小編快報
《柏林脈動》（The Berlin Pulse) 今天出刊了。這是德國一年一度的外交及國際關係專刊。作者群包括學者、智庫專家、政府官員。

這一期談歐洲問題的作者有波蘭外長、Moldova 總理、德國國防部長等等等。

今年《脈動》特別做了中國專題，作者有五位，分別是：
中國的全國人大外事委員會副主任委員傅瑩、日本眾議會議員Minora Kiuchi、巴黎的中國問題專家Francois Godement、曾任澳洲駐華大使，現任外交及貿易秘書長的Frances Adamson，以及台灣的龍應台。

德國編輯在文末放了一個德國的民意調查圖表，提問是：「面對中國，你認為德國應該更強力保護自己的政治利益，即使犧牲經濟利益？」
答案：贊成 76%
反對 19%

小編把龍應台文章翻譯成中文，跟讀者分享。英文原文附在後面。如果嫌我翻譯得不好，那那那，那表示你英文很好，你就看英文吧......
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兩千三百萬人在獨木舟上
——為什麼歐洲應該關切台灣的未來

反對黨公布2020總統候選人名單的那一天，我在台北和知識圈的朋友們午餐。那悲觀的，用問句來表達自己的悲觀，譬如，「你覺得台灣還有多少年?」那樂觀的，用黑色幽默來表達樂觀，譬如，「感謝老天。香港讓他們太忙了，沒時間管台灣。」

跟德國一樣，台灣對中國大陸和香港的貿易順差，在2018年是831億美元。百分之四十一的對外貿易針對中國，中國大陸市場對台灣的重要不言而喻。然而，隨著近年來台灣海峽兩岸的關係緊張，反對黨(國民黨) 憂慮市場的優勢無法持續，而執政黨(民進黨) 則選擇強化選民對北京的不信任來抵制中國的影響力。執政黨最近提出的國安新法可能將任何被認定為為中國宣傳者入罪。

和歐洲一樣，台灣人對中國的感受也是複雜的。 當中國代表的是活躍的經濟機會時，很多台灣人就容易所謂「親中」，當中國代表的是壓迫和可能的入侵時，很多台灣人就是所謂的「反中」。問題是，中國兩者兼備。後果就是，台灣內部的分歧遠遠超過了僅只是政治和經濟的層面。

如果你知道台灣是如何一路走來的，你會覺得它今天變成一個民主社會真是一個不得了的成就。沒有革命，一黨獨裁四十年的國民黨，不管你說它是自願還是被迫，放下了政權，分享權力。沒有流血，昔日牢裡的政治犯變成今日的立法者和政治領袖。1987年解嚴以後，政權的交替基本上公平而有序地進行了三十年。

台灣安靜地進行了三十年的民主，時間幾乎和它的國際孤立一樣長。美國不承認台灣的國家地位，但是，就如同當年對於德國，美國也扮演了安全守護者的角色。令人不安的是，在美國宣布要把軍售台灣常態化的同時，中國也宣布，它在台灣海峽及其領空，要把軍艦和戰機的演習常態化。

所以台灣民主的威脅其實是雙重的。比較明顯的是中國的威脅，這個威脅，往往超出台灣本身的控制能力。一個不那麼明顯的威脅，卻是內部自製的。台灣的政治人物和政黨熱切拿這個威脅做為政治資本，刺激集體恐懼來強化部落式的愛國主義。這種操作的成功，對台灣的民主制度和機構本身，是個真實的危險。

國際上那些純粹為了攻擊中國而故意把台灣捧在手心讚美的人，其實讓我坐立不安。一代又一代的台灣人為民主付出了代價，很大的代價，而得到今天的成果。這個成果，太珍貴了，不可以變成別人或別國為了自己的利益而拿來玩弄的籌碼或棋子。

德國的歷史是特殊的。德國的人民親身目睹了，如果不戒慎恐懼地去維護，一個開放合理的社會制度是如何容易地瓦解，一夜之間可以被獨裁取代。經歷了二戰，又擺脫了共產黨的歷史爭取到自由，德國可能比很多其他國家更容易理解台灣人的困境和追求。道德勇氣的來源往往是歷史的痛苦。身為歐盟的重要成員，德國有責任為世界的和平做出最大的努力，發揮最大的影響力。

但是，歐洲憑什麼一定要關心台灣呢?

