💕「愛台灣，我的選擇」系列第16發：熱愛台灣詩的美國學者白瑞梅(Amie Parry)

「我在加州內陸地區一個叫做聖伯納迪諾的小城市長大，隨後在聖地牙哥念大學和研究所，並獲得文學博士學位。求學期間我們必須至少選修一門外語，所以我就選了中文。1987年我大學畢業之後，跟朋友來了台灣一趟，在台灣教英文和學中文六個月，接著就自己一個人當起背包客在亞洲四處旅遊。

我本來想要研究中國古典詩詞，後來因為獲得傅爾布萊特獎學金，便又再度回到台灣。當時我在討論詩詞的聚會上認識了幾位現代派詩人，所以我就將研究主題轉而聚焦在台灣60、70和80年代的現代詩。我的博士論文探討的就是，以現代主義來理解現有政治語言中難以理解的現代性。我認為歷史形塑而來的經驗，往往比語言本身還要複雜。

我研究的那些詩作沒有明確的政治性，反而是有很強的實驗性質，並帶著詭譎的神秘感。當時我認識的現代派詩人大多是跟著國民黨飄洋過海來台的外省人，他們經歷過戰爭和顛沛流離，也經歷過劇烈且痛苦的歷史創傷。每個人的經驗都不同，在那個年代，也很難說出口。後來，我寫了一本關於詩的書，並聚焦在一兩位我覺得特別有趣的詩人。我在書中問了一些類似的問題：這些詩作如何幫你思考艱難的議題？

當時的現代詩已經頗有制度，許多詩人都有投稿《現代詩》這份重要的詩刊，有些詩人則是將詩作與戲劇結合。整體而言，台灣的現代詩、表演藝術和文學都發展地如火如荼，也深深吸引了我，但我還未全盤了解。當我完成博士論文時，我便獲得交通大學的教職，讓我對台灣的學術圈感到非常驚艷。而當我出版第一本著作時，我也很訝異能在美國獲獎；我根本不知道自己獲得提名，當時我問授獎單位：「為什麼選擇我的書？」他們表示：「因為書中其中一個章節是以跨國的架構來進行整體論述，妳不是單用西方的理論和東方的詩詞，而是從東西方共同錘煉出嶄新的知識。」

我目前任教於中央大學英美語文學系，除了擔任系主任之外，我也有教授寫作課、文學課和文學文化理論課程。從我1987年第一次來台灣到現在，我覺得台灣人愈來愈能自在地與來自不同地方的人交談，就個人經驗來說，我認為台灣社會愈來愈開放。我第一次來台灣時，經歷了許多台灣社會有趣的發展，也結交了許多朋友，並認識了許多學術圈的同好。我想，這些珍貴的回憶就是呼喚我再度回台的動力；就像是，如果你覺得這個社會充滿生氣和活力，而你也能夠參與其中、做出貢獻，我想這就是像家一樣的感覺吧！」

✨白瑞梅 Amie Parry 現為中央大學英美語文學系 專任教授

💕Why I chose Taiwan #16 – Amie Parry

“I grew up in a small city in inland California called San Bernardino. I went to college and graduate school in San Diego. I got my PhD in literature. We were all expected to learn at least one language, so I did Chinese. I traveled to Taiwan with a friend right after I graduated from college in 1987. We came here to teach English and study Chinese for six months, then I traveled around Asia by myself with a backpack.

I originally wanted to study classical Chinese poetry. I got a Fulbright grant and I came back here. I started going to the poetry nights that were happening at that time. I met some of the modernist poets, and I switched my focus to the modernist poetry of the 60s, 70s, and 80s in Taiwan. I wrote my dissertation on modernism as a way of understanding the parts of modernity that are hard to know in the existing political language that we inherit. I think that experience in historical formation is always more complicated than the language.

These poems are not explicitly political; they're very experimental and strange. At the time, the modernist poets I met were mostly 外省, men who had been drafted and come over with the KMT, so they had experienced war and displacement, and a very intense and traumatic historical moment. People experienced it differently, and at that time, it was a hard thing to talk about. Later, I wrote a book about poetry, but I just focused on one or two poets I find really, really fascinating. And I was asking some of the same kinds of questions: how can these poems help you think about certain topics that are hard to think about?

