【#TheDiplomat: 沈旭暉隨緣家書英文版🇭🇰】很久沒有向國際關係評論網 The Diplomat 供稿，但國際線十分重要，不應放棄。這次他們希望分享23條、國安法、反恐法風雨欲來的「新香港」前瞻，願國際社會能多了解快將出現的危機：

While the world is preoccupied with a fight against the COVID-19 pandemic, Beijing has been tightening its political grip on all aspects of Hong Kong’s civil society. Rumor has it that Beijing will push through legislating national security laws under Article 23 of Hong Kong’s Basic Law by unconventional means, such as massively disqualifying pro-democratic legislators or even directly applying a national law, widely argued as a major step to destroy the rights and freedom of Hong Kongers, and bring Chinese authoritarianism to Hong Kong.

After the 2019 protests, the administration of Carrie Lam, who theoretically is still leading the special administrative region of China, has little political capital at stake, with its legitimacy reaching rock bottom. The pro-government camp has dwindling prospects for the city’s upcoming Legislative Council election. The government‘s ”nothing to lose“ mentality is apparent from its recent blatant reinterpretation of the Basic Law’s Article 22 (another article that limits the influence of China’s offices in Hong Kong’s internal affairs). The debate is nothing new, but the pressure this time is quite different.

This article highlights the different strategies Beijing could adopt to enact Article 23 insidiously or under disguise to avoid backlash from the international community, while continuing to reap benefits from the city’s globally recognized special status. This seems to be part of Beijing’s brinkmanship to bring Hong Kong protesters and their supporters to their knees and move the city closer to authoritarianism. To counter these moves, Hong Kongers must define the boundaries beyond which Hong Kong falls into authoritarian rule and make a case as to why the city’s downfall is detrimental to the international community‘s interest.

The Long-Term Controversy Over National Security Laws

Back in 2003, the implementation of Article 23 was thwarted by the moderate pro-establishment politician James Tien. In face of overwhelming public disapproval of the law, he withdrew support and votes from his Liberal Party. However, 17 years later, it is hard to imagine Beijing following the old legislative playbook: start with a public consultation, followed by public discourse and political debate, and end with the majority rule. This playbook only works in peaceful societies ruled by a trustworthy government with integrity.

The aftermath of 2003, as well as the 2019 protests, should have taught Beijing and the Hong Kong government a lesson: pushing through national security legislation in a flawed parliament controlled by the minority pro-government camp would inevitably set off another full city-scale protest — and undoubtedly more fierce and focused this time. Given the current government’s numerous displays of dishonesty, it is conceivable that they will embark on a less-traveled path to implement Article 23.

Strategy One: “Anti-Terrorism”

In principle, one possible strategy could be to directly enact Chinese national law across Hong Kong, which can be achieved by declaring a state of emergency in the city. However, this is risky business as it would tarnish the integrity of “one country two systems” and subsequently Hong Kong’s international standing. Beijing, a risk-averse regime, is also unwilling to see Hong Kong’s status as a middleman for laundering money disappear into thin air.

Instead, Beijing could be concocting a narrative that would see Chinese national law applied to Hong Kong while not damaging Hong Kong’s international standing and Beijing’s own interests. The key word in this script is “anti-terrorism.” As early as 2014, pro-Beijing scholars have been claiming the emergence of “local terrorist ideology” on Hong Kong soil. Since the anti-extradition bill protests last year, government rhetoric frequently described the protests, which caused no deaths at all in the entire year, with phrases like “inclination to terrorist ideology.” That was a signal to the world that Hong Kong’s internal conflicts had ballooned into a national security issue. This gives the government the legitimacy to justify the implementation of Chinese national laws across the highly autonomous region to counter terrorism. The Chinese government knows that if it can persuade the world that terrorism exists in Hong Kong, and that it is as severe as the terror threat facing many other nations today, the international community will be less critical of Beijing’s actions in Hong Kong. Enacting Chinese laws directly is a convenient path that will save Beijing from having to tackle Hong Kong’s internal conflicts, basically turning the Hong Kong issue into a nonissue.