首先，如果沒有台灣模式，全世界大概就都得接受一種說法，就是，儒家文化和民主制度是無法相容的，而所謂「中國模式」就是唯一邏輯、不可避免的現代中國。台灣的存在證明了一件事：未必如此。

第二，台灣本身的努力值得世界的尊敬。沒錯，如果中國是一艘航空母艦，那麼台灣只不過是一葉孤零零的獨木舟。可是在這個獨木舟上有兩千三百萬人正在追求一種有自由、有尊嚴的生活方式。如果台灣是歐盟的一個成員，就人口論，台灣就是二十八個成員國(英國脫歐後二十七國)中第七大國，比波蘭稍小，但比荷蘭和比利時大。以經濟購買力來看，台灣更是名列全球第二十二。所以，歐洲可以想像剝奪波蘭人或者荷蘭人對生活方式和政治體制的選擇權利嗎?

23 Million People on a Canoe
—Why Europe should care about Taiwan’s future

Lung Yingtai

On the day when the opposition party announced its presidential candidate for the 2020 election, I was sitting at a lunch table in Taipei listening to my intellectual friends uttering their concerns about the future of Taiwan. The pessimists phrased their pessimism in the form of questions such as “How many years do you think Taiwan has left?” The optimists expressed their optimism with dark humour, “Thank God they will be too busy with Hong Kong and the US for a while.”

Like Germany, Taiwan operates a trade surplus with mainland China and Hong Kong, amounting to $83.1 billion in 2018. With 41% of Taiwan’s exports going to China, Taipei’s economy depends on trade with the mainland. However, given the increasing tension across the Taiwan Strait, the opposition Kuomintang (KMT) in particular has been worrying whether Taiwan will be able to sustain these figures. The ruling Democratic Progressive Party, on the other hand, is capitalizing on voters’ intense distrust of Beijing, stepping up measures to “contain” China’s influence. Taipei recently drafted a national security law that would make it a punishable offense to spread “political propaganda” for China.

As in Europe, Taiwanese feel highly ambivalent about mainland China: When China signifies economic opportunities, most Taiwanese are 23 Million People on a Canoe Why Europe should care about Taiwan’s future “pro-China”; when China represents oppression and potential invasion, most Taiwanese are “anti-China”. The problem is that China resembles both. The result is a deep division among Taiwanese extending far beyond the political and economic spheres.

Given the circumstances under which Taiwan emerged and evolved, its evolution into an authentic democracy represents an extraordinary achievement. It was without a revolution that the KMT, which had ruled Taiwan for more than 40 years, put an end to martial law and, whether convinced or compelled to act, opened the country’s political system to sharing power. Without bloodshed, dissidents who had once sat in jails became legislators and political leaders. Since the lifting of martial law 1987, power has changed hands fairly and orderly, following the results of each election.

Taiwan has been a quiet democracy for more than thirty years, nearly as long as the four decades during which it has been isolated by the international community. The US does not formally recognize Taiwan but, as with Germany, acts as the country’s security guarantor. While Washington has indicated that arms sales to Taiwan will become more of a routine, China has devised a routine of its own by holding long-range combat drills and ordering its fighter jets to cross the maritime line.

However, the threat to Taiwanese democracy is twofold. The obvious one comes from China, and to a large extent lies beyond Taipei’s control. The less obvious threat is home-made, as the looming China threat tempts domestic politicians to mobilize the population’s collective fear to foment a tribal nationalism. Their success would pose a real danger to Taiwan’s democratic institutions.

Those who applaud Taiwanese democracy for the sole purpose of criticizing China make me nervous. Generations of Taiwanese fought and ultimately achieved a democracy – it is simply too precious for other people’s agendas, internal or external.

Germany has a unique history: its people have experienced first-hand how easily democratic institutions may fall apart when not meticulously guarded. Having received democracy as a gift following World War II and struggled to regain their freedom from Communist rule, Germans are in a unique position to understand both the predicament as well as the aspirations of the Taiwanese. Moral courage often comes from past sufferings. As a leading EU member state, Germany has a responsibility to maximize its own efforts as well as to influence others’ efforts for world peace.

