一球是光芒的Jose Molina，世界
上最好的捕手之一；而第二球是雙城的Ryan Doumit，最差的之一。這個差別，可能就是
這兩球結果截然不同的原因。

Focus on how catchers "frame" pitches to make them look more like strikes, or
talk to guys who are good at it, and the distinction between players like
Molina and Doumit starts to stand out. Depending on how they're caught, two
pitches that are almost identical on their way to the plate can look a lot
different once they get to the glove.

多注意捕手的「接捕」怎麼產生更多好球，或是和那些善於接捕的人聊聊，Molina和
Doumit這些球員之間的差別就會慢慢浮現了。被接捕的方式不同，這兩顆進壘路徑幾乎一
樣的球在進手套的時候，看起來真的差很多。

Concentrate on the catchers in those clips. Molina sets up farther outside,
so even though the pitch to him is farther from the plate, he catches it in
the center of his body. Doumit has to reach for the ball, drawing attention
to its distance from the strike zone. The bases are empty in both clips,
giving the catchers the freedom to set up any way they want without worrying
about base runners. But only Molina goes down to one knee to present a lower,
more stable target. Doumit's head jerks sharply downward the instant after he
catches the pitch. Molina's remains still. And Doumit's glove, descending to
meet the pitch, dips even more after he catches it. This sends the ball
farther outside the zone and forces him to jerk the glove back up in an
exaggerated fashion. Molina's glove never gets any lower than it is when he
receives the pitch. He makes a much more subtle upward movement, and it takes
about half as much time for his glove to come to rest.

再看一次圖檔，只看捕手就好。Molina一開始就蹲得比較外面，所以即使這一球對他來說
離本壘遠一點，他還是可以在身體的中間把球接進手套。Doumit得去追那顆球，凸顯了球
和好球帶的距離。這兩球投出的時候，壘上都沒有人，所以捕手沒什麼好分心的，可以在
最舒服的位置接球。Molina準備時單膝跪地，讓他可以一開始就設定一個比較低，比較穩
定的目標。Doumit的頭在球進手套之後頓了一下，Molina的頭穩穩的沒有動。Doumit把手
套往下探去接到球之後，又更往下沉了一點，這讓球跑到更外角，要在使用捕手的尾勁喬
回來的時候就太過誇張了。Molina的手套自始至終都沒有往下掉，他往上喬的時候動作是
很細微的，只花了一點點時間，手套就定住了。

These differences in technique don't only pop up on some pitches. They're
present for almost every pitch, as constant as a pitcher's motion or a
batter's stance. Go back to 2011, when Molina (top) was with Toronto and
Doumit (bottom) played for Pittsburgh. You'll see the same differences:

剛剛講的這些技術差別可不是偶爾才出現，幾乎每一球你都可以看到一樣的差別，就好像
投球姿勢或是打擊動作一樣固定。回到2011年，這張藍鳥時期的Molina，還有海盜時期的
Doumit，同樣的差別還是出現了。

http://goo.gl/lKaaW Molina藍鳥時期

http://goo.gl/ECDCi Doumit海盜時期

Although the changes in camera angle and batter position make it difficult to
tell, these pitches are even closer together, according to PITCHf/x: 1.26
feet and 1.29 feet from the center of the strike zone, respectively. Both are
four-seamers on 0-1 counts called by umpire Mike Winters. Again, we see the
call go one way for Molina and the other for Doumit. And again, it's not
tough to tell why. Doumit's whole body leans toward the outside of the plate,
while Molina's stays almost perfectly still. Doumit raises and clenches his
right hand, creating a potential distraction for the umpire; Molina's right
hand remains tucked behind him. Doumit's head and glove again dip before his
pronounced pull. Molina times his reception to catch the ball with his glove
already on the rise.

雖然說攝影機角度和打者的姿勢影響了我們的判斷，但是2011年的這兩球事實上更接近：
根據PITCHf/x，離本壘板中心1.26和1.29英呎。這兩球投出的球數都是一個好球沒有壞球
，主審都是Mike Winters。再一次地，只有Molina接的才是好球，再一次地，不難看出為
什麼。Doumit的身體重心都往打者的方向跑了，而Molina不動如山。Doumit的右手抬起來
還握了個拳，可能對主審造成了一些干擾，而Molina的右手一直揣在他身體後面。老樣子
，Doumit的頭和手套在他把球喬回來之前已經先往下掉，而Molina算得很準，在接球的同
時，手套也微微地抬起來。

Once you train yourself to see it, it's almost impossible to stop seeing it.
Baseball is often described as a chess match between batter and pitcher. But
it's more like a chess match between batter and pitcher in which, once in a
while, the catcher grabs the board and moves someone's piece.