Strategy Two: Stacking the Legislature by Disqualifying Candidates

An even bolder strategy was probably foretold by a recent incident where the Hong Kong government and Beijing’s agencies for Hong Kong affairs (HKMAO and the Liaison Office) jointly criticized lawmaker Dennis Kwok for filibustering, framing it as “misconduct in public office” and “violating his oath.” It is incomprehensible to claim that filibustering goes against a lawmaker’s main duty; rather, it is common understanding that legislative work includes debating the law and representing public opinion against unreasonable laws. In a parliament controlled by the minority, pro-democratic members representing the majority of Hong Kongers are forced to express their objections using means like filibustering. Wouldn’t a lack of different political opinions turn the legislative branch into a rubber-stamp institution?

The above allegation has set a dangerous precedent for twisting the logic behind a certain provision in the Basic Law to target opposing lawmakers. In other words, to fulfill Beijing’s interpretation of the principal requirement for holding public office in Hong Kong, one could be required to take a meticulously legalistic approach to uphold the Basic Law down to its every single wording. A public official, by this new definition, not only needs to support “one country, two systems” or object Hong Kong independence, but also must abide by every single provision in the Basic Law. Worst of all, based on the previous cases, whether an official’s words or actions oversteps a provision is up to Beijing’s interpretation of his/her “intent.”

If this approach is applied, in the next election, there might be additional official questions for screening candidates like the following: “The Basic Law states that the enactment of Article 23 is a constitutional duty. Failing to support Article 23 legislation violates the Basic Law. Do you support it?” This question would suffice to disqualify even moderate or even pro-establishment candidates like James Tien. Even if any pro-democratic candidates were elected, once Article 23 re-enters the legislative process, they could risk ouster by raising objections.

Despite the absurdity of this tactic, the Chinese regime may just be tempted enough if such a strategy could resolve two of China’s current nuisances — voices of dissent in the Legislative Council and the previous failure to implement Article 23.

Strategy Three: The “Boiling Frog Effect”

Article 23 is not yet implemented, but the dystopian world that the protesters pictured in 2003 is already becoming reality. Regular citizens have been persecuted for “sedition” for sharing their views on social media or participating in legal protests; workers face retaliation for taking part in strikes; corporations are pressured to publicly side with the government’s stance; employees who have the “wrong” political views are fired; schools have been closely monitored for teaching material; protest-supporting fundraisers were framed for money laundering; a retweet or like may lead to persecution, under a colonial-era law. Only now have Hong Kongers woken up to their new reality — although the Basic Law technically protects citizens’ rights to speak, rally, march, demonstrate, and go on strike, the government could enfeeble civil rights by bending antiquated laws and legal provisions. The frequent abuse of law enforcement power on a small scale, such as improper arrests and police violence, is desensitizing the public and the international community. In a few years, Hong Kong will become unrecognizable. This is indeed a clever play on Beijing’s part to slowly strip away Hong Kong’s autonomy and freedom, without causing much international attention.

Counter-Strategies Against Beijing’s Brinkmanship

Beijing’s overarching goal is to hollow out Hong Kong but, at the same time, avoid major backlash from the international community, which could spell the end of the privileged global status of Hong Kong not granted to other Chinese cities. Beijing also aims at preventing single incidents that could cascade down into mass protests as seen in 2003, 2014, and 2019; and eliminating any resistance forces from within Hong Kong’s legislature. The tactics outlined above are typical in a game of brinkmanship.

In response, Hong Kongers in Hong Kong and on the so-called “international frontline” must know their strengths and bargaining chips on this negotiating table with Beijing.

Unlike Xinjiang and Tibet, Hong Kong is a city with transparency and free flow of information. Hong Kongers need to make a case to the world that the protests are not acts of terrorism. Some suggestions include comparing the Hong Kong protests to similar struggles in 20 or so other counties in the world at the present time, none of which were classified as terrorism; collecting a large amount of concrete evidence of the disproportionate use of force by the Hong Kong police; and showing how enacting Chinese national laws in Hong Kong will end the city’s autonomy and spell disaster for international community‘s interests.