But why should the world care about the future of Taiwan? First of all, save the Taiwan model, the world might have to accept the claim that democracy and Confucianism are incompatible, and that a communist China presents the only logical and inevitable path to modernity. Secondly, Taiwan deserves respect on its own merits. True, if China were an aircraft carrier, Taiwan would be a lone canoe. But standing on this canoe are 23 million people aspiring for a life with liberty and dignity. If it were an EU member, Taiwan would be the 7th largest of the Union’s 28 member-states (27 after Brexit), smaller than Poland but larger than the Netherlands or Belgium, with a developed economy ranking 22nd in the world by purchasing power parity. Do we really want to return to a world in which it is imaginable that countries such as Poland or the Netherlands should be deprived of their autonomy to determine their own way of life and political system?

The Berlin Pulse 2019
龍應台專文：https://www.koerber-stiftung.de/fileadmin/user_upload/koerber-stiftung/redaktion/the-berlin-pulse/pdf/2019/3_Koerber_TheBerlinPulse_YingTai.pdf
全本：https://www.koerber-stiftung.de/fileadmin/user_upload/koerber-stiftung/redaktion/the-berlin-pulse/pdf/2019/TheBerlinPulse_2019_FINAL.pdf

【前港督彭定康錄影發言　促香港政府撤回修訂逃犯條例】

「我希望即使在這個最後階段，政府仍然可以退讓，撤回方案，不要再添亂。這修例不需要通過，亦不應該通過，香港應該繼續是一個有法治、有自由的社會，而不應該面對這些令人憂心的引渡修例。」

發言英文紀錄及中文翻譯：

Former Hong Kong Governor Lord Chris Patten video message Transcript

I know that this week in Hong Kong, thousands of people will be making their views clear, demonstrating against the proposals on extradition, which the government has put forward, extradition to China. It’s a proposal, or a set of proposals, which strike a terrible blow - I think - and so, I think to most people in Hong Kong and so does the international community, against the rule of law, against Hong Kong’s stability and security, against Hong Kong’s position as a great international trading hub. And the surprise is that the government in Hong Kong doesn’t seem to understand that. It does make you wonder sometimes who actually runs Hong Kong these days: is it the Hong Kong government or is it the joint liaison office acting on behalf of the communist regime in Beijing?

Why is this important? Well it’s the latest in a number of things that have happened in recent years which have tightened Beijing’s grip on Hong Kong, and which have profoundly worried people. I think for ten or a dozen years after 1997, things in Hong Kong went pretty well. Of course they could have gone better, I’m sorry that Beijing throttled the development of democracy, much against the promises that have been made earlier. But by and large, I think, Hong Kong remained a very free and successful society.

But ever since the regime in Beijing started to roll back Deng Xiaoping’s reforms and the developments that have taken place under Jiang Zemin and Zhu Rongji and Hu Jintao, and Wen Jiabao; ever since then, with the Party taking control over everything, cracking down on dissidents, cracking down on human rights, locking people up, incarcerating them in Xinjiang and so on. Ever since then, we know that Beijing has also been tightening its grip, or trying to, in Hong Kong. And I think that the latest proposals on extradition are an example of that.

Now a lot of very spurious arguments are put forward, it said that the present situation is a “loophole” which needs to be filled up - that’s absolute nonsense. People have known exactly why there shouldn’t be an extradition agreement with China for years, and many of the arguments put for the government’s proposals don’t actually pass the laugh-off-your-seat test. The argument that, well, it’s better to have an extradition treaty than to abduct people illegally from Hong Kong - are people really supposed to believe that?

Except for, but of course, Western democracies in Europe have extradition agreements with China, but they’re in a very different position to the position that Hong Kong is in. The reason why international chambers of commerce, why lawyers, why business around the world, why governments have raised their objections is very simple: because what these proposals do is to remove the firewall between Hong Kong’s rule of law and the idea of law - which prevails in Communist China - an idea of law where there aren’t any independent courts, where the courts and the security services and the party’s rules - which are, sometimes, pretty obscure - are rolled altogether. That’s why we’ve seen recently Canadian citizens that are locked up are taken as if it were hostage against things happening in Canada itself under the rule of law there. So it’s not surprising that people are so worried about what is happening.

I know that when people talk about the particular problem in relation to Taiwan, the leaders of the Hong Kong Bar Association over the last few years, I think a dozen of them, have put forward proposals which show how you could deal with that issue building on the existing common law.

So these proposals are bad for Hong Kong, they - I think - raise all sorts of questions which the government hasn’t even thought through, not least about Hong Kong’s economic importance and economic stability. We know very well that Hong Kong needs to be treated separately in economic and commercial matters from the rest of China. When I was governor a long time ago, I used to travel to Washington fairly regularly to argue the case for treating Hong Kong differently from, say, Shenzhen and Shanghai. But if you appear to be regarding Hong Kong from Beijing as though it was just another China city, then sooner or later, economic governments around the world, businesses around the world, when they’re looking even at things like the Belt and Road Initiative, they’re going to regard Hong Kong as just another part of China, and that would be really bad for the standard of living, for the quality of life in Hong Kong!

Above all, of course, if we go ahead, if the government goes ahead with this extradition agreement, it will cause unnecessary worries and anxieties in Hong Kong. That’s a really bad thing. I hope that even at this late stage, the government will back off and leave well alone. It doesn’t have to happen, it shouldn’t happen, and Hong Kong should carry on as a free society, under the rule of law, without having to worry about this extradition.

前港督彭定康錄影講話翻譯

我知道這星期在香港，成千上萬的人將會到街上遊行表達自己的意見，反對政府所提出將會容許引渡到中國的引渡修例建議。這是一項，或者應該說是一系列我及國際社會認為將會對香港的法治、香港的穩定和社會安全造成很大打擊的建議，它將會嚴重傷害香港作為一個國際貿易中心的地位。令人驚訝的是，香港政府似乎並不理解這一點。這確實令人懷疑這些日子究竟是誰在管治香港：是香港政府還是代表北京共產黨政權的中聯辦？

為甚麼這修例是這麼重要？這是近年來發生的一系列容許北京強行控制香港的事件之一，而這一直以來都讓人深感憂慮。我覺得在1997年之後的十年至十幾年，香港的情況進展尚算順利。當然，是本來可以更好，我很遺憾北京扼殺了香港民主的發展，違背了之前所作出的承諾。但總的來說，香港在那個時候仍然是一個非常自由和成功的社會。

但是，自北京政權開始推翻鄧小平的改革以及在江澤民、朱熔基、胡錦濤和溫家寶時期所推行的發展以後，共產黨控制着一切，打擊持不同政見的人，打擊人權，在新疆把人民關押等等。從那時起，我們就知道北京一直在試圖加緊控制香港。我認為最新的引渡建議就是一個例子。

現在香港政府提出了許多非常虛假的論點，它說目前的情況是展現了一個需要填補的「洞」，這絕對是胡說八道。大家多年來都確切地清楚知道不應該與中國達成引渡協議的原因。而政府提出的許多論點實際上也沒有一個不令你拍案大笑。政府認為制定引渡條約比從香港非法綁架人民更好，你認真覺得人們應該相信這個說法嗎？

當然他們又會說歐洲的西方民主國家與中國已經簽訂了引渡協議，但它們與香港根本處於完全不同的地位。國際商會、律師、商人及各國政府之所以提出反對意見的原因非常簡單：因為這些修例將會摧毀香港法治與中國共產黨的法治概念之間的防火牆。中國的法律觀念不包括任何獨立的法院，並把法院、國安部門以及黨的規則 （黨規則亦有時相當模糊）完全混在一起。這就是為甚麼我們最近看到被關起來的加拿大公民被用為人質，反對加拿大本身在她自己國家的法治下所發生的事情。因此，人們如此擔心這修例所帶來的影響並不奇怪。

我知道當人們都正在談到與台灣有關的問題之際，過去幾年的香港大律師公會領導人，應該是有十幾位，都已經提出意見，說明你如何就着香港現行的普通法來處理這個問題。

這些修例對香港不利，我認為這些修例所引發的疑問是甚至政府都沒有仔細考慮過的，尤其是對香港經濟重要性和經濟穩定性的影響。我們非常清楚在經濟和商業方面是需要把香港與中國其他地區分開對待。很久以前，當我還是港督的時候，我經常前往華盛頓游說對方看待香港的時候要跟對待深圳和上海之類的中國城市有所不同。但是如果以北京的角度看香港，將香港當為另一個普通中國城市，那麼世界各地的政府及企業將會視香港為中國的一部分（而不是特區），就算是看待「一帶一路」之類倡議時亦會是如此。這對香港的生活水平和生活質素都是非常不利的！