你一旦學會看得出這種差別，你就很難停下來不繼續看了。常常有人形容棒球是一盤打者
和投手之間下的棋，但是其實更像是三不五時，在這盤棋局裡，捕手忽然把棋盤拿起來，
動了幾步。

§§§

In a September 2011 article titled "Spinning Yarn: Removing the Mask," Mike
Fast, then an analyst for Baseball Prospectus (and now an analyst for the
Houston Astros), attempted to determine what catcher receiving was worth. By
studying where strikes are typically called and establishing which pitchers
were getting more or fewer strikes than they "should" have, given where their
pitches crossed the plate, Fast was able to isolate the effect of the
catcher. He concluded that pitch framing can make a major impact, and it also
is more consistent from year to year than even reliable offensive metrics
like on-base percentage or slugging percentage. In other words, it's not
insignificant, and it's not just noise. It's a valuable skill that persists
from season to season.

2011年九月，當時在Baseball Prospectus的分析師Mike Fast（他現在在太空人系統裡當
分析師）寫了這篇文章 http://goo.gl/QvEmc，企圖想要找出捕手接捕的價值。Fast研究
了什麼位置的球通常會被判好球，並找出了哪些投手比他們所「應得」的拿到了更多或是
更少的好球，他最終得以將捕手的影響獨立出來討論。他的結論是，捕手的接捕真的有很
大的影響，而且這種能力以每一年來看，比常用的打擊數據上壘率長打率之類的還要穩定
。換句話說，不容小覷。這可是一種每一季都保持如常的珍貴技巧。

Fast found that Molina, the best receiver, was worth 35 runs above average
per 120 games, and Doumit, the worst, was worth 26 runs below average. After
Houston hired Fast, another analyst named Max Marchi succeeded him at
Baseball Prospectus2 and brought with him a sophisticated model for framing
that accounted for most of the potentially confounding factors: the umpire,
the ballpark, the batter, the ball-strike count, and the pitch location and
type. According to Marchi, who has consulted for a major league club and
whose work has been mentioned by Rays manager Joe Maddon, Molina has saved
his teams 111 runs — or, using the standard 10-runs-to-a-win conversion,
about 11 wins — because of framing from 2008 to 2013. (The only other
catcher with a higher run total over that same time period, Brian McCann at
122, has caught more than twice as many pitches.) Doumit, on the other end of
the receiving spectrum, cost his teams 155 runs. That comes out to 0.50 runs
added by Molina and 0.55 runs subtracted by Doumit per 100 pitches, an
enormous difference.3 For comparative purposes, Barry Bonds's bat during the
2001-2004 seasons, when he basically broke baseball, was worth about 0.78
runs above average per game.

Fast發現，Jose Milina是最好的接捕者，靠著接捕，每120場比賽比捕手平均還要多守下
35分。Doumit是最差的，比平均還要低26分。Fast去了太空人之後，在Baseball
Prospectus接手他工作的Max Marchi使用了一個更複雜的模型，考慮了各種可能影響的因
素，包括裁判、球場、打者、好壞球數、進壘位置和球種。根據Marchi的模型，Monila從
2008年到2013年，光是用接捕，就為他的球隊守住了111分，如果守住10分算是一場勝利
的話，那就是11勝了。（同樣的時間，只有McCann守住的分數比他多，高達122分，但是
McCann接到的球比Molina多了一倍。）Doumit身處接捕光譜的另一側，他在這段時間之內
花了球隊155分。以每接一百球來計算，Molina幫球隊增添了0.50分，Doumit讓球隊虧了
0.55分，差距真大。繼續比較下去的話，Barry Bonds從2001年到2004年爆走的時候，他
的打擊每一場比賽換算下來大約值得0.78分。

Granted, those run totals aren't typical. Molina and Doumit are outliers; no
one else comes close to costing his team as much per pitch as Doumit, and
only Brewers catcher Jonathan Lucroy has approached Molina levels of framing
effectiveness. (Lucroy has some advantages over Molina. He's 11 years younger
and has a better bat, which allows him to stay in the lineup. Since his debut
in 2010, he's saved almost twice as many runs due to framing as any other
catcher, aside from Molina.)