The Legislative Council is the institution that can counteract Beijing’s “boiling frog” strategy and to keep Hong Kongers’ hope alive in the system. Those who plan to run for legislative office must be prepared to be disqualified from running. If only individuals are banned, there need to be alternative candidates as back-up plans. However, if and when the disqualification process is applied broadly to entire camps of candidates (for example, all who object to Article 23), the pro-democracy camp must make a strong case to the Hong Kong and global public that this is the endgame for Hong Kong democracy. Then the incumbent popularly elected legislators will hold the internationally recognized mandate from the public and serve as the last resistance.

These recommendations delineates how the slogan “if we burn, you burn with us,” often seen in the protests, may play out in the game of international relations. If the national security laws are “passed” by a legislature that is jury-rigged in this manner, or if related national laws are directly implemented in Hong Kong, Hong Kongers should signal clearly to the world that it goes way beyond the promised “one country, two systems.” Crossing this red line by Beijing should be seen by the world as a blunt violation of its promised autonomy to Hong Kongers. At that time, if the international community led by the United States and the United Kingdom decided to revoke the “non-sovereignty entity” status of Hong Kong and regard the SAR as an ordinary Chinese city, it shouldn’t come as a surprise.

Dr. Simon Shen is the Founding Chairman of GLOs (Glocal Learning Offices), an international relations start-up company. He also serves as an adjunct associate professor in the University of Hong Kong, Chinese University of Hong Kong and the Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, and associate director of the Master of Global Political Economy Programme of the CUHK. The author acknowledges Jean Lin, Coco Ho, Chris Wong, Michelle King, and Alex Yap for their assistance in this piece.

▶️ 高度自治 vs 全面管治
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pwt8wZl8jHQ

2 Support ดีเด่น แห่ง 7.07c และ Dreamleague Season 8

Dreamleague Season 8 ได้ปิดฉากลงไปเมื่อวาน โดยทีม Secret โชว์ฟอร์มมหาเทพตบทีม Liquid แชมป์ TI ลงไป 3-0 ในรอบ Grand Final

วันนี้เราจึงเอาข้อมูล Support ดีเด่น 2 ตัวในรายการนี้มาเล่าให้ฟังกัน

1. Bane
เป็นฮีโร่ที่ถูกเลือกมากที่สุดในรายการคือ 12 ครั้ง อีกทั้งยังถูกแบนไปถึง
21 ครั้งเป็นอันดับที่ 2 รองจาก Omniknight

ทำไมฮีโร่ตัวนี้ถึงฮิตขนาดนี้?

ด้วย Meta ที่การยืนเลนสำคัญมาก เพราะฝั่งไหนที่ชนะเลน จะสามารถตัดเลเวลฝั่งตรงข้ามจากการ Deny ครีปและแย่ง Bounty รูนเค้าได้ด้วย Bane เป็นฮีโร่ที่ชำนาญเรื่องเลนสุดๆ จากสกิล Enfeeble ลดแดเมจตัวฟาร์มศัตรูให้เกลี้ยงไม่ต้องลาสครีปกันเลยทีเดียว ต่อให้เลน 2 เจอ 3 แต่ตัวฟาร์มไม่มีแดเมจก็ทำอะไรไม่ได้เลย

ในจังหวะสู้ต้นเกม มักจะมีฮีโร่ 2-3 ตัวในแต่ละฝ่าย ซึ่งการหลับด้วย Nightmare ไป 1 ตัวแล้วจับด้วยอัลติอีกหนึ่งตัวก็ทำให้ฝั่งตรงข้ามหมดทางสู้อย่างง่ายดาย

และสุดท้ายสามารถคอมโบกับฮีโร่ยอดฮิตอีกตัวอย่าง Razor กับการ "หลับแล้วดูด" โดนเข้าไปตื่นมาอีกทีแดเมจหมดตัวแล้วจ้าาาา

ด้วยเหตุผลทั้งหมดที่ว่ามานี้และอื่นๆอีก ทำให้ Bane มีอัตราการชนะสูงถึง 75% ใน Dreamleague Season 8

2. Rubick
อาจไม่ได้ถูกเลือกบ่อยเท่า Bane แต่การันตีความโหดด้วยอัตราการชนะถึง 70% กว่าๆ และพุ่งสูงถึง 100% เมื่อถูกเล่นโดย Secret ในรายการนี้ (3 ใน 3 เกม)

ความดีงามอย่างแรกของ Rubick คือเป็นซัพพอร์ตไม่กี่ตัวตอนนี้ ที่สามารถถูกเล่นได้ทั้ง 2 ตำแหน่ง คือ 4 หรือ 5 ก็ได้ สร้างความปวดหัวให้ฝั่งตรงข้ามตอนดราฟได้ เพราะ Rubick ทำได้หมดทั้งเดิน Gank หรือเลี้ยงเลนให้ Carry

ความยืดหยุ่นของ Rubick ยังไม่หมดแค่นั้น ยังสามารถเข้ากับแผนได้หลากหลายแบบ ไม่ว่าจะเป็นการสู้ ไฟท์แหลก หรือเน้นการ Rat แยกดันตีป้อม หรือเน้นเก็บฮีโร่ Rubick ทำได้หมด

Rubick can do it all.

และการขโมยสกิลของ Rubick ยังแก้ทางฮีโร่ที่ถูกเลือกบ่อยๆช่วงนี้หลายตัว เช่น Bane, Winter Wyvern, Tidehunter และ Omniknight
ร่ายได้ทุกสกิลในเกม Rubick can do it all จริงๆ

แล้วจะไม่ให้ทีม Secret แชมป์ได้ยังไง ในเมื่อมีมือฉมัง Rubick อย่าง Yapzor อยู่ในทีม ในเกมสุดท้ายที่ Secret คว้าแชมป์ ก็มาจากฮีโร่ 2 ตัวนี้ึคือ Bane Puppey และ Rubick Yapzor

และนี่ก็คือข้อมูลที่น่าสนใจจาก Dreamleague Season 8
ท่านไหนเป็น Main Support ก็ลองเอา 2 ตัวนี้ไปไต่ Rank ดูนะครับ

Lakoi DOTA2

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TIỀN TỐ, HẬỤ TỐ - Bài 4
1. eco-
- Liên quan tới "môi sinh, sinh thái"
- VD: ecology (sinh thái học), ecosystem (hệ sinh thái), ecosphere (sinh quyển), eco-disaster (thảm họa sinh thái)

2. -ectomy
- Với danh từ chỉ bộ phận cơ thể, thường trong các từ y học, nghĩa là "phẫu thuật cắt bỏ" bộ phận mà danh từ gốc đề cập
- VD: appendectomy (PTCB ruột thừa), splenectomy (PTCB lá lách), tonsillectomy (PTCB amiđan)

3. -ee
- Với động từ --> danh từ chỉ người nhận hành động đó.
- VD: interviewee (người được phỏng vấn), trainee (thực tập viên), employee (nhân viên), addressee (người nhận thư), appointee (nguời được bổ nhiệm), examinee (thí sinh)

4. en-
- Với danh từ hoặc tính từ --> "làm cho" có đặc tính mà danh hoặc tính từ đó mô tả
- VD: enrich (làm giàu thêm), enfeeble (làm cho yếu ớt), enjoy (thưởng thức), ensure (bảo đảm), entitle (đặt tựa)

-en
- Với tính từ --> động từ, nghĩa là "làm cho"
- VD: darken, blacken, sharpen, sadden, strengthen, moisten
- Ghi chú: 1 số từ có cả 2 gốc en- và -en
VD: enlighten (làm sáng tỏ), enliven (làm sôi nổi)

5. equi-
- "bằng, bằng nhau"
- VD: equidistant (có khoảng cách bằng nhau), equilateral (đều, trong Hình học)

6. -ery
- Chỉ "nơi chốn"
- VD: bakery (lò bánh mì, nursery (nhà trẻ), nunnery (nhà dòng nữ), winery (nhà máy rượu)