At that time, Modernist poetry was a kind of an institution already. There was a journal called 現代詩, “Modern Poetry,” a really important journal that most of these poets were published in. Some of them combined poetry and theater. There's just so much going on in Taiwan in terms of poetry and performance and literature. It's just amazing. And I'm very interested in it at all, but I haven't kept up. After I finished my dissertation, I got a job offer at 交大. I thought, wow, there's something really amazing happening intellectually here. When my first book came out, it actually got an award in the U.S., and I was so surprised. I didn't even know it had been nominated. I asked them, ‘Why did you choose my book?’ And they said, because one of the chapters has a transnational of framework for the whole argument, so it wasn't like you used Western theories and Eastern texts, it's like the whole knowledge part is coming out of both places.

I currently teach in the English department at National Central University. I'm the chair and I teach writing classes, literature classes, and literary and cultural theory classes. Since my first visit to Taiwan in 1987, I think people are a little more comfortable talking to people from different places. In my personal interactions, I feel a difference, like a greater openness. Back then, there were so many interesting things happening here, all at one time, and that's the time that I happened to be here. And I made good friends in my personal life and in my intellectual life. And I think those are the things that made me come back: like if you feel that there's something interesting happening and there's some way that you can support it. I guess that's a way of feeling at home.” — Amie Parry

✨Amie Parry is professor of the Department of English at the National Central University

【After Winning Majority in LegCo: Beijing's Crackdown May Trigger International Intervention】

***感謝Hong Kong Columns - Translated，將我早前撰寫『議會過半想像：以「#國際攬炒」反制「臨立會2.0」』長文（https://www.facebook.com/joshuawongchifung/photos/a.313299448762570/2887650867994069/）翻譯成英文，鼓勵國際社會關注立會選舉一旦過半的沙盤推演，在最惡劣形勢下的制衡策略。***

中文精簡版本：https://www.facebook.com/joshuawongchifung/photos/a.564294826996363/2888641404561682/

Hongkongers have experienced our revolution for over half a year. They no longer take a consequentialist view to the effectiveness of their movement as they did years ago, or waste time second-guessing the intentions and background of fellow activists. Following the defensive battles at CUHK and PolyU, November’s District Council election saw a great victory of unity. More marvellous is the union between peaceful and “valiant” protesters.

In the process of resisting tyranny, the people have realised that one cannot prioritize one strategy over another. This is also how the common goal of “35+” came into being—the hope that we will win over half of the seats in the Legislative Council (LegCo) this September, such that the political spectrum that represents the majority of Hongkongers is able to gain control of legislative decisions. The political clout of Hongkongers will increase if 35 or more seats are successfully secured on our side. It is certainly one vital step to achieve the five demands within the system.

The possibility of realizing legislative majority

Technically it is not unrealistic to win a majority even under the current undemocratic system. Back in the 2016 LegCo election, we already won 30 seats. In addition to the District Council (First) functional constituency seat that is already in the pocket of the pan-democrats, as long as the candidates in Kowloon East and New Territories West do not start infighting again, we could safely secure 33 seats based on the number of pan-dem votes in 2016.

The other 3 seats required to achieve a majority depend on democrats’ breakthrough among the functional constituencies by dispersing the resources of the Liaison Office. They also count on whether the turnout this September could exceed 71.2% — that of last year’s District Council elections. Some of the factors that could affect the turnout include: will the epidemic persist into the summer? Will there be potential violent repression of protests in the 2 weeks preceding the election? Will Hong Kong-US relations be affected by the downturn of the global economy?

Therefore, the ambition of “35+” is to be prioritised by the resistance as both a means and an end. I have already expressed my support for an intra-party primary at the coordination meeting. In the meantime, it is pleasing to see the ongoing debates reaching a consensus of maximising the seats among geographical constituencies in the upcoming election.

Whilst enthusiastic coordination, we should also assess the post-election landscape and gauge Beijing’s reactions: if we do not reach 35 seats, Hong Kong will be subject to tighter control and more severe repression by China; but if the democratic parties successfully form a majority in LegCo, CCP’s fears of a “constitutional crisis” would become imminent. Hence, the key questions are how the Pan-Democrats should deal with the volatile political situation in Hong Kong and how they are going to meet Beijing’s charge head-on.

Watching out for Beijing’s dismissal of LegCo after reaching majority

To take back control of LegCo such that it faithfully reflects the majority’s principles and needs is the definition of a healthy democracy. Recently, however, DAB’s Tam Yiu-chung has warned that the plan of the Pan-Dems to “usurp power” in the LegCo would only lead to Beijing’s forceful disqualification of certain members or the interpretation of the Basic Law. This proves that winning a majority in LegCo is not only a popular conception but also a realistic challenge that would get on the nerves of Beijing. Could Beijing accept a President James To in LegCo? These unknown variables must be addressed upon achieving a majority.

