[爆卦]definition翻譯是什麼?優點缺點精華區懶人包

雖然這篇definition翻譯鄉民發文沒有被收入到精華區:在definition翻譯這個話題中,我們另外找到其它相關的精選爆讚文章

在 definition翻譯產品中有42篇Facebook貼文,粉絲數超過0的網紅,也在其Facebook貼文中提到, 【力量訓練應從簡單的動作開始,但何種動作才算簡單?】 《The System》中提出了一個力量課表設計的重要原則:動作進階的路徑要由簡入繁。無論你是何種運動的教練,你可以先根據選手的位置、體型或其他變數來分組安排課表,但不管程度如何,剛開始訓練時你的課表和動作都應該「夠簡單」,等運動員訓練一段時間...

 同時也有1部Youtube影片,追蹤數超過3,890的網紅鋼琴輕鬆談-手指建立&音色表達Aweken your inner pianist,也在其Youtube影片中提到,為紀念巴哈生日,我們放上中英文解說,並在影片加上字幕了,讀了文字後,讓我們欣賞這段相當 #入心的 #非常具個人風格的巴哈 To commemorate J.S.Bach — 1 Let’s start from a slow and introspection works from Bach. ...

definition翻譯 在 CORIN 不羈優雅 Instagram 的最讚貼文

2021-01-12 04:04:24

那天和小我一個decade的少女聊天。他的家境相較一般家庭已是不錯,但跟曾經的我們一樣,不斷在向上看時,也忘記同時珍惜已有的。我覺得這是正常的,也因此是需要時時提醒自己的。 我們無法控制自己的出生環境,但你依舊可以滴水穿石的試著去改變自己,改變現況。 但如果過了30還要將人生受難全推給家庭時,也...

  • definition翻譯 在 Facebook 的最讚貼文

    2021-07-22 06:00:45
    有 82 人按讚

    【力量訓練應從簡單的動作開始,但何種動作才算簡單?】

    《The System》中提出了一個力量課表設計的重要原則:動作進階的路徑要由簡入繁。無論你是何種運動的教練,你可以先根據選手的位置、體型或其他變數來分組安排課表,但不管程度如何,剛開始訓練時你的課表和動作都應該「夠簡單」,等運動員訓練一段時間後對課表內容和動作都適應之後,才開始增加課表的難度和動作的複雜度。但什麼樣的動作叫「簡單」?什麼動作被歸為「複雜」?作者有明確的定義,分享如下:

    #以下為譯文
    ●「簡單」動作的定義是指:一個穩定、左右對稱且負重平均的動作。
    ●「複雜」動作的定義則為:一個多關節參與、多種基本動作組成、單邊(單手或單腳)或爆發力動作。

    因此臥推是一個相對簡單的動作,而分腿挺舉則偏向複雜的動作。
    動作愈複雜,對中樞神經系統的需求也愈高。

    當運動員已經能漂亮地完成簡單的動作時,就能開始換成較進階與複雜的動作。進階的方式可以是加大動作幅度、改成單手負重、減少支撐點或是跟其他的基本動作結合。也就是說,換動作時不一定是換另一個完全不一樣的動作,可以從已經熟悉的動作來調整。(作者建議每四週換一次動作)

    從下面圖表 4.12 中你可以看到「上膊」和「推舉」這兩個動作的進階路徑,由左到右分正是從最簡單的動作開始,逐漸增加動作的複雜度(附圖)。

    #原文如下
    Our definition of “simple” is a movement that is stabilized, symmetrical, or performed with an even load.
    “Complex” means multi-joint, multi-movement, unilateral, or explosive movements.

    The bench press is a relatively simple movement, while the split jerk and snatch are complex. The more complex or compound the movement, the more demand on the nervous system.

    Once a simple movement can be per- formed well, you can advance your athletes to a more complex movement. You can achieve that simply by taking a simple exercise and performing it through a larger range of motion, unilaterally, removing support, or combining it with another movement. The change does not need to be a completely different movement.

    In the continuum shown in Figure 4.12, you can see a natural progression of cleans and presses from the simplest form to more complex variations.
    --
    以上摘錄自原文書第125頁,若有發現翻譯不到位或有問題的地方,非常歡迎也希望各界指正!