當然啦，這些分數並不是很典型。Molina和Doumit都是離群值，Doumit每一球給球隊的損
失無人可望其項背，也只有釀酒人的Jonathan Lucroy在接捕效率上和Molina堪稱同一等
級。（Lucroy有不少優點。他比Molina年輕11歲，打擊也比較好，這讓他可以保持定期出
賽。2010年在大聯盟亮相後，他比聯盟的任何其他捕手多用接捕守住了一倍以上的分數，
當然，除了Molina以外。）

Still, consider the implications. Giancarlo Stanton, one of the most coveted
young players in the game, was worth as much4 (in terms of Wins Above
Replacement) over the past two seasons as Molina's framing alone was worth in
a part-time role over the past five-plus, yet Molina's value, unlike
Stanton's, is largely overlooked. And that's without factoring in any value
Molina added by calling games, handling his pitching staff, and controlling
the running game. Best of all, Molina's done it all for an average of $1.5
million per season, in an era when a single win on the free-agent market
usually runs teams around $5 million. It's no surprise that Molina plays for
the Rays, low-payroll competitors who've found ways to make a dollar go
further than any other organization. Nor is it a coincidence that Molina, a
career backup catcher whom standard sabermetric stats peg as a
replacement-level player, became a first-time starter and appeared in a
career-high 102 games in his age-37 season, barely six months after Fast's
study appeared on Baseball Prospectus.

但還是要想想其中含意。聯盟最讓人流口水的年輕人之一Gincarlo Stanton在過去兩年的
價值（用WAR來算）跟Molina在過去五年光光用接捕的價值是一樣的，不過相較之下，
Molina的能力大大地被忽略了。我們都還沒提到Molina控制全場、幫助投手和看管跑者的
能力耶。最棒的是，Molina做了這麼多，他的年薪只有150萬美金。Molina在光芒陣中也
不意外，這是一支團隊薪資低，所以必須想盡辦法讓每一塊錢都花得比其他人更加在刀口
上的球隊。Fast發表了那篇文章六個月後，一路走來都是二號捕手的Molina開始在光芒打
上先發，並在37歲的2012球季打上生涯新高的102場比賽，也不是什麼巧合。

Eleven wins sounds like too much for a single part-time pitch receiver to add
in just over five seasons, but think about how many opportunities to gain and
lose strikes there are over a 162-game schedule. A durable catcher can catch
around 10,000 called pitches in a single season. Many of those pitches are
clear-cut calls. But that still leaves hundreds, maybe thousands, of pitches
in the shadowy border region between ball and strike, where a good receiver
can perform the catching equivalent of turning water into wine. Even if an
extra strike doesn't send the batter back to the dugout, it puts him in a
less-favorable count and makes him less likely to do damage later in the
at-bat. Dan Turkenkopf, another former Baseball Prospectus staffer who was
recently hired by the Rays, put the average value of turning a single ball
into a strike at 0.13 runs. If you do that a few times per game, as Molina
does, the run total climbs quickly.

一個二號捕手，在五個球季中靠著接捕幫球隊拿到11場勝利，聽起來好像有點過頭了，但
是想想看，一年有162場比賽，有多少好壞球的機會可以把握和錯失啊。有檔頭的捕手一
年可以接到一萬個左右沒出棒的球，其中有很多都是明顯的好球或壞球。但依然有幾百個
，甚至上千個球是在好壞球的模糊地帶，這也是善於接捕的球員點石成金的大好機會。即
便多一顆好球不代表著打者就此出局，但也讓他球數落後，造成破壞的可能性也變小了。
前Baseball Prospectus分析師，現在在為光芒工作的Dan Turkenkoph把將壞球喬成好球
的價值定在0.13分，如果一場比賽可以做個幾次，就像Molina一樣，那總分就會爬得很快
了。

"If a catcher can perfect a great way of receiving the ball, and he gets the
ball maybe a half a ball outside — or even a ball outside — off the corners
consistently, I think he's worth his weight in gold," says Steve Yeager, a
15-year big league veteran and the Dodgers' catching coach. Molina is listed
at 250 pounds, so depending on the karat, his weight in gold would be worth
much more than he's making. But even a 24-karat Molina wouldn't go for as
much as Marchi's model suggests he's worth to a team.