當然，最重要的是如果香港政府繼續硬推這些引渡修例，這將會在香港引起不必要的憂慮和焦慮。這些都是非常糟糕的事情。我希望即使在這個最後階段，政府仍然可以退讓，撤回方案，不要再添亂。這修例不需要通過，亦不應該通過，香港應該繼續是一個有法治、有自由的社會，而不應該面對這些令人憂心的引渡修例。

【前港督彭定康錄影發言　促香港政府撤回修訂逃犯條例】

「我希望即使在這個最後階段，政府仍然可以退讓，撤回方案，不要再添亂。這修例不需要通過，亦不應該通過，香港應該繼續是一個有法治、有自由的社會，而不應該面對這些令人憂心的引渡修例。」

發言英文紀錄及中文翻譯：

Former Hong Kong Governor Lord Chris Patten video message Transcript

I know that this week in Hong Kong, thousands of people will be making their views clear, demonstrating against the proposals on extradition, which the government has put forward, extradition to China. It’s a proposal, or a set of proposals, which strike a terrible blow - I think - and so, I think to most people in Hong Kong and so does the international community, against the rule of law, against Hong Kong’s stability and security, against Hong Kong’s position as a great international trading hub. And the surprise is that the government in Hong Kong doesn’t seem to understand that. It does make you wonder sometimes who actually runs Hong Kong these days: is it the Hong Kong government or is it the joint liaison office acting on behalf of the communist regime in Beijing?

Why is this important? Well it’s the latest in a number of things that have happened in recent years which have tightened Beijing’s grip on Hong Kong, and which have profoundly worried people. I think for ten or a dozen years after 1997, things in Hong Kong went pretty well. Of course they could have gone better, I’m sorry that Beijing throttled the development of democracy, much against the promises that have been made earlier. But by and large, I think, Hong Kong remained a very free and successful society.

But ever since the regime in Beijing started to roll back Deng Xiaoping’s reforms and the developments that have taken place under Jiang Zemin and Zhu Rongji and Hu Jintao, and Wen Jiabao; ever since then, with the Party taking control over everything, cracking down on dissidents, cracking down on human rights, locking people up, incarcerating them in Xinjiang and so on. Ever since then, we know that Beijing has also been tightening its grip, or trying to, in Hong Kong. And I think that the latest proposals on extradition are an example of that.

Now a lot of very spurious arguments are put forward, it said that the present situation is a “loophole” which needs to be filled up - that’s absolute nonsense. People have known exactly why there shouldn’t be an extradition agreement with China for years, and many of the arguments put for the government’s proposals don’t actually pass the laugh-off-your-seat test. The argument that, well, it’s better to have an extradition treaty than to abduct people illegally from Hong Kong - are people really supposed to believe that?

Except for, but of course, Western democracies in Europe have extradition agreements with China, but they’re in a very different position to the position that Hong Kong is in. The reason why international chambers of commerce, why lawyers, why business around the world, why governments have raised their objections is very simple: because what these proposals do is to remove the firewall between Hong Kong’s rule of law and the idea of law - which prevails in Communist China - an idea of law where there aren’t any independent courts, where the courts and the security services and the party’s rules - which are, sometimes, pretty obscure - are rolled altogether. That’s why we’ve seen recently Canadian citizens that are locked up are taken as if it were hostage against things happening in Canada itself under the rule of law there. So it’s not surprising that people are so worried about what is happening.

I know that when people talk about the particular problem in relation to Taiwan, the leaders of the Hong Kong Bar Association over the last few years, I think a dozen of them, have put forward proposals which show how you could deal with that issue building on the existing common law.

So these proposals are bad for Hong Kong, they - I think - raise all sorts of questions which the government hasn’t even thought through, not least about Hong Kong’s economic importance and economic stability. We know very well that Hong Kong needs to be treated separately in economic and commercial matters from the rest of China. When I was governor a long time ago, I used to travel to Washington fairly regularly to argue the case for treating Hong Kong differently from, say, Shenzhen and Shanghai. But if you appear to be regarding Hong Kong from Beijing as though it was just another China city, then sooner or later, economic governments around the world, businesses around the world, when they’re looking even at things like the Belt and Road Initiative, they’re going to regard Hong Kong as just another part of China, and that would be really bad for the standard of living, for the quality of life in Hong Kong!