While there is no telltale sign as to Beijing’s exact strategy, we are already familiar with the way CCP manipulated the Basic Law in the past 4 years. Having experienced three waves of disqualifications in LegCo, twice kicked out of LegCo with my team, and thrice locked up in jail, I have no false hopes of an easy compromise from Beijing: they would not let Pan-Dems control LegCo for half a year and wait (as is the proper procedure) until after having negatived the Budget to dissolve the legislature, and thereby giving them an easy victory in the re-elections. The greater the Pan-Dems threaten Beijing’s rule in Hong Kong, the more likely that it will trigger Beijing’s repression.

Since the disqualification and arrest of lawmakers have already become “normalised”, one can even imagine the police stepping into the LegCo building to force Pan-Dems into voting. Neither is it beyond our imagination to expect the CCP to kick out all 70 lawmakers in a fit of rage and replace them with a provisional LegCo “2.0” [HKCT note: The first was from 25 Jan 1997 to 30 Jun 1998]. To depend on a majority that could lead to a chapter of a “new testament” for One Country, Two Systems is perhaps what many elites long for, but they are overly optimistic:for a ticket to the promised land will not be available at the Chief Executive election campaign a year and a half later.

Admittedly, the Pan-Dems cannot unilaterally initiate “Laam-chaau” [HKCT note: mostly translated into “scorched-earth” mentality or “mutual destruction”; some even translated into “If I burn, you burn with us”]. The most they can do is to force a standstill of the government, and not for long the LegCo will have been eliminated from the equation to make the wheels turn again. It all leaves the plan of “Negativing the motion → Dissolving LegCo → Re-election after re-election → the stepping down of Carrie Lam” merely as overly positive speculation, probably resulting from their overestimate of CCP's capacity for rational calculation. The Pan-Dems must guard their frontlines and recognise what the biggest threat from Hong Kong to China could be. In this case, should LegCo sessions be disrupted or suspended, the Pan-Dems would have to be well prepared to surmount the expected obstacles and prevent the disqualification crisis 4 years ago—a Catch-22 indeed.

Productive tension from global intervention: Using Laam-chaau against the CCP

What aggravates the CCP the most is the potential threat to Hong Kong’s unique status as the one and only “separate customs territory”. Any miscalculation will compromise its role as the Chinese economy’s “white gloves”. Imagine if CCP were to disqualify all 70 elected lawmakers and convene a meeting north of the Shenzhen River to pass a resolution to Hong Kong’s affairs (much like the Provisional Legislative Council “1.0" in 1997), how great will the shock be in a world with an effective Hong Kong Human Rights and Democracy Act? However hard it is to predict the future one thing is certain: With the US presidential election just around the corner, blows to the separation of powers would not be tolerated, and the West would necessarily effect countermeasures against the Hong Kong government.

Beijing has been relying upon Hong Kong to navigate the international community for decades. While clamping down on the political freedom of the cosmopolitan city, Beijing desires to maintain the financial centre’s economic freedom. Hence, we started lobbying for the Hong Kong Human Rights and Democracy Act four years ago, and today we are determined to promote “Laam-chaau” on an international scale.

The will of the voters must be reflected in an election. If a “35+” legislature were to be dismissed and replaced, such flagrant violation of democracy would assuredly cause a greater backlash than the infamous extradition bill. Knowing what the reality ahead of us could be, we have to combine our election and international strategies to oppose the placement of a 35+ LegCo with an “Emergency Legislative Council 2.0”, to advance an international “Laam-chaau” to Hong Kong’s status as “separate customs territory”. Only then will we stand a chance to resist the regime and to realise the five demands.

Adjusting our mindset: Overcoming the “constitutional crisis” to reach a resolution

Upon the realization of the “35+” LegCo, it is expected that the CCP will launch a devastating counterattack. The Pan-Dems should not expect LegCo to run normally; neither can the lawmakers realise their governing blueprints they have for Hong Kong. Rather, candidates will be able to compete against one another with visions of a liberated Hong Kong through popular vote. Bringing this point up has nothing to do with undermining the common goal of reaching a majority in LegCo, but rather channels the battle of LegCo to positive use upon the rule of law’s death and a “constitutional crisis” ahead. Knowing that Hongkongers have nothing to fall back on, all Pan-Dems should not miss the only way to the realization of “35+”.

Thus, be they partisans, nonpartisans, incumbent politicians, amateur politicians, or the civil society as a whole – if we stay in the political discourse of 2016 and continue to perpetuate old stereotypes, that is to deal with the divisions on the pan-democratic camp by favouring the most “local” faction; to consider only resource allocation and self-aggrandizement as the purpose of a LegCo campaign; to ignore how potential lawmakers are fitted to what specific roles; to turn a blind eye to the journey of resistance since last summer (extending indefinitely into the future)—They would lead as astray and cost us lose a precious opportunity for change by winning a 35+ majority.