「如果一個捕手可以精進於接捕，把好球帶外半顆球，甚至一顆球的壞球變成好球的話，
我覺得這捕手的價值根本是等體重的黃金。」闖蕩大聯盟15年，現在在道奇擔任捕手教練
的Steve Yeager如是說。Molina體重號稱250磅，這個重量的純金比他賺的錢多得多。但
就算是24K金的Molina，也比不上Marchi的模型當中他對球隊的價值。

It's not as if receiving skills weren't valued when Yeager was playing; as
more than one person (OK, almost every person) I spoke to pointed out, the
word "catch" is right there in the name of the position. But it's easier to
discount a certain skill when there are no numbers attached to it. (Just try
to talk to the more dogmatic species of stathead about clubhouse chemistry.)
Before framing became a sabermetric buzzword, Molina's receiving skills were
known but nebulous. His offensive struggles, on the other hand, were easier
to see, and almost as easy to quantify. But now that we can count his
contributions on both sides of the ball, what he does on defense is
impossible to dismiss. The Rays, a team that's smart enough to see that, are
reaping the rewards (and so is Molina, though it's a little late for him to
cash in).

並不是說接捕的能力在Yeager的年代就不被重視。不只一個人（好啦，幾乎是每個人）跟
我說，「捕」這個字再怎麼說就是在捕手這兩個字裡面啊。但是呢，如果沒有數據佐證，
某種能力的價值就很容易被打折扣（你只要試試看去跟那些比較偏激的數據派聊聊看團隊
氣氛就知道我意思了）。早在接捕能力成為棒球統計分析的熱門話題之前，Molina多會接
球大家早就知道了，只是對於其含義還不是很了解。另一方面，他打擊不好這件事情還蠻
顯而易見的。但是我們現在在攻守兩端都計算他的貢獻，他在防守的表現根本無法忽視。
光芒聰明到看得到這一點，現在歡笑收割中。（當然Molina也是啦，只是現在這年紀要開
始賺大錢有點晚了。）

Jose's younger brother Yadier and retired older brother Bengie share(d) his
receiving skill to a lesser degree, and all three inspire awe from their
peers at the position. "I think the three Molinas, they come from another
planet," says Yankees catcher Francisco Cervelli. "I've never seen anything
like that in my life." But as many Molinas as there are, they're not a
renewable resource. At some point, the last Molina will retire, and if
receiving skills are still undervalued among major league catchers, a team
that could learn to teach framing efficiently at the lower levels, minting
Molina-like receivers while other teams are still running out Ryan Doumits,
might have its hands on a major market inefficiency.

摸家小弟Yadier和已經退休的大哥Bengie在接捕能力上也有一定程度的水準，這三兄弟在
同業之間備受推崇。Cervelli說：「摸家三兄弟跟本外星人，沒看過這種的啦。」但是，
摸家就只有三兄弟，他們可不是再生能源可以一直冒出來。遲早摸家人會退休光，如果這
種接捕的能力依然被大聯盟捕手低估的話，願意從小聯盟開始教球員有效接捕的球隊，可
以慢慢栽培出這種摸式選手。當其他球隊還在用Doumit之流的捕手時，他們就有機會得利
了。

Thanks to advances in technology and analysts like Fast and Marchi, we have a
much better sense than before of what a catcher with good receiving skills is
worth. We also know which big leaguers qualify as the best in the business.
What we don't know, necessarily, is where good framing catchers come from.
Are good receivers born or made? And if they're made, how do you make them?

多虧了現代科技和Fast以及Marchi這樣的分析師，我們現在比以往更清楚一個善於接捕的
捕手的價值所在。我們也知道有哪些大聯盟捕手善於此道。我們不知道的是，這些接捕能
力從何而來？是天生的還是可以訓練的？如果是可以訓練的，又要怎麼做呢？

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