Above all, of course, if we go ahead, if the government goes ahead with this extradition agreement, it will cause unnecessary worries and anxieties in Hong Kong. That’s a really bad thing. I hope that even at this late stage, the government will back off and leave well alone. It doesn’t have to happen, it shouldn’t happen, and Hong Kong should carry on as a free society, under the rule of law, without having to worry about this extradition.

前港督彭定康錄影講話翻譯

我知道這星期在香港，成千上萬的人將會到街上遊行表達自己的意見，反對政府所提出將會容許引渡到中國的引渡修例建議。這是一項，或者應該說是一系列我及國際社會認為將會對香港的法治、香港的穩定和社會安全造成很大打擊的建議，它將會嚴重傷害香港作為一個國際貿易中心的地位。令人驚訝的是，香港政府似乎並不理解這一點。這確實令人懷疑這些日子究竟是誰在管治香港：是香港政府還是代表北京共產黨政權的中聯辦？

為甚麼這修例是這麼重要？這是近年來發生的一系列容許北京強行控制香港的事件之一，而這一直以來都讓人深感憂慮。我覺得在1997年之後的十年至十幾年，香港的情況進展尚算順利。當然，是本來可以更好，我很遺憾北京扼殺了香港民主的發展，違背了之前所作出的承諾。但總的來說，香港在那個時候仍然是一個非常自由和成功的社會。

但是，自北京政權開始推翻鄧小平的改革以及在江澤民、朱熔基、胡錦濤和溫家寶時期所推行的發展以後，共產黨控制着一切，打擊持不同政見的人，打擊人權，在新疆把人民關押等等。從那時起，我們就知道北京一直在試圖加緊控制香港。我認為最新的引渡建議就是一個例子。

現在香港政府提出了許多非常虛假的論點，它說目前的情況是展現了一個需要填補的「洞」，這絕對是胡說八道。大家多年來都確切地清楚知道不應該與中國達成引渡協議的原因。而政府提出的許多論點實際上也沒有一個不令你拍案大笑。政府認為制定引渡條約比從香港非法綁架人民更好，你認真覺得人們應該相信這個說法嗎？

當然他們又會說歐洲的西方民主國家與中國已經簽訂了引渡協議，但它們與香港根本處於完全不同的地位。國際商會、律師、商人及各國政府之所以提出反對意見的原因非常簡單：因為這些修例將會摧毀香港法治與中國共產黨的法治概念之間的防火牆。中國的法律觀念不包括任何獨立的法院，並把法院、國安部門以及黨的規則 （黨規則亦有時相當模糊）完全混在一起。這就是為甚麼我們最近看到被關起來的加拿大公民被用為人質，反對加拿大本身在她自己國家的法治下所發生的事情。因此，人們如此擔心這修例所帶來的影響並不奇怪。

我知道當人們都正在談到與台灣有關的問題之際，過去幾年的香港大律師公會領導人，應該是有十幾位，都已經提出意見，說明你如何就着香港現行的普通法來處理這個問題。

這些修例對香港不利，我認為這些修例所引發的疑問是甚至政府都沒有仔細考慮過的，尤其是對香港經濟重要性和經濟穩定性的影響。我們非常清楚在經濟和商業方面是需要把香港與中國其他地區分開對待。很久以前，當我還是港督的時候，我經常前往華盛頓游說對方看待香港的時候要跟對待深圳和上海之類的中國城市有所不同。但是如果以北京的角度看香港，將香港當為另一個普通中國城市，那麼世界各地的政府及企業將會視香港為中國的一部分（而不是特區），就算是看待「一帶一路」之類倡議時亦會是如此。這對香港的生活水平和生活質素都是非常不利的！

當然，最重要的是如果香港政府繼續硬推這些引渡修例，這將會在香港引起不必要的憂慮和焦慮。這些都是非常糟糕的事情。我希望即使在這個最後階段，政府仍然可以退讓，撤回方案，不要再添亂。這修例不需要通過，亦不應該通過，香港應該繼續是一個有法治、有自由的社會，而不應該面對這些令人憂心的引渡修例。