  • definition翻譯 在 Alexander Wang 王梓沅英文 Facebook 的精選貼文

    2020-05-05 10:37:32
    有 235 人按讚

    【悶騷的英文,講不出來怎麼辦?】

    曾經跟兩三個中文極好的美國人,在餐桌上討論台語的ㄍㄧㄣ (形容人)要怎麼用英文適切表答 (not just uptight),彼此更改定義、討論了15分鐘。上週口說課也假藉機會,請大家討論「悶騷」要怎麼說:重點是在練習 elaborate and paraphrase 的能力。

    很多時後語言間不見得會有一對一對應的翻譯(例:他真的很現實誒!這個現實英文也不好表答...not realistic...not practical...not snobbish)。下了「每個概念在別的語言都會有相對應的字」就是低估了文化對語言的影響性。

    也問一波大家一個中文:cross your arms 的中文大家會怎麼道地、生活地傳答呢?😃(我覺得「交叉雙臂」太 formal 不是好的對應。但如果在生活中,我可能 (1) 只會就做給對方看,補上:”你這樣用” (2) 你雙手交叉一下。

    講那麼多,我不是要探究翻譯(翻譯專家太多,我留給他們分析)。我想強調的是,在online production / spontaneous speech 即時的口說中第一時間找不到最適切的表答,是非常正常的 (連母語人士都是如此,想想我們的中文吧)。

    也有些時候,甚至是母語人士,都對該詞沒有一個一致的定義 (a unified definition).

    遇到這樣的狀況時,知道如何 paraphrase, elaborate 也是口語能力的一環 (strategic competence)。

  • definition翻譯 在 黃之鋒 Joshua Wong Facebook 的最讚貼文

    2020-04-08 18:22:53
    有 400 人按讚

    【After Winning Majority in LegCo: Beijing's Crackdown May Trigger International Intervention】

    ***感謝Hong Kong Columns - Translated,將我早前撰寫『議會過半想像:以「#國際攬炒」反制「臨立會2.0」』長文(https://www.facebook.com/joshuawongchifung/photos/a.313299448762570/2887650867994069/)翻譯成英文,鼓勵國際社會關注立會選舉一旦過半的沙盤推演,在最惡劣形勢下的制衡策略。***

    中文精簡版本:https://www.facebook.com/joshuawongchifung/photos/a.564294826996363/2888641404561682/

    Hongkongers have experienced our revolution for over half a year. They no longer take a consequentialist view to the effectiveness of their movement as they did years ago, or waste time second-guessing the intentions and background of fellow activists. Following the defensive battles at CUHK and PolyU, November’s District Council election saw a great victory of unity. More marvellous is the union between peaceful and “valiant” protesters.

    In the process of resisting tyranny, the people have realised that one cannot prioritize one strategy over another. This is also how the common goal of “35+” came into being—the hope that we will win over half of the seats in the Legislative Council (LegCo) this September, such that the political spectrum that represents the majority of Hongkongers is able to gain control of legislative decisions. The political clout of Hongkongers will increase if 35 or more seats are successfully secured on our side. It is certainly one vital step to achieve the five demands within the system.

    The possibility of realizing legislative majority

    Technically it is not unrealistic to win a majority even under the current undemocratic system. Back in the 2016 LegCo election, we already won 30 seats. In addition to the District Council (First) functional constituency seat that is already in the pocket of the pan-democrats, as long as the candidates in Kowloon East and New Territories West do not start infighting again, we could safely secure 33 seats based on the number of pan-dem votes in 2016.

    The other 3 seats required to achieve a majority depend on democrats’ breakthrough among the functional constituencies by dispersing the resources of the Liaison Office. They also count on whether the turnout this September could exceed 71.2% — that of last year’s District Council elections. Some of the factors that could affect the turnout include: will the epidemic persist into the summer? Will there be potential violent repression of protests in the 2 weeks preceding the election? Will Hong Kong-US relations be affected by the downturn of the global economy?

    Therefore, the ambition of “35+” is to be prioritised by the resistance as both a means and an end. I have already expressed my support for an intra-party primary at the coordination meeting. In the meantime, it is pleasing to see the ongoing debates reaching a consensus of maximising the seats among geographical constituencies in the upcoming election.

    Whilst enthusiastic coordination, we should also assess the post-election landscape and gauge Beijing’s reactions: if we do not reach 35 seats, Hong Kong will be subject to tighter control and more severe repression by China; but if the democratic parties successfully form a majority in LegCo, CCP’s fears of a “constitutional crisis” would become imminent. Hence, the key questions are how the Pan-Democrats should deal with the volatile political situation in Hong Kong and how they are going to meet Beijing’s charge head-on.

    Watching out for Beijing’s dismissal of LegCo after reaching majority

    To take back control of LegCo such that it faithfully reflects the majority’s principles and needs is the definition of a healthy democracy. Recently, however, DAB’s Tam Yiu-chung has warned that the plan of the Pan-Dems to “usurp power” in the LegCo would only lead to Beijing’s forceful disqualification of certain members or the interpretation of the Basic Law. This proves that winning a majority in LegCo is not only a popular conception but also a realistic challenge that would get on the nerves of Beijing. Could Beijing accept a President James To in LegCo? These unknown variables must be addressed upon achieving a majority.

    While there is no telltale sign as to Beijing’s exact strategy, we are already familiar with the way CCP manipulated the Basic Law in the past 4 years. Having experienced three waves of disqualifications in LegCo, twice kicked out of LegCo with my team, and thrice locked up in jail, I have no false hopes of an easy compromise from Beijing: they would not let Pan-Dems control LegCo for half a year and wait (as is the proper procedure) until after having negatived the Budget to dissolve the legislature, and thereby giving them an easy victory in the re-elections. The greater the Pan-Dems threaten Beijing’s rule in Hong Kong, the more likely that it will trigger Beijing’s repression.

    Since the disqualification and arrest of lawmakers have already become “normalised”, one can even imagine the police stepping into the LegCo building to force Pan-Dems into voting. Neither is it beyond our imagination to expect the CCP to kick out all 70 lawmakers in a fit of rage and replace them with a provisional LegCo “2.0” [HKCT note: The first was from 25 Jan 1997 to 30 Jun 1998]. To depend on a majority that could lead to a chapter of a “new testament” for One Country, Two Systems is perhaps what many elites long for, but they are overly optimistic:for a ticket to the promised land will not be available at the Chief Executive election campaign a year and a half later.

    Admittedly, the Pan-Dems cannot unilaterally initiate “Laam-chaau” [HKCT note: mostly translated into “scorched-earth” mentality or “mutual destruction”; some even translated into “If I burn, you burn with us”]. The most they can do is to force a standstill of the government, and not for long the LegCo will have been eliminated from the equation to make the wheels turn again. It all leaves the plan of “Negativing the motion → Dissolving LegCo → Re-election after re-election → the stepping down of Carrie Lam” merely as overly positive speculation, probably resulting from their overestimate of CCP's capacity for rational calculation. The Pan-Dems must guard their frontlines and recognise what the biggest threat from Hong Kong to China could be. In this case, should LegCo sessions be disrupted or suspended, the Pan-Dems would have to be well prepared to surmount the expected obstacles and prevent the disqualification crisis 4 years ago—a Catch-22 indeed.

    Productive tension from global intervention: Using Laam-chaau against the CCP

    What aggravates the CCP the most is the potential threat to Hong Kong’s unique status as the one and only “separate customs territory”. Any miscalculation will compromise its role as the Chinese economy’s “white gloves”. Imagine if CCP were to disqualify all 70 elected lawmakers and convene a meeting north of the Shenzhen River to pass a resolution to Hong Kong’s affairs (much like the Provisional Legislative Council “1.0" in 1997), how great will the shock be in a world with an effective Hong Kong Human Rights and Democracy Act? However hard it is to predict the future one thing is certain: With the US presidential election just around the corner, blows to the separation of powers would not be tolerated, and the West would necessarily effect countermeasures against the Hong Kong government.

    Beijing has been relying upon Hong Kong to navigate the international community for decades. While clamping down on the political freedom of the cosmopolitan city, Beijing desires to maintain the financial centre’s economic freedom. Hence, we started lobbying for the Hong Kong Human Rights and Democracy Act four years ago, and today we are determined to promote “Laam-chaau” on an international scale.

    The will of the voters must be reflected in an election. If a “35+” legislature were to be dismissed and replaced, such flagrant violation of democracy would assuredly cause a greater backlash than the infamous extradition bill. Knowing what the reality ahead of us could be, we have to combine our election and international strategies to oppose the placement of a 35+ LegCo with an “Emergency Legislative Council 2.0”, to advance an international “Laam-chaau” to Hong Kong’s status as “separate customs territory”. Only then will we stand a chance to resist the regime and to realise the five demands.

    Adjusting our mindset: Overcoming the “constitutional crisis” to reach a resolution

    Upon the realization of the “35+” LegCo, it is expected that the CCP will launch a devastating counterattack. The Pan-Dems should not expect LegCo to run normally; neither can the lawmakers realise their governing blueprints they have for Hong Kong. Rather, candidates will be able to compete against one another with visions of a liberated Hong Kong through popular vote. Bringing this point up has nothing to do with undermining the common goal of reaching a majority in LegCo, but rather channels the battle of LegCo to positive use upon the rule of law’s death and a “constitutional crisis” ahead. Knowing that Hongkongers have nothing to fall back on, all Pan-Dems should not miss the only way to the realization of “35+”.

    Thus, be they partisans, nonpartisans, incumbent politicians, amateur politicians, or the civil society as a whole – if we stay in the political discourse of 2016 and continue to perpetuate old stereotypes, that is to deal with the divisions on the pan-democratic camp by favouring the most “local” faction; to consider only resource allocation and self-aggrandizement as the purpose of a LegCo campaign; to ignore how potential lawmakers are fitted to what specific roles; to turn a blind eye to the journey of resistance since last summer (extending indefinitely into the future)—They would lead as astray and cost us lose a precious opportunity for change by winning a 35+ majority.

    The extent to which the pan-democrats can stay united in light of the political atmosphere since last summer is another problem that our side must to address. Before the watershed moment of 12th June 2019, many democratic delegates were trapped in the mentality of needing to “preserve people’s livelihood”, “be content of what we have accomplished”, and other strategies that favours stability. As the government refuses to heed to the five demands, whether the democrats, especially those in the functional constituencies, have the political will to go all-in is the real difficult question that confronts us in the upcoming LegCo election.

    All in all, if “35+” cannot be realised, it is unsurprising to see LegCo being more heavily suppressed in the next 4 years; even if "35+" is achieved, it is questionable whether the pan-democrats are able to weather multiple attacks, verbal or physical, from the regime (judging from its power in the last four years) and utilise the international Laam-chaau strategy against the displacement of LegCo. Adhering to the motto of “we fight on, each in his own way”, I can only hope that Hongkongers in elections, street confrontations and international front can reconcile with each other, so that we may collectively compel the government to yield to our demands in the next six months. It is only by reaching a resolution before a real constitutional crisis that we can combat the institutional violence of the regime and not be devoured by it.

    https://hkcolumn.blogspot.com/2020/04/joshua-wong-after-winning-majority-in.html?fbclid=IwAR216gf53pG_j9JOpDfr2GItvjLfrFSekKTPzoEs3-s9KBqvPEwz865P8vw

  • definition翻譯 在 鋼琴輕鬆談-手指建立&音色表達Aweken your inner pianist Youtube 的最讚貼文

    2018-02-23 20:51:26

    為紀念巴哈生日,我們放上中英文解說,並在影片加上字幕了,讀了文字後,讓我們欣賞這段相當 #入心的 #非常具個人風格的巴哈

    To commemorate J.S.Bach — 1

    Let’s start from a slow and
    introspection works from Bach.
    It is different from the conservative definition to French Suite. Presented this work from an independent music, gave this century music full of modern and personal spirit.

    It is moderate, internal, in the midnight. Sit down with ease, throw the traditional impression away. The work finally had the different interpretation because the player’s personality. It's very fit for the midnight time that you enjoy by yourself.

    This interpretation is like from three centuries ago, from Bach till now. It is the prayer from human beings! “ Who am I? Am I alone? Look up to the sky, God, How can I feel your mercy ? ”

    The whispers from inner heart, sometimes turn out to a smoke and floating up to the sky, pray for God’s compassion.

    英文翻譯--林庭瑀

    就從這首很慢、很心內的巴哈開始吧!

    不依循傳統對於法國組曲的定義,以獨立樂曲之姿呈現,賦予百年音樂一個現代且具個人風格的新精神。

    很慢、很內心、很深的夜。聽前先坐舒服,拋開既定印象,因爲演奏者的個性,賦予此曲另一種風貌,非常適合夜深人靜孤單的那一刻。

    這個詮釋就像是三百多年來,從巴哈到現代,人們心中的禱詞。

    「我是誰?我是孤寂嗎?靜夜中仰望著天:上帝!如何才能感受你慈悲的慰藉?」

    這些心中的默語,有時化為一縷輕煙飄向天,祈求悲憫的溫柔。

    影片選自2015 RUBATO聯合音樂會

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