The extent to which the pan-democrats can stay united in light of the political atmosphere since last summer is another problem that our side must to address. Before the watershed moment of 12th June 2019, many democratic delegates were trapped in the mentality of needing to “preserve people’s livelihood”, “be content of what we have accomplished”, and other strategies that favours stability. As the government refuses to heed to the five demands, whether the democrats, especially those in the functional constituencies, have the political will to go all-in is the real difficult question that confronts us in the upcoming LegCo election.

All in all, if “35+” cannot be realised, it is unsurprising to see LegCo being more heavily suppressed in the next 4 years; even if "35+" is achieved, it is questionable whether the pan-democrats are able to weather multiple attacks, verbal or physical, from the regime (judging from its power in the last four years) and utilise the international Laam-chaau strategy against the displacement of LegCo. Adhering to the motto of “we fight on, each in his own way”, I can only hope that Hongkongers in elections, street confrontations and international front can reconcile with each other, so that we may collectively compel the government to yield to our demands in the next six months. It is only by reaching a resolution before a real constitutional crisis that we can combat the institutional violence of the regime and not be devoured by it.

https://hkcolumn.blogspot.com/2020/04/joshua-wong-after-winning-majority-in.html?fbclid=IwAR216gf53pG_j9JOpDfr2GItvjLfrFSekKTPzoEs3-s9KBqvPEwz865P8vw

[有中文字幕 English subtitle available]
一樣的賽道，一樣的車架，一樣的c.c.數。以一個普通騎士來說，街車版和跑車版到底有沒有差？這次拿Triumph Street Triple R對比Daytona 675R直接比較。(兩台車配備當然也有些不同，測試僅供參考）
Same track, same frame, same displacement. For an average rider like myself, how different are these two siblings, Street Triple R and Daytona 675R? Both bikes are obviously ridden under difference condition, but I still find the difference interesting.

對單圈差別有興趣的可以看原檔：https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RK1Tq5F8ih0

MotoVlog 192 摩托日記第一百九十二篇

Outro Music: Trixtor - Just This Once
Other Music: Thorr - Overlord

#Triple #Daytona #675R #StreetTriple #Sonoma #TrackDay

[打開下方看有獎徵答規則和範例 Open description box to see sticker prize rules] 雖然每次都是選喜歡的車試，但實際試騎後才知道是不是真的適合自己，藉由找新山路來聊聊過去試車後的心得。當然，影片重點就是有獎徵答，我買到心儀的車子了。😀

有獎徵答規則：
- 在YouTube或Instagram下方留言猜我買的車子
- 前六名猜中車款名稱就可以拿到我試印的貼紙，總共十二張
- 數量不多，中獎者不得重複，兩邊都猜對也只能拿一張
- 中獎會由YouTube或Instagram私訊通知
- 貼紙全部從美國以國際郵件寄出
註：中獎只看車款名稱，不分cc數和特仕版，例如你猜Hypermotard 1100S，可是我買的是Hypermotard 939 SP，那也算對。不過如果是XSR900，猜XSR700就算錯，因為是不同車款。當然Z900和Z900RS也是不同車款。

Although I always pick the bike I like to test ride on, I don't always connect with the bike after riding it. In this video, let's talk about the bike I rode and find new canyon roads. By the way, there's a prize draw. Guess what bike I bought!

Contest rules:
- Guess the name of the bike in this YouTube video or Instagram's comment section
- First 6 people that guessed right will get the sticker. Total 12 stickers
- Please note that you can only win once even if you guessed right on both YouTube and Instagram.
- Winner will be notified via private messages from YouTube and Instagram
- All stickers will be mailed internationally from USA
Note: Guess the bike model. No need to be specific on displacement or trim level. For example, if you guess Hypermotard 1100S, and I bought a Hypermotard 939 SP, I will count it as correct answer. Keep in mind that XSR900 and XSR700 are two differents bikes, just like how Z900RS is different from Z900.

Bike: Kawasaki Z125 Pro

MotoVlog 99 摩托日記第九十九篇

Outro Music: Trixtor - Just This Once 追蹤 13N Instagram:

希望這股檔車熱潮可以一波接一著一波。檔車魂不能滅！Keep the new motorcycle wave coming!

Bike: Kawasaki Ninja 300 川崎忍300
Vlog 81 摩托日記第八十一篇

Outro Music: Trixtor - Just This Once 追蹤 13N Instagram: