【After Winning Majority in LegCo: Beijing's Crackdown May Trigger International Intervention】

***感謝Hong Kong Columns - Translated，將我早前撰寫『議會過半想像：以「#國際攬炒」反制「臨立會2.0」』長文（https://www.facebook.com/joshuawongchifung/photos/a.313299448762570/2887650867994069/）翻譯成英文，鼓勵國際社會關注立會選舉一旦過半的沙盤推演，在最惡劣形勢下的制衡策略。***

中文精簡版本：https://www.facebook.com/joshuawongchifung/photos/a.564294826996363/2888641404561682/

Hongkongers have experienced our revolution for over half a year. They no longer take a consequentialist view to the effectiveness of their movement as they did years ago, or waste time second-guessing the intentions and background of fellow activists. Following the defensive battles at CUHK and PolyU, November’s District Council election saw a great victory of unity. More marvellous is the union between peaceful and “valiant” protesters.

In the process of resisting tyranny, the people have realised that one cannot prioritize one strategy over another. This is also how the common goal of “35+” came into being—the hope that we will win over half of the seats in the Legislative Council (LegCo) this September, such that the political spectrum that represents the majority of Hongkongers is able to gain control of legislative decisions. The political clout of Hongkongers will increase if 35 or more seats are successfully secured on our side. It is certainly one vital step to achieve the five demands within the system.

The possibility of realizing legislative majority

Technically it is not unrealistic to win a majority even under the current undemocratic system. Back in the 2016 LegCo election, we already won 30 seats. In addition to the District Council (First) functional constituency seat that is already in the pocket of the pan-democrats, as long as the candidates in Kowloon East and New Territories West do not start infighting again, we could safely secure 33 seats based on the number of pan-dem votes in 2016.

The other 3 seats required to achieve a majority depend on democrats’ breakthrough among the functional constituencies by dispersing the resources of the Liaison Office. They also count on whether the turnout this September could exceed 71.2% — that of last year’s District Council elections. Some of the factors that could affect the turnout include: will the epidemic persist into the summer? Will there be potential violent repression of protests in the 2 weeks preceding the election? Will Hong Kong-US relations be affected by the downturn of the global economy?

Therefore, the ambition of “35+” is to be prioritised by the resistance as both a means and an end. I have already expressed my support for an intra-party primary at the coordination meeting. In the meantime, it is pleasing to see the ongoing debates reaching a consensus of maximising the seats among geographical constituencies in the upcoming election.

Whilst enthusiastic coordination, we should also assess the post-election landscape and gauge Beijing’s reactions: if we do not reach 35 seats, Hong Kong will be subject to tighter control and more severe repression by China; but if the democratic parties successfully form a majority in LegCo, CCP’s fears of a “constitutional crisis” would become imminent. Hence, the key questions are how the Pan-Democrats should deal with the volatile political situation in Hong Kong and how they are going to meet Beijing’s charge head-on.

Watching out for Beijing’s dismissal of LegCo after reaching majority

To take back control of LegCo such that it faithfully reflects the majority’s principles and needs is the definition of a healthy democracy. Recently, however, DAB’s Tam Yiu-chung has warned that the plan of the Pan-Dems to “usurp power” in the LegCo would only lead to Beijing’s forceful disqualification of certain members or the interpretation of the Basic Law. This proves that winning a majority in LegCo is not only a popular conception but also a realistic challenge that would get on the nerves of Beijing. Could Beijing accept a President James To in LegCo? These unknown variables must be addressed upon achieving a majority.

While there is no telltale sign as to Beijing’s exact strategy, we are already familiar with the way CCP manipulated the Basic Law in the past 4 years. Having experienced three waves of disqualifications in LegCo, twice kicked out of LegCo with my team, and thrice locked up in jail, I have no false hopes of an easy compromise from Beijing: they would not let Pan-Dems control LegCo for half a year and wait (as is the proper procedure) until after having negatived the Budget to dissolve the legislature, and thereby giving them an easy victory in the re-elections. The greater the Pan-Dems threaten Beijing’s rule in Hong Kong, the more likely that it will trigger Beijing’s repression.

Since the disqualification and arrest of lawmakers have already become “normalised”, one can even imagine the police stepping into the LegCo building to force Pan-Dems into voting. Neither is it beyond our imagination to expect the CCP to kick out all 70 lawmakers in a fit of rage and replace them with a provisional LegCo “2.0” [HKCT note: The first was from 25 Jan 1997 to 30 Jun 1998]. To depend on a majority that could lead to a chapter of a “new testament” for One Country, Two Systems is perhaps what many elites long for, but they are overly optimistic:for a ticket to the promised land will not be available at the Chief Executive election campaign a year and a half later.

Admittedly, the Pan-Dems cannot unilaterally initiate “Laam-chaau” [HKCT note: mostly translated into “scorched-earth” mentality or “mutual destruction”; some even translated into “If I burn, you burn with us”]. The most they can do is to force a standstill of the government, and not for long the LegCo will have been eliminated from the equation to make the wheels turn again. It all leaves the plan of “Negativing the motion → Dissolving LegCo → Re-election after re-election → the stepping down of Carrie Lam” merely as overly positive speculation, probably resulting from their overestimate of CCP's capacity for rational calculation. The Pan-Dems must guard their frontlines and recognise what the biggest threat from Hong Kong to China could be. In this case, should LegCo sessions be disrupted or suspended, the Pan-Dems would have to be well prepared to surmount the expected obstacles and prevent the disqualification crisis 4 years ago—a Catch-22 indeed.

Productive tension from global intervention: Using Laam-chaau against the CCP

What aggravates the CCP the most is the potential threat to Hong Kong’s unique status as the one and only “separate customs territory”. Any miscalculation will compromise its role as the Chinese economy’s “white gloves”. Imagine if CCP were to disqualify all 70 elected lawmakers and convene a meeting north of the Shenzhen River to pass a resolution to Hong Kong’s affairs (much like the Provisional Legislative Council “1.0" in 1997), how great will the shock be in a world with an effective Hong Kong Human Rights and Democracy Act? However hard it is to predict the future one thing is certain: With the US presidential election just around the corner, blows to the separation of powers would not be tolerated, and the West would necessarily effect countermeasures against the Hong Kong government.

Beijing has been relying upon Hong Kong to navigate the international community for decades. While clamping down on the political freedom of the cosmopolitan city, Beijing desires to maintain the financial centre’s economic freedom. Hence, we started lobbying for the Hong Kong Human Rights and Democracy Act four years ago, and today we are determined to promote “Laam-chaau” on an international scale.

The will of the voters must be reflected in an election. If a “35+” legislature were to be dismissed and replaced, such flagrant violation of democracy would assuredly cause a greater backlash than the infamous extradition bill. Knowing what the reality ahead of us could be, we have to combine our election and international strategies to oppose the placement of a 35+ LegCo with an “Emergency Legislative Council 2.0”, to advance an international “Laam-chaau” to Hong Kong’s status as “separate customs territory”. Only then will we stand a chance to resist the regime and to realise the five demands.

Adjusting our mindset: Overcoming the “constitutional crisis” to reach a resolution

Upon the realization of the “35+” LegCo, it is expected that the CCP will launch a devastating counterattack. The Pan-Dems should not expect LegCo to run normally; neither can the lawmakers realise their governing blueprints they have for Hong Kong. Rather, candidates will be able to compete against one another with visions of a liberated Hong Kong through popular vote. Bringing this point up has nothing to do with undermining the common goal of reaching a majority in LegCo, but rather channels the battle of LegCo to positive use upon the rule of law’s death and a “constitutional crisis” ahead. Knowing that Hongkongers have nothing to fall back on, all Pan-Dems should not miss the only way to the realization of “35+”.

Thus, be they partisans, nonpartisans, incumbent politicians, amateur politicians, or the civil society as a whole – if we stay in the political discourse of 2016 and continue to perpetuate old stereotypes, that is to deal with the divisions on the pan-democratic camp by favouring the most “local” faction; to consider only resource allocation and self-aggrandizement as the purpose of a LegCo campaign; to ignore how potential lawmakers are fitted to what specific roles; to turn a blind eye to the journey of resistance since last summer (extending indefinitely into the future)—They would lead as astray and cost us lose a precious opportunity for change by winning a 35+ majority.

The extent to which the pan-democrats can stay united in light of the political atmosphere since last summer is another problem that our side must to address. Before the watershed moment of 12th June 2019, many democratic delegates were trapped in the mentality of needing to “preserve people’s livelihood”, “be content of what we have accomplished”, and other strategies that favours stability. As the government refuses to heed to the five demands, whether the democrats, especially those in the functional constituencies, have the political will to go all-in is the real difficult question that confronts us in the upcoming LegCo election.

All in all, if “35+” cannot be realised, it is unsurprising to see LegCo being more heavily suppressed in the next 4 years; even if "35+" is achieved, it is questionable whether the pan-democrats are able to weather multiple attacks, verbal or physical, from the regime (judging from its power in the last four years) and utilise the international Laam-chaau strategy against the displacement of LegCo. Adhering to the motto of “we fight on, each in his own way”, I can only hope that Hongkongers in elections, street confrontations and international front can reconcile with each other, so that we may collectively compel the government to yield to our demands in the next six months. It is only by reaching a resolution before a real constitutional crisis that we can combat the institutional violence of the regime and not be devoured by it.

https://hkcolumn.blogspot.com/2020/04/joshua-wong-after-winning-majority-in.html?fbclid=IwAR216gf53pG_j9JOpDfr2GItvjLfrFSekKTPzoEs3-s9KBqvPEwz865P8vw

【語言偽術練成法】

語文除了用來傳情達意，有時也用來矇混敷衍、塗脂抹粉。此道官員政客、公關人員最擅長。舉個例，公司要裁員減開支，直截了當的說法是：To cut costs, we will sack some of you.（為減開支，我們要炒些人。）但通告上一定不會這樣寫，而可能是：

In response to the current global economic downturn, we are planning to better manage our costs by introducing a series of business restructuring initiatives which will result in an increase in non-voluntary turnovers.（為應對目前環球經濟衰退，我們正籌備一系列商務重組計劃以更有效地控制成本，其間非自願人員更替的數量會因而上升。）

因為語言在此的功用不在達意，而在粉飾。這些粉飾壞事、醜事、尷尬事的句子，其實不難寫。只須掌握以下五招，再加一張厚臉皮就行。

第一招：Use the passive and omit the agent. 轉主動為被動，不要加「by」

主動句的主語通常是做事的所謂agent，假如改寫成被動句即可把他從句子剔走。所以不說 Tom stole the apple 而說 The item was stolen（物件被盜）。當然不要加 by Tom。

第二招：Prefer the abstract to the concrete. 棄精確，取模糊。

所有精確的字，都要用含混語言代替：棄 kill，steal，rape，sack，dump，而取 occur，engage，conduct，render，undergo。所以，不是 We are going to sack some people（我們將要炒人），而是 Our company is undergoing a restructuring process（本公司正進行業務重組的過程。）

第三招：Prefer nouns to verbs. 棄動詞，取名詞

這與第二招互相補足。總之生動鮮明的動詞，都改成名詞，再配上 abstract verb。所以，不說 Tom raped Mary（Tom強姦Mary了）而說 Tom and Mary engaged in non-consensual sexual activities（Tom跟Mary發生非自願的性行為）。

第四招：Prefer the long to the short. 字越長越好，句子亦然

因為讀起來較廢勁，表達亦較間接。所以 steal 不夠 misappropriate 好，misappropriate 又不夠 temporarily remove from the lawful owner（從合法物主處暫時拿走）好，所以：Tom temporarily removed the apple from its lawful owner。假如配合第一招一起用，就變成：The item was temporarily removed from its lawful owner（物件被人暫時從合法物主處拿取）。從 Tom 的角度看，這樣寫肯定比赤裸裸的「Tom stole the apple」（Tom偷了個蘋果）順眼。以上四招的目標相同，都務求令讀者花最大力氣才能把文字和文字代表的事物連繫起來。最後，畫龍還要點睛：

第五招：Sprinkle with favourable modifiers. 有利己方的修飾詞，不妨多加

別說 We tortured the suspects（我們虐待疑犯），要說 We subjected the suspects to some harmless but effective interrogation methods（我們在疑犯身上進行了一些無害但有效的審問措施）。別說 We burn coal to get electricity（我們燒煤取電），卻說 We have devised a fuel strategy that enables us to produce electricity in a sustainable and environmentally-responsible manner（我們的燃料政策，讓我們能以可持續和有利環境的方式發電）。

實際應用

說了這麼多，看例子吧。兩軍打仗，傷及無辜在所難免，但政府通常怎樣向公眾交代無辜平民傷亡增加的消息？最符合現實、最容易理解的寫法是：

We are killing more and more innocent civilians in the war.（我們殺的無辜平民越來越多。）

怎樣令它變得「得體」？首先改成被動句，就不必寫「我們」：

More and more innocent civilians are killed in the war.（越來越多無辜平民被殺。）
再用名詞配上模糊的動詞。現在「kill」不見了，變成委婉詞「collateral damage」（這個詞，根據新出的牛津英漢漢英詞典 Oxford Chinese Dictionary，中文譯為「附帶性破壞」，跟英文的有異曲同工之妙）。「More and more」太直接了，改成「There is an increase in」；「war」也因為太敏感而改成「operation」：

There is an increase in the occurrence of collateral damage during the course of our operation.（我方執行任務其間，附帶性破壞的發生次數上升了。）

血腥味頓時消減不少。最後，「There is an increase」語氣太肯定了，改成「There have been reports of the possibility of an increase」（有報告顯示有可能增加）。而「our operation」可進一步修飾成「our peacekeeping operation」（維持和平任務）：

There have been reports of the possibility of an increase in the occurrence of collateral damage during the course of our peacekeeping operation.（有報告顯示，我方執行維持和平任務其間附帶性破壞的發生次數可能上升了。）

這樣就把血淋淋的慘劇化妝成冰冷的陳述，大功告成。

蕭叔叔