7. -ese
- Trong tính từ nói về cái chất điển hình, hay "phong cách" của danh từ mà nó kết hợp
- VD: Americanese (phong cách người Mỹ), journalese (văn viết báo, văn phong nhà báo), officialese (giọng điệu quan liêu)

8. -esque
- Với danh từ ---> tính từ chỉ ý "mang phong cách", hay "giống như phong cách" của danh từ gốc
- VD: Beethovenesque (giống nhạc của Beethoven), Tarzanesque, picturesque (đẹp như tranh)

9. -ess
- Với danh từ ---> danh từ giống cái
- VD: lioness (sư tử cái), tigress (cọp cái), hostess (nữ gia chủ), actress, waitress (nữ hầu bàn)

10. ex
- Với danh từ ---> chỉ ý "cựu, cũ"
- VD: ex-wife (vợ cũ), ex-chairman (cựu chủ tịch), ex-pupil (cựu học sinh)

11. extra-
- Cách dùng 1: với tính từ --> "rất"
- VD: extra-fine (rất mịn), extra-bright (rất sáng), extra-large (rất rộng), extra-long

- Cách dùng 2: "ngoài, ngoại"
- VD: extra-curricular (ngoại khóa), extra-European (ngoài Châu Âu), extra- terrestrial (ngoài trái đất), extra-marital (ngoài hôn nhân), extra-territorial (ngoài lãnh thổ)

12. -first

- Kết hợp với danh từ chỉ bộ phận cơ thể để tạo trạng từ (adverb) chỉ ý "theo hướng của bộ phận đó"

- VD: fall head-first (ngã chúi đầu). When gorillas descend, they do so feet-first, lowering themselves with their arms. (Khi khỉ tuột xuống, chúng tuột chân xuống trước rồi hạ thấp người bằng cánh tay.)

13. -fold
1. Với số đếm -> tính từ chỉ gấp bao nhiêu lần
- VD: twofold (gấp đôi), fourfold (gấp tư)
2. Với số đếm -> tính từ chỉ ý có bao nhiêu thành phần quan trọng.
- VD: The aims of the new organization are eight-fold. (Mục tiêu của tổ chức mới có 8 phần.)

14. fore-
- Nghĩa là "trước", "phía trước của"
- VD: forearm (cánh tay), foredeck (boong tàu phía trước), forefoot (chân trước), forepart (phần trước), forefathers (tổ tiên), foresee (thấy trước), forewarn (cảnh báo trước), foreword (lời nói đầu)

15. -free
- Với danh từ -> tính từ chỉ ý "không có trong thành phần"
- VD: cholesterol-free cooking oil (dầu ăn không chứa cholesterol), meat-free diet (chế độ ăn kiêng không thịt), risk-free investment (sự đầu tư không rủi ro), carefree (vô tư lự), debt-free (không mắc nợ)

- Ghi chú: -less cũng có nghĩa là "không có", nhưng khác với -free ở chỗ -less chỉ ý "đáng ra phải có mà không có". VD: careless (bất cẩn, đáng lẽ phải "care" nhưng không "care", carefree (không "care" gì hết, vô tư lự), a childless couple = 1 cặp vợ chồng không có con (muốn có con mà không có, a childfree couple = 1 cặp vợ chồng không (muốn) có con (không muốn bị con cái ràng buộc)

16. -ful
- Với danh từ chỉ vật chứa --> danh từ mới chỉ sự đo lường
- VD: a teaspoonful of salt (một muỗng muối), a boxful of chocolates (một hộp đầy sôcôla), mouthful (đầy 1 miệng), handful (đầy 1 nắm tay)

17. full-
- "toàn, trọn, hết mức"
- VD: full-color (toàn là màu, đầy màu), full-size (cỡ lớn), full-year (trọn năm)

แก้ไขในวีดีโอ : สกิลแรกของ Bane (ที่ชื่อ Enfeeble) ไม่ได้ทำให้ศัตรูโดนโจมตีหนักขึ้น แต่มีผลลดพลังการโจมตีทางกายภาพของศัตรูลงนาน 20 วินาที (แหม ชุดนอนนี่ก็มั่วไปเรื่อย